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Abstract 
This thesis aims to examine the extent to which the UK’s SMEs face credit rationing 
and to examine the impact of monetary policy on the availability of bank credit to the 
UK’s SMEs, and the substitution relationship between bank credit and trade credit. 
The estimation is based on a large dataset between 1991 and 2010. Using 
disequilibrium model of credit rationing to estimate the impact of monetary policy is 
able to detangle the effect of demand from the supply and it overcome the 
identification problem in the previous studies of credit channel of monetary 
transmission. An index of monetary condition (MCI) that incorporated both interest 
rate and exchange rate in the estimation has been used as a measure of monetary 
condition in the UK.  
The results show that the demand for bank loans for small and medium sized firms 
increases when they have stronger needs of working capital and investment, lower 
level of internal cash flow and trade credit, and larger firm size. This is compared to 
micro sized firms in the sample which their demand for bank loans increase when they 
have more internal cash flow and trade credit, lower needs of working capital but 
stronger for investment, and firm size. The supply of bank loans for UK’s SMEs was 
determined by firm risk, size, collateral, trade credit, and if it belongs to the 
manufacturing industry. The result also confirms that lower proportion of medium 
firms were borrowing constraint than micro and small firms.  
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Based on the fixed effect panel data estimation method, the results show that small 
and medium sized firms that are borrowing constraint use more trade credit than 
unconstraint, and those borrowing unconstraint tend to extend more credit to other 
firms when they have access to bank credit. The results provide practical knowledge 
for policymakers regarding the financing of the UK’s SMEs, which plays a key role 
in the UK economy.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis in the mid of 2007 has spread to the real economy in 
countries around the world (Adair et al., 2009; King, 2011). The financial crisis has 
resulted in wealth destruction of US$50 trillion, which is equivalent to one year of the 
world GDP associated with a fall in the value of stocks, bonds, property, and other 
assets (Aisen and Franken, 2010). In the UK, the GDP has dropped by 5.5% between 
2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2 (Astley et al., 2009). The International Monetary Funds (IMF) 
reported that banks in advanced countries have suffered losses of over US$4 trillion 
between 2009 and 2010 (Aisen and Franken, 2010). The huge losses in the banking 
sector have caused banks lowering their capacity to lend and willingness to take on 
risk, thus tighten the credit policy and being more selective in their credit granting 
(Duchin et al., 2010). As a result, a credit crunch emerged – a reduction in the general 
availability of loans or a sudden tightening of the conditions required for borrowers to 
acquire loan from banks. 
The on-going credit crunch problem is crucial because bank credit plays an important 
role in amplifying and propagating initial shock of the financial crisis to the real 
economy, recently termed as ‘financial accelerator’. During the financial crisis, the 
fall in asset prices negatively affect the economy activity. The firms’ cash flow and 
net worth declined, in turn increasing their financial needs. However, the credit crunch 
problem reduces the ability of these firms in the access to bank credit to finance their 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                                                  2 
 
 
 
needs of working capital and investment. This credit restriction reinforces the initial 
real effect of the financial crisis. This situation where borrowers are unable to acquire 
the desired amount of bank loans, known as credit rationing, is the direct result of the 
credit crunch. 
Increasing difficulty in the access to bank credit is especially significant for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), which tend to be informational opaque due to a lack of 
credit history (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). For SMEs, bank credit has been 
suggested as a preferable source of external finance because banks specialise in 
collecting credit information and better identify the credit quality of the prospective 
borrowers. The UK’s SMEs are greatly depending on bank credit to fund working 
capital needs and investment (Hall, 2001; OECD, 2006).  
The recent financial distress in the banking industry and the adverse credit market 
condition as indicated above have been widely recognised as the causes of the intense 
depression in the worldwide economy. Both policy makers and researchers have 
attributed the slow economy recovery to substantial corporate debt liabilities and tight 
credit policies by the undercapitalised banking system (IMF, 2009; Allen et al., 2009). 
Therefore, it becomes important to understand the credit conditions in the corporate 
sector, especially SMEs that are crucial to the economy recovery. However, the 
analysis of credit rationing on corporate bank loans in the UK were less examined in 
the literature. Although there has been an increasing amount of literature that estimate 
the existence of credit rationing to identify the impact of the credit crunch, the majority 
of them emphasise on the US and other European countries. The analysis of credit 
rationing in the UK has not been updated since Atanasova and Wilson (2003). This 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                                                  3 
 
 
 
creates inspiration to the thesis to examine the extent of credit rationing in the access 
of the UK’s SMEs to bank credit.  
There are a few interesting questions arise from the credit crunch and the credit 
rationing in the financial crisis. For example, how do the borrowing constrained firms 
fund their working capital and investment needs when they face restriction in the 
access to bank credit. Although trade credit is a less desirable alternative to corporate 
borrowing, the borrowing constrained firms may use more interfirm credit offered by 
their suppliers in order to alleviate financial problem (Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; 
Danielson and Scott, 2004). Another question arise is that whether firms are willing 
to extend more interfirm credit as others are likely to have greater default risk and at 
the same time they are also likely to be affected by the shocks in the business cycle. 
The redistribution theory of trade credit suggests that the unconstrained firms with 
better access to external finance will extend the credit they receive to firms with less 
capability in the access to external finance (Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 
2013).  
In response to the intensified financial crisis, the Bank of England (BoE)’s Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) implemented a loosening monetary policy using both 
conventional and unconventional measures to recover the UK economy from recession. 
The conventional measure of loosening monetary policy is related to the series of 
interest rate cut by the MPC, with a decrease of 3 percentage points during Q4 2008 
and reduce to 0.5% that close to zero bound in early March 2009 (Joyce et al., 2011). 
The interest rate cut following a loosening monetary policy can improve the credit 
conditions as it decreases borrowing costs to encourage corporate borrowing to fund 
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investment and spending, therefore stimulates economic output. However, this 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy becomes more complicated during 
financial crisis because banks generally tighten the credit policy, restricting the 
corporate sector in accessing to bank credit, which cause the interest rate cut becomes 
ineffective to boost spending and to stimulate economy. This raises question about the 
effectiveness of the conventional measure of monetary policy in steering the economic 
activities through its impact on corporate borrowing.  
The MPC also announced an unconventional measure in March 2009 that it would 
ease the monetary policy further through a programme of large scale asset purchase, 
known as quantitative easing. The purpose of the quantitative easing is to inject money 
directly into the economy in order to boost spending in order to stimulate economy 
into sustainable recovery, and to achieve the 2% inflation target (Joyce et al., 2011). 
Under the quantitative easing programme, the BoE has purchased a total amount of 
£200 billion of assets between March 2009 and January 2010, which mostly focus on 
medium and long-term UK government gilts. That was equivalent to 30% of the 
amount of outstanding gilts held by the private sector at the time, or 14% of the annual 
nominal GDP (Joyce and Spaltro, 2014). Several studies have examined the impact of 
quantitative easing, including Bernardo et al. (2013), Joyce et al. (2012), and Churm 
et al. (2015). However, these studies have focused on the impact on economic growth 
and financial markets, the effect of quantitative easing on bank credit has received 
little attention in the literature. Policymakers in the UK anticipated the quantitative 
easing to affect the output demand mainly through its impact on asset prices (i.e., the 
portfolio rebalancing channel). The bank credit channel works in a way that when 
assets are purchased from non-bank firms, banks gain additional reserves and a 
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corresponding increase in deposits. This increases banks’ liquid assets and encourage 
banks extending more loans to corporate sector (Joyce and Spaltro, 2014). However, 
the policymakers anticipated little effect through bank credit channel because banks 
tend to deleverage during financial crisis. Nonetheless, it appears implausible that it 
has no effect through bank lending channel at all if compared to counterfactual of no 
quantitative easing. 
1.2 Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis attempts to describe the contributions by explaining the significance of 
credit crunch and corporate financing for SMEs in the UK given the importance of 
SMEs in the UK economy, plus to generate knowledge based on a large unique panel 
dataset. Indeed, the analysis of credit rationing and impact of monetary policy in the 
UK has not been implemented since Atanasova and Wilson (2003) that examined the 
period between 1989 to 1999. This thesis also used the credit rationing model to 
detangle the supply and demand effect and thus is better than previous studies in 
examining the impact of monetary policy. These issues are further discussed in the 
following paragraphs.  
During the financial crisis, credit crunch emerged as banks generally tightened their 
credit policy, restricting the corporate sector in accessing to bank credit. The credit 
restriction is crucial to the UK’s SMEs, which plays a key role in the UK economy 
and they are greatly depending on bank credit to fund their working capital and 
investment needs. Both policymakers and researchers have attributed the slow 
economy recovery to substantial corporate debt liabilities and tight credit policies by 
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the undercapitalised banking system (IMF, 2009; Allen et al., 2009). In response to 
the intensified financial crisis, the BoE’s MPC implemented loosening monetary 
policy by cutting interest rate close to zero bound and inject money directly to the 
economy through a large scale asset purchases. The impact on the corporate borrowing 
of the credit crunch and the effectiveness of loosening monetary policy in the UK 
remain unknown. Questions also arise about whether trade credit has been used by 
UK’s SMEs as alternative to bank credit to fund their working capital and investment 
needs when they face restriction in accessing to bank credit. Also, it is unknown if the 
UK’s SMEs are willing to extend more trade credit to the firms that face borrowing 
constraint.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by addressing the above problems concerning 
the external financing of the SMEs in the UK. This thesis aims to generate knowledge 
based on a large unique panel dataset of the UK’s SMEs between 1991 and 2010. The 
scope of this thesis is not limited to the recent financial crisis, but the overall 
borrowing conditions of the SMEs in the UK between 1991 and 2010, and to review 
the credit channel in the monetary policy transmission. Indeed, the analysis of the 
credit rationing in the UK has not been updated since Atanasova and Wilson (2003).  
This study is targeted at the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the UK from 
1991 to 2010. This study is targeted at SMEs because they play a key role in the UK 
economy. They make up the majority of jobs in the UK and account for a significant 
proportion of the UK GDP. In the ‘SME Statistics for the UK and Regions 2009’, BIS 
(2010) reported that 99.9% of all the 4.8 million private businesses in the UK are 
SMEs, and accounting for 59.8% (or 13.64 million people) of the private sector 
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employment and 49% (or £1,589 billion) of the private sector turnover. Mark Hoban, 
the financial secretary to the Treasury, highlighted the importance of SMEs as the 
drivers of economy recovery, innovation and growth from the perspectives of the UK 
and European policymakers (Crawley-Moore, 2011). 
This thesis is mainly divided into three major parts. First, this thesis constructs man 
index of monetary condition (MCI) for the UK, which is used as a measure of the 
monetary condition to examine the impact of monetary policy on the corporate 
borrowing in the UK. The MCI is a leading indicator measuring the degree of tightness 
of monetary condition in an economy. The MCI is used because the interest rate itself 
is not a good indicator of the monetary policy stance because the monetary condition 
of a nation is also affected by some other factors, including the exchange rate. In fact, 
the MCI has been widely estimated and used by central banks, financial institutions, 
and governmental institutions as the indicator of the stance of monetary policy (Batini 
and Turnbull, 2002).  
The second part of this thesis is to estimate the extent of credit rationing and to 
examine the impact of monetary policy and quantitative easing on the corporate 
borrowing. In order to estimate the extent of credit rationing, this thesis uses the 
disequilibrium model, which comprises of a demand and a supply equation, each 
containing the determinants of demand and supply of bank credit, respectively. The 
demand equation and the supply equation are used to estimate the firms’ quantity of 
loan demand and loan supply. The credit rationed firms are those with the quantity of 
loan demand exceeds the quantity of loan supply. By using the disequilibrium model 
to estimate credit rationing, it is able to capture and to detangle the factors affecting 
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the demand and supply of bank loans. For example, it is able to capture not only the 
shocks to firms’ balance sheet that banks used as a signal of creditworthiness such as 
collateral and credit risk, but also the shocks to the firm’s demand for bank finance. 
Indeed, firms may reduce their purchases and investment in such deteriorating market 
demand and thus a drop in the demand for bank loans (Kremp and Sevestre, 2011). It 
is not possible to infer credit rationing by looking at the patterns of aggregate bank 
loans because a fall of bank loans may not be necessarily driven by restriction in bank 
credit but may be demand driven. 
In order to examine the impact of monetary policy and quantitative easing on the credit 
supply to SMEs in the UK, the MCI (as a measure of monetary policy stance) that 
estimated in the first part of this thesis, and a measure of quantitative easing are 
included in the supply equation of the disequilibrium model. This thesis follows 
Morais et al. (2015) to use the change in the balance sheet of the BoE as ratio to 
nominal GDP as a measure of quantitative easing. Previous studies that examined the 
effect of monetary shocks to corporate sector face challenges in separating effect of 
firm-specific demand shock from supply shock (i.e., identification problem). For 
example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and others cited by Hulsewig et al. (2006) 
examined the credit channel of monetary policy transmission using the vector 
autoregression (VAR) analysis on the aggregate data. The results of these VAR 
analysis generally showed an obvious reduction of bank loans following a tighten 
monetary policy. However, it has been largely criticised for failing to identify whether 
the loans reduction is caused by a shift in loan supply or loan demand (e.g., Kashyap 
and Stein, 1995; Hulsewig et al., 2006; Brissimis and Delis, 2009). If the reduction in 
bank loans is solely driven by a fall in loan demand, then their analysis should not 
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form evidence showing the impact of monetary shock to banks’ capital on corporate 
borrowers. By including a measure of monetary condition in the supply equation of 
the disequilibrium model, the identification problem can be solved because it 
disentangles the effect of firm-specific demand shock from supply shock.  
The third part of the thesis is to examine the substitution relationship between trade 
credit and bank credit, i.e., whether SMEs in the UK that are subject to credit rationing 
use more trade credit as an alternative to bank credit. This part of thesis also examines 
if the SMEs in the UK are willing to extend credit to credit rationed firms that are 
likely to have greater default risk. This thesis uses the result of disequilibrium model 
that classifies the sample firms into borrowing constrained and unconstrained (in the 
second part) and then compares the trade credit behaviour between them. The 
substitution relationship between bank credit and trade credit are examined by 
estimating the determinants of trade creditors (i.e., accounts payable). The willingness 
of unrationed firms to extend credit to rationed firms can be examined by estimating 
the determinants of trade debtors (i.e., accounts receivable). In order to examine the 
effect of monetary policy and quantitative easing on the trade credit behaviour, the 
MCI and the measure of quantitative easing are also included in both the equations of 
trade creditors and trade debtors.  
There is a considerable amount of prior literature providing analysis of trade credit as 
a source of fund substitute for bank credit in the UK, including Atanasova and Wilson 
(2004), Mateut et al. (2006), Guariglia and Mateut (2006), Mateut and Mizen (2003), 
Mateut et al. (2010), and Paul and Guermat (2009). These studies commonly use the 
fixed effect panel data method to estimate the substitution relationship between bank 
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credit and trade credit. This analysis remains minimal since then. Moreover, the 
majority of empirical papers that investigate the trade credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission focus only on the trade credit demand, but ignore the firms’ 
willingness to offer trade credit. If firms are not willing to extend credit to customers, 
then firms might not able to use trade credit as a source of funds substitute for bank 
credit. The thesis contributes by estimating the equation of trade debtors, which 
contains the determinants affecting firms’ willingness to supply interfirm credit.  
In sum, the thesis contributes to an understanding of the extent of credit rationing in 
the access of the UK’s SMEs to the bank credit, the impact of monetary policy on 
corporate borrowing, and whether firms use and able to use more trade credit as 
substitute for bank credit when they face restriction in accessing to bank credit. The 
thesis uses a large panel data of the UK’s SMEs between 1991 and 2010. The analysis 
of credit rationing and financial behaviour of SMEs in response to a change in the 
monetary policy are important as references for the policy makers in order to make an 
adequate and effective decision to tackle with the economy recession. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the theories related to the credit rationing and the findings of 
previous studies of credit rationing. It includes defining the credit rationing and 
explaining the existence of credit rationing from the perspective of the New Keynesian 
school of economics, including the credit market imperfection, the model of bank-
dependent borrowers, and the role of collateral in mitigating the credit market 
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imperfection. The perspectives of the Post Keynesian economics are also reviewed in 
this chapter. Moreover, this chapter also evaluates the empirical methodologies used 
by prior studies to examine the credit rationing and discusses the findings of these 
empirical studies.  
Chapter 3 reviews the transmission mechanism of how monetary policy affects the 
economy through corporate borrowing, i.e., the money view versus the credit channel 
of monetary policy transmission. The two specific credit channels of monetary policy 
transmission are balance sheet channel and bank credit channel. Moreover, this 
chapter also reviews the transmission channels of quantitative easing that is designed 
to inject money directly into the economy in order to stimulate spending and economic 
activities, including portfolio rebalancing and bank lending channel. Moreover, this 
chapter evaluates the empirical methodologies used by prior studies to examine the 
existence of bank lending channel and bank credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission. as well as the findings of these empirical studies. A major challenge to 
these empirical studies is to separate the effect of demand shock from the supply shock 
of the monetary policy on the corporate borrowing. The result of this chapter is used 
in Chapter 5 to construct the empirical strategy to examine the impact of monetary 
policy and quantitative easing on the economy through corporate borrowing.   
Chapter 4 constructs and estimates the monetary condition index (MCI) for the UK, 
which will be subsequently included in the supply equation of the disequilibrium 
model in order to examine the impact of monetary condition on the loan availability 
to the UK’s SMEs. Instead of using official rate, MCI has been suggested as a better 
measure of monetary policy tightness of a nation because it takes into account other 
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factors such as exchange rate that might affect the monetary condition of a nation. This 
chapter includes an evaluation of the methodologies used by previous empirical 
studies to examine the monetary condition of a nation. This chapter also presents and 
discusses the estimated MCI for the UK.  
Chapter 5 discusses the estimation methodology (i.e., disequilibrium model) used by 
this thesis to examine the impact of monetary policy on corporate borrowing and the 
extent of credit rationing targeted at SMEs in the UK. It includes a description of the 
construction and set up of the disequilibrium model, all variables included in the 
demand and supply equations, and the data used in the estimation of the disequilibrium 
model. It followed by the presentation of the result of the disequilibrium model and 
the extent of borrowing constraint among the UK’s SMEs. This chapter also provides 
a discussion of the estimated results of the disequilibrium model and compare the 
differences of financial variables between constrained and unconstrained firms.  
Chapter 6 further examine the implication of the credit rationing in the UK, whether 
SMEs in the UK that are borrowing constrained uses trade credit as a substitute fund 
for bank credit to alleviate the financial problem. This chapter uses the results in 
chapter 5 that classifying the sample into borrowing constrained and unconstrained 
and compares their behaviours in trade credit by examining the determinants of trade 
creditors. This chapter also estimates the determinants of trade debtors in order to 
examine the redistribution theory of trade credit, which suggests that borrowing 
unconstrained firms with better access to bank credit will extend the credit they receive 
to firms with less capability to access to bank credit.  
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Chapter 7 provides a summary of the empirical findings, concludes the contribution 
of this thesis, and to explain the problems encountered during the research process and 
limitations of this thesis.  
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2. Credit Rationing  
2.1 Introduction 
The major aims of this thesis include examining the credit rationing and the impact of 
monetary policy on the availability of bank credit to the UK’s SMEs. It is important 
to gain an understanding on how firms might be credit rationed and how this differs 
between the SMEs and large firms, as well as the underlying mechanism of monetary 
policy transmission. This chapter is to provide a review of the theories and evaluate 
previous studies related to the credit rationing. This chapter begins with defining the 
credit rationing and briefly explaining the difference between credit rationing and 
credit crunch. This chapter also reviews the theories that explain the existence of credit 
rationing, including credit market imperfection, information asymmetry from the 
perspective of the New Keynesian economics, as well as the arguments of credit 
rationing from the perspective of the Post Keynesian economics. These theories of the 
credit market will be explained in the context of microeconomics. The model of bank-
dependent borrowers is also discussed to explain the significance of credit crunch to 
the SMEs compared with large firms. This chapter also discusses the role of collateral 
in mitigating the credit market imperfection.  
2.1 Definitions of Credit Rationing 
There are several definitions have been developed by researchers to explain the 
meaning of credit rationing. The earlier definitions of credit rationing can be traced 
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back to Hodgman (1960), which described that credit rationing happens if there is 
greater demand for credit than supply in a given interest rate. Hodgman (1960) 
differentiated the traditional rationing and the credit rationing. Traditional rationing is 
the situation in which the borrower offers to pay higher interest rate to compensate for 
the risk that the lender assumes but the interest rate is overly high for the borrower 
(Hodgman, 1960). Credit rationing is related to behaviour of the lender who 
determines the maximum amount of payment that the lender will receive (principal 
and interest) based on its assessment of the borrower’s credit quality and willingness 
to pay, and credit rationing occurs when the lenders believe that the interest rate charge 
based on the borrowers’ credit demanded cannot compensate for the risk of default 
(Hodgman, 1960).  
Besides that, credit rationing has also been broadly defined in the literature as a 
situation in which corporate borrower has excess demand for credit; cannot acquire a 
desired amount of credit from banks; and would like to increase borrowing but unable 
to do so (Martin, 1990). Bellier et al. (2012) provided a clearer definition by specifying 
that those face credit rationing are unsatisfied borrowers that are unable to borrow at 
the prevailing interest rate. Elwood (2010) described the credit rationing as the 
existence of excess demand for credit and that more funds being wanted by borrowers 
at market interest rate than are provided by lenders. The key to the definitions 
developed by Martin (1990), Elwood (2010), and Bellier et al. (2012) is that the excess 
demand for loans in the market cannot be cleared by increasing the interest rate.  
Adair and Fhima (2014) divided the credit rationing into credit volume rationing and 
rationing of borrower. Credit volume rationing refers to the situation when lenders 
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provide a smaller amount of credit than the borrower’s demand, while the rationing of 
borrower refers to the situation when the credit applicants are rejected (Adair and 
Fhima, 2014). The credit volume rationing was described by Kremp and Sevestre 
(2011) as partially rationing, which refers to the situation where only a fraction of loan 
the borrower apply for was rejected. The rationing of borrower was also described by 
Kremp and Sevestre (2011) as full credit rationing, which means that the credit 
application was fully rejected.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) presents a very important study of credit rationing and it 
provided a more comprehensive explanation of credit rationing. Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) defined credit rationing as a situation where a borrower is restricted from 
obtaining the amount of loans demanded even the borrower if willing to pay higher 
interest rate, and/or even the bank held an excessive loanable supply. Similarly, Brown 
(2011) described credit rationing as a situation in which the bank does not use interest 
rate to allocate funds. This implies that credit rationing occurs when the bank denies 
to provide any loan to certain groups of borrowers or to limit the size of loans granted, 
despite or because the borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rate. We will explain 
why banks denies to lend when the borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rate 
later in section 2.3.  
In addition, credit rationing is also known as borrowing constraints (Atanasova and 
Wilson, 2003) and credit constraint (Hayashi, 1987; Grant, 2007; Helsen and Chmelar, 
2014). Grant (2007) described that borrowers face credit constraint or rationing if they 
face some quantity constraint on the amount of borrowing. Studies such as Atanasova 
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and Wilson (2003) used borrowing constraint, credit constraint, and credit rationing 
interchangeably throughout their discussion.  
Credit Rationing and Credit Crunch 
Some may confuse credit crunch with credit rationing. Credit crunch refers to the 
reduction in the general availability of loans or a sudden tightening of the conditions 
required for borrowers to acquire loan from banks (Korab and Pomenkova, 2017). 
Credit crunch indicates a decline in the supply of credit that is unusually large for a 
particular stage of the business cycle, i.e., economy recession (Bernanke and Lown, 
1991). When a credit crunch occurs, there is a leftward shift of the credit supply curve 
at at specified level of interest rate (Costa and Margani, 2009). Large number of 
borrowers may not able to obtain the desired quantity of credit demanded 
independently of interest rates due to tighten credit policy. However, during credit 
crunch period, it does not mean all companies must be credit rationed. Companies are 
still able to obtain bank credit during credit crunch period but the condition required 
is higher. Banks are only tightening their credit policy and set a higher condition for 
loan approval during credit crunch period. Credit rationed borrowers are those who 
not given the amount of credit demanded or credit application are rejected. 
For example, in the recent financial crisis 2007-2010, the banking sector has suffered 
huge losses and caused banks to lower their capacity to lend and willingness to take 
on risk. Banks generally tightened their credit policy and being more selective in the 
loan approval. This circumstance implies the emergence of credit crunch, which 
indicates a reduction in the general availability of loans or sudden tightening of the 
conditions required for borrowers to acquire loans from banks. During the credit 
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crunch period, companies find it harder to obtain bank loans (although the central bank 
strives to loosen the monetary condition), but it does not mean all companies are credit 
rationed. Banks may require borrowers to have a lower debt to equity ratio, larger asset 
base, and better industrial experience.  
Up to this point, it provides an understanding of the meaning of credit rationing. 
However, a question may arise is that why banks refuse to provide loans to certain 
borrowers, at least not the full amount of credit demanded. A possible explanation is 
that a bank might refuse to provide the amount of credit the borrower desire – because 
the bank does not want to make a loss as the borrower has a too high probability of 
default. It might be a bit more confusing that the bank rejects to offer loans when the 
borrower offers to pay higher interest rate for the loan. All these questions can be fully 
explained by the credit market imperfection theory developed in the New Keynesian 
and Post Keynesian economics, which will be explained in detail in the section 2.3.  
2.2 Why Credit Rationing Exists? 
As discuss in section 2.2, credit rationing can be defined as a situation in which a 
borrower desires to obtain a specific amount of bank loan but the bank reject to supply, 
at least not the full amount, despite or because the borrower offer to pay higher interest 
rate, even if the bank has excessive loanable supply. There are several questions arise 
here about the existence of credit rationing. First, why banks may reject to supply the 
amount of loans the borrower desires. Second, why banks may reject even if the 
borrower offered to pay higher interest rate. Third, why banks may reject because the 
borrower offered to pay higher interest rate. This section is to evaluate these questions 
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using the concepts and assumptions of the credit market imperfection theories. To 
explain the credit market imperfection, it is necessary to start by discussing the perfect 
and frictionless credit market from the perspective of the Neoclassical economics 
theory, which has been widely criticised for its unrealistic assumptions. The credit 
market imperfection theory suggests a possibility of a firm being credit rationed and 
the existence of credit rationing can be viewed from the perspectives of the New 
Keynesian economics and the Post Keynesian economics. Both New Keynesian 
economics and the Post Keynesian economics suggest a possibility of credit rationing. 
However, the proponents of the New Keynesian economics emphasise on the 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. In contrast, the proponents of 
the Post Keynesian economics argue that the concept of information asymmetry is not 
important because even the borrowers themselves should also uncertain about the 
future returns and risks associated with the investment projects. These concepts will 
be discussed in the following subsections.  
2.2.1 Assumptions of Perfect, Frictionless Credit Market 
From the perspective of the Neoclassical economics, the credit market is perfect and 
frictionless based on the assumptions that lenders and borrowers in the credit market 
are have equal access to information about risks and returns to the lending and incur 
no transaction cost (Hubbard, 1995). The credit market is perceived as frictionless 
when there is no cost and restraint incurred associated with transactions in the credit 
market. The Neoclassical theory of rational choice assumes that lenders have complete 
and precise knowledge of the effects on outcomes of all potential competitor’s choices 
of action (Crotty, 1993). In such a perfect and frictionless credit market, the capital 
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structure of a firm does not influence the real decisions of both the borrowers and the 
lenders, as described by Modigliani and Miller (1958) as the capital structure 
irrelevance (Hubbard, 1995). If this is the case, then the credit market should always 
achieve its equilibrium through the price adjustment mechanism. The price adjustment 
mechanism refers to the role of interest rate that always adjust upward to clear the 
credit market, i.e., the borrowers’ demand for credit should always be fulfilled. The 
price adjustment mechanism works in a way that in the case of excess demand for 
loans over supply, there will always be an upwards adjustment in the level of interest 
rates (i.e., the price of bank loans). The upward adjustment of the interest rate will lead 
to a fall in the credit demand and/or increase in the credit supply until they are equated 
at a new equilibrium interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Cowling, 2010). In other 
words, when a borrower demands an amount of loans more than the bank is willing to 
supply, the bank always offer more loans by increasing the interest rate up to a point 
the borrowers can accept.  
Under the assumptions of perfect and frictionless credit market, both the banks and 
the borrowers will always able to make a loan deal by either the bank increasing the 
interest rate or the borrower reduces the credit demand at the interest rate they can 
accept. If the credit market works in this way, then the borrowers’ demand for credit 
should always be fulfilled and the credit rationing should not exist. However, the 
assumptions of perfect and frictionless credit market have been widely criticised that 
do not exist in reality (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Cowling, 2010).  
It has been cited that the assumptions of the neoclassical model of perfect credit market 
are incorrect according to numerous empirical studies and there is no direct evidence 
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to show they are true (Crotty, 1993). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present an important 
study explaining that the credit market frictionless is not always happened in real 
world based on the asymmetric information of principal-agent model to describe the 
lender-borrower relationship. The credit rationing model developed by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) has been widely agreed and documented in the corporate finance and 
microeconomics literature as a major perspective of the New Keynesian economists. 
The credit rationing model of the New Keynesian and Post Keynesian economists will 
be explained in the next section.  
2.2.2 The New Keynesian Theory: Credit Market Imperfection 
The New Keynesian theory suggests that the credit market is imperfect, in that means 
the borrowers’ demand for bank loans is not always being fulfilled and the interest rate 
is not always used to clear the market. In this section, there are three questions sought 
to be answered in relation to the credit rationing using the perspective of New 
Keynesian theory. First, why does bank charges different interest rate to different 
borrowers? Second, why some borrowers are credit rationed? Third, why does bank 
reject to lend even if or because the borrower is willing to pay higher interest rate?  
Why does bank charges different interest rate to different borrowers?  
According to the New Keynesian economics theory, the credit market may not 
function perfectly because the lender (the principal) does not have sufficient 
information or knowledge of the borrower’s (the agent) credit quality, known as the 
information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The information asymmetry makes 
lenders challenging to produce accurate lending decisions. When making a loan 
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approval, the lenders concern the interest rate they receive and the associate riskiness 
of the loan. Borrowers who looks to obtain a loan is thought to have ex-ante private 
information about the potential return and risks associated with the investment project 
that is unknown by the lender (Crotty, 1996; Janda, 2006; Ekpu, 2016). The lenders 
may identify the expected mean return of an investment project, but it cannot 
determine the riskiness of a project (Ekpu, 2016). The information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers may give rise to the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problem. The adverse selection problem refers to the possible situation in which the 
borrower fails to pay back the loan, whereas the moral hazard problem arises when 
the borrower takes on riskier project to generate higher return than the originally stated 
in the loan contract that give rise to higher probability of default (Hall, 2001). In order 
to address the adverse selection problem and the moral hazard problem arising from 
the information asymmetry, rational lenders will incur agency costs to verify and 
monitor borrowers’ claims. The agency cost will be translated to external finance 
premium (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Janda, 2006; Jarrow, 2011). Moreover, the 
external finance premium also increase along with the riskiness of the borrowers 
because the lender incurs higher agency cost for higher-risk borrowers and to 
compensate the default risk associated with the borrower. Therefore, the interest rate 
banks charge must rise along with the default risk of the borrower. This explains why 
some borrowers are charged higher interest rate than some other borrowers.  
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Why lenders are unwilling to lend to some borrowers, at least not the full amount that 
the borrower demanded?  
Figure 1 in the next page helps to explain why lenders are not willing to lend to some 
borrowers, at least not the full amount that the borrower demanded. From the last 
paragraph, it showed why some borrowers are charged higher interest rate than others. 
Due to information asymmetry between lender and borrower that give rise to the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem, the lender uses interest rate to 
compensate the default risk of the borrower resulted from the information asymmetry. 
The interest rate reflects the default risk of the borrowers. Higher interest rates are 
used to compensate the higher agency costs and higher default risk associated with the 
borrowers. Therefore, the interest rate the bank charges will increase along with the 
default risk of the borrower. Question arises is that why credit rationing exists when 
the higher interest rate can be used to compensate the higher risk borrowers? This can 
be explained by the idea that the expected returns to the bank depends on the 
probability of loan repayment or in other word the riskiness of the borrower. In other 
words, loans should be granted to those who offer the most reliable prospects that the 
loan will be repaid (Fioretti, 2005).  
As shown in Figure 1, the expected return to bank will increase along with the interest 
rate but less rapidly than the interest rate because the probability of default associated 
with the borrower is higher along with the higher interest rates. At the interest rate 
lower than the optimal level of interest rate (indicated by r*), the bank can make a 
higher expected profit because the implied default risk of the borrower is still low. 
However, the expected returns of the bank should reach its peak at the optimal level 
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of interest rate (r*), but started to reduce when the interest rate is beyond the optimal 
level (r*). This is due to the implied default risk above the optimal interest rate (r*) is 
too high that it will decrease the expected return to the bank. In other words, when it 
is perceived that the loan demand and supply are the functions of interest rate, the 
borrower’s credit demand exceeds the supply if the implied interest rate is beyond the 
optimal level (r*) because the expected returns to bank decrease beyond the optimal 
level (r*). Therefore, the bank is not willing to lend to those borrowers with the 
probability of default beyond its optimal level implied by the interest rate.  
Figure 2.1: Credit Rationing 
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r* indicates the optimal interest rate. This figure is used to help illustrating how credit 
rationing could happen. This figure is adapted from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). This figure 
shows that the expected return to the bank increase along with the interest rate (i.e., the 
borrower’s default risk), but less rapidly, up to the optimal level (r*). The bank can make a 
profit at the interest rate lower than r* as the implied default risk of the borrower is still low. 
However, the implied default risk above the optimal interest rate (r*) is too high that will 
decrease the expected return to the bank. The default risk can be explained by the adverse 
selection and moral hazard risk stemming from informational asymmetry between the bank 
and the borrower. Therefore, the bank is not willing to lend to borrower who offered to pay 
interest rate more than r*, and thus the borrower is credit rationed.  
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Why banks may reject to lend even if or because the borrower offers to pay higher 
interest rate?  
From the last paragraph, it showed that lenders are not willing to lend to some 
borrowers because their default risks are too high that will reduce their expected 
returns. Question arises is that what if the borrowers offer to pay higher interest rate 
to compensate the default risks. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explained that banks may 
also not willing to lend to some borrowers if they offer to pay higher interest rate not 
only because higher interest rates indicate higher default risk, but also the interest rate 
itself may have an incentive effect on the behaviour of the borrowers after the signing 
of loan contract. The idea is that higher interest rates may induce the borrower to 
switch its funds to riskier project than originally stated with lower likelihood of 
success but higher returns when successful in order to cover the higher finance cost 
(Hall, 2001), which further increase the probability of default. Borrowers are willing 
to pay higher interest rate are perceived as higher risks because they believe that their 
likelihood of repaying the loan is low (Ekpu, 2016). This concept is known as the 
moral hazard or incentive problem, which is associated with the borrowers have ex-
post private information over the lender (Ekpu, 2016). For the bank, the risk become 
higher than the case before it increases the interest rate. Therefore, rational lenders 
will not raise the interest rate to clear the credit market. This moral hazard or incentive 
problem explains why banks are not willing to lend to those borrowers with high 
default risk, even if or because they are willing to pay higher interest rates.  
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2.2.3 The Post Keynesian Theory of Credit Rationing 
The New-Keynesian theory provides a sensible explanation of how the credit rationing 
may exist. It highlights the concept of information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers, in that the lender does not have complete information about the risk and 
returns of the borrower’s investment project, and the borrower knows the risk and 
returns of the investment project better than the lender (Crotty, 1996). The information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers has led the lenders to use interest rate as a 
screening device to cope with adverse selection risk in the loan approval. It also 
highlights that interest rate itself may drive the borrower to take higher risk investment 
that is not originally stated in the loan contract and thus increase the default risk. The 
New-Keynesian theory suggests that banks’ returns depend on the probability of loan 
repayment. When the interest rate charged on the borrower indicates the default risk 
is too high, it will decrease the overall bank returns. As a result, banks are reluctant to 
lend to borrowers with the level of default risk that is beyond its optimal level, and 
therefore credit ration.  
However, it has been argued that the New-Keynesian theory ignored the fact that even 
the borrowers themselves are uncertain of the riskiness and returns of the investment 
projects. The Post-Keynesian theory takes into account this reality and argues that both 
lenders and borrowers do not have precise information about the riskiness and returns 
of the investment project (Ekpu, 2016). The Post-Keynesian theory argues that the 
information asymmetry is not important in practice because the borrowers, like the 
lenders, do not know with certainty about the riskiness and returns of the investment 
project. This is contrasted to the New-Keynesian theory, which assume that only the 
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lender is uncertain about the riskiness of the borrower. The proponents of the Post-
Keynesian theory argue that both lenders and borrowers are subject to the fundamental 
uncertainty about the risk and possible outcomes of the investment project 
(Ramskogler, 2011).  
The Post-Keynesian theory also enhances the New-Keynesian theory in explaining the 
existence of credit rationing by incorporating the effect of changes in macroeconomic 
condition on the borrowers’ creditworthiness. According to the Post-Keynesian theory 
of credit rationing, banks assess the creditworthiness of the borrowers not only by 
evaluating the borrower’s loan repayment history and financial condition, but also 
consider the prevailing macroeconomic conditions (Ekpu, 2016). The Post-Keynesian 
theory also argues that the economic environment of a new investment varies from the 
similar investments made in the past (Wofson, 1996). Moreover, the proponents of the 
Post-Keynesian theory also suggest that both the lender and the borrower will have 
different expectation about the future and therefore have asymmetric expectation 
about the future prospect of the investment returns (Ramskogler, 2011). In this case, 
the lender is perceived to be more risk-averse than the borrower because borrowers 
are more optimistic about the prospects of the investment and the value of collateral 
than the lender who are more objectively and carefully justified. Lenders will provide 
funds to fulfil the creditworthy loan demand, and ration all the loan demands that are 
not creditworthy. Lenders constantly review the borrower’s financial condition and 
will alter their usual valuations of the lending risk.  
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Comments on the New Keynesian and Post Keynesian Theory 
The above has discussed the theoretical framework of how the credit rationing may 
exist from the perspective of the New Keynesian and the Post Keynesian economics 
theory. It is now necessary to comment on these theories. First, the price mechanism 
as described by the Neoclassical economics must not be true in reality. Indeed, banks 
will not always raise the interest rate to fulfil the credit demand of borrowers along 
with the perceived riskiness of the borrower. When banks believe that the borrowers 
are overly risky, then rationally speaking banks will tend not to lend to them, at least 
not the fully amount demanded, due to the great chance of payment default.  
The concept of information asymmetry highlighted by the New Keynesian theory is 
making sense, in that the borrower may have incentive not to fully disclose the real 
prospects of the investment project to the lender, motivated by its intention to obtain 
the desired quantity of loan, at least at minimum interest rate. The borrowers only 
present the favourable information that enable them to obtain bank loans successfully. 
As a result, lenders are likely to have only partial information about the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers, which give rise to adverse selection problem. In 
this case, lenders may not able to correctly assess the risk and returns associated with 
the borrower’s investment. This is especially critical for the small, young SMEs, 
which tend to be informational opaque because they have limited business and credit 
history, compared to those larger, older SMEs.  
However, the Post Keynesian economics theory argues that the information 
asymmetry is not important in explaining the credit rationing as it believes that even 
the borrowers do not have correct information about the risk and returns of the 
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investment project. In addition, it also depends on the future macroeconomic condition 
and business environment, in which the borrowers are uncertain. It also highlights that 
both lenders and borrowers should have different expectation about the risk and 
returns of the investment project, known as the asymmetric expectation. Nevertheless, 
it seems quite unreasonable to say that information asymmetry is not important in 
explaining the credit rationing. Indeed, the firm’s managers should know better than 
the lender about the future prospects of the firm, the industry, and the business 
environment that affect them, simply because they are playing in the game. Lenders, 
on the other hands, are outsiders and they depend on reports generated by the corporate 
borrowers, as well as other similar investments and industrial reports by third party 
consultation firms. From this perspective, lenders should nevertheless face 
information asymmetry about the risk and returns of the borrower’s investment project.  
2.3 Credit Rationing, Credit Crunch, and SMEs 
After explaining how credit rationing may occur, it is now necessary to discuss the 
relevance of the credit rationing to the SMEs. This section discusses why SMEs are 
depending on bank credit as an important source of external finance, and evaluates 
why SMEs are more subject to credit rationing by banks than large firms.  
The credit market imperfection has strong influential implications to many important 
issues in economics through its significant effects in the corporate finance structure, 
especially those of small- and medium sized firms (SMEs). According to the 
perspective of New Keynesian economics, banks are preferable source of external 
finance than other debt finance because of their ability to better identification of 
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borrowers’ quality and the cost advantage in monitoring the real ability of borrowers 
to repay loans, and thus reducing the agency costs incurred with overcoming the 
asymmetric information and incentive problems (Ramskogler, 2011). It is highly 
probable because banks specialise in collecting information about borrowers’ ability 
to repay, including the patent of past loan repayment, income, and amount of present 
debt (Hall, 2001), obtained from the credit agencies/databases and the on-going 
relationships with customers. Moreover, banks as financial intermediaries may also be 
able to save searching and transaction costs that otherwise incur in the direct capital 
market. All these costs advantages have enabled banks to offer finance to their 
borrowers at a lower premium than in the direct capital market. This is especially 
important for smaller companies, which are particularly informational opaque and 
subject to these costs (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Atta-Mensah and Dib, 2008).  
In contrast to larger firms, the fixed transaction cost of direct capital financing is likely 
to be a small proportion to their borrowing, and informational costs are likely to be 
lower due to their established reputations, bond ratings and published annual reports 
(Hall, 2001). Therefore, it is unlikely that large firms are highly dependent on bank 
finance but rather readily switch to finance from direct capital market. However, it is 
arguable that direct capital financing may be more costly for SMEs mainly due to 
asymmetric information problem (Hyytinen and Vaananen, 2006).  
In the context of the SMEs, the consequence of credit rationing is that it might not 
only prevent the SMEs from having sufficient financial resource to fund profitable 
investment opportunities (Duchin et al., 2010), but also might seriously affect their 
ability to fund business operations, cause a dramatic surge in insolvencies and 
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bankruptcies, and eventually reflecting a failure in aggregate economy. Indeed, the 
perspective of New Keynesian economists suggests that SMEs have been largely 
dependent on bank credit as a major source of external finance in supporting their 
business activities. This has an important implication that any shock to banks’ ability 
and willingness to lend may affect finance costs and availability of external finance to 
SMEs. 
A number of studies have identified that bank credit is the main external source of 
finance for the SMEs (e.g., OECD, 2006; European Commission, 2011; European 
Commission, 2015; OECD, 2015). OECD (2006) reported that commercial banks are 
the main source of finance for the SMEs in most countries of the European Union. 
According to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) conducted 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2011, half of all SMEs in Europe Union 
countries have applied for bank loans in the past two years (European Commission, 
2011). The SAFE survey conducted by ECB in 2014 reported that bank loans is the 
main source of external financing for 62% of the SMEs in the European countries 
(European Commission, 2015). The latest report from OECD (2015) also indicated 
that bank credit is the most common source of external finance for the SMEs sector 
and entrepreneurs. Hall (2001) also indicated that small firms are more reliant upon 
bank finance than large firms, especially short-term loans including bank overdraft. 
Hall (2001) find that bank loans remain the most important source of external finance 
for small firms in the UK and bank loans represent about 60% of all external finance 
for small firms during 1997 to 1999. In contrast, for larger firms in the UK, equity 
issuance is main source of corporate external financing, partly as the results of a 
number of large equity-financed mergers and acquisitions (Hall, 2001).  
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This perspective of New Keynesian economists, with the support of empirical 
evidence, suggest that SMEs have been largely dependent on bank credit as a major 
source of external finance in supporting their business activities. This conclusion leads 
to an important implication that any shock to banks’ ability and willingness to lend 
may affect finance costs and availability of external finance to SMEs. 
2.4 Previous Studies of Credit Rationing 
There is a growing amount of literature use disequilibrium model that developed by 
Maddala and Nelson (1974) to provide analysis on the extent of credit rationing. The 
disequilibrium model initially established to examine the existence and the extent of 
credit rationing at macroeconomic level and it has recently used to identify credit 
rationing using microeconomic data. Empirical papers that use microeconomic data to 
examine the extent of credit rationing endogenously include Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), 
Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Voordeckers and Steijvers (2008), Kremp and Sevestre 
(2011), and Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012), Adair and Fhima (2014), Farinha and Felix 
(2014), and Soana et al. (2015). They commonly assume that the quantity of credit 
demanded does not always being supplied or fulfilled due to credit market 
imperfection. Basically, the disequilibrium model consists of separate equations for 
demand, supply, and transaction equation, which allows estimation of proportion of 
firms facing credit rationing, that is, their demand for bank credit were not fulfilled by 
banks. An important advantage of using disequilibrium model to estimate credit 
rationing is that it is able to identify and isolate the effect of both demand and supply 
shocks to the credit condition of the sample firms. Their studies endogenously 
classified sample firms into borrowing-constrained and unconstrained using firm-
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specific variables such as sales turnover, size, internal cash flow, trade credit, 
collateral, and riskiness. Their studies emphasise the advantage of using endogenous 
variables for classification over exogenous that based on dividend policy and 
relationship characteristics. Their studies argued that using exogenous variables to 
estimate credit rationing restrict the sample firms from switching between between 
credit rationed and non-credit rationed (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Voordeckers 
and Steijvers (2008), while some proxies of exogenous variables such as dividend 
policy and capital structure are the outcome of management decisions, and are not 
appropriate measures to estimate the credit rationing (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 
2008).  
Atanasova and Wilson (2004) present an important paper examine the extent of credit 
rationing and the impact of monetary policy on credit supply in the UK using 
disequilibrium model. A measure of monetary condition is included in the supply 
equation to estimate the credit channel of monetary policy through corporate 
borrowing. Their result show that collateral can mitigate borrowing constraints and 
firms’ demand for bank credit rises but credit supply decreases during monetary policy 
tightening, whereas the proportion of credit-constrained firms is significant greater 
during recession. These results confirm the theoretical prediction of credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission. Moreover, the study also find that internal generated 
cash flow and trade credit are important substitutes for bank credit. A similar empirical 
strategy and specification has been used by other researchers to evaluate the credit 
rationing, including Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) in Japan, Voordeckers and Steijvers 
(2008) in Belgium, Kremp and Sevestre (2011) in France, and Carbo-Valverde et al. 
(2012) in Poland, Adair and Fhima (2014) in Tunisia, Farinha and Felix (2014) in 
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Portugal, and Soana et al. (2015) in Italy. These studies generally confirm the findings 
of Anatasova and Wilson (2004) that collateral significantly mitigate borrowing 
constraints, while internal generated cash flow and trade credit are important sources 
of funds substitutes for bank credit.  
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) examine the impact of securitisation in the credit supply 
and the study finds that both asset and mortgage backed securities (ABS) and covered 
bonds as measures of securitisation can reduce credit constraints in normal period but 
can intensifies credit rationing in crisis period. Kremp and Sevestre (2011) based on 
data of French SMEs found that firms do not strongly affected by credit rationing even 
during the financial crisis since 2008, caused by a decreasing firms’ demand for bank 
credit due to a significant fall in turnover and investment activities. Farinha and Felix 
(2014) examine on Portuguese SMEs found that a large proportion of firms was 
affected by credit rationing especially smaller and younger firms.  
2.5 Collateral and Access to Finance of SMEs 
As indicated in section 2.3, the credit markets may not function perfectly because 
lenders concern the adverse selection and moral hazard problem stemming from 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. The credit market 
imperfection explains that a firm is credit rationed when its demand for bank loans 
more than the amount that bank is willing to supply. It is caused by the information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers that give rise adverse selection problem. If 
the bank believes that the default risk associated with the borrower is too high, it would 
refuse to lend to the borrower even if the borrower offers to pay higher interest rate. It 
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has to highlight that smaller and younger SMEs are more subject to credit rationing 
than large firms because they tend to be more information opaque, due to a lack of 
trading and credit history (Helsen and Chmelar, 2014). For smaller and younger SMEs, 
lenders face greater adverse selection and moral hazard problem arising from 
information asymmetry. The uncertainty about the creditworthiness of smaller and 
younger SMEs lead them to more likely be credit rationed. There are a number of 
studies suggested that collateral can be used to mitigate the credit rationing for under 
the information asymmetry (e.g., Cowling, 2007; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009; 
Vlieghe, 2010; Berger et al., 2011; Berger and Udell, 1995; Gama and Duarte, 2015). 
A number of surveys have identified the importance of collateral in obtaining loans 
from banks in the real business world. For example, the National Survey of Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF) reports that nearly one third of business loans in 1998 were 
granted with collateral provided, and this figure has increased to 45% in 2003 
(Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Recently, the Survey on the Access to Finance of 
Enterprises (SAFE) conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2011 reported 
that one in five of the SMEs managers indicated that insufficient collateral was the 
key factor preventing from getting bank loans (European Commission, 2011). The 
SAFE survey conducted in 2013 identified an increasing collateral requirement for 
German and French SMEs (Helsen and Chmelar, 2014).  
Collateral plays a key role in mitigating the credit rationing arising from the problems 
of information asymmetry. For the smaller and younger SMEs that are particularly 
information opaque, it can be difficulty for the lender to assess their creditworthiness 
and the general viability of the economy. As a result, SMEs are more subject to credit 
rationing. In this case, collateral become an important assurance that allow the lender 
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to fix the interest rate more precisely, to the extent that the loan is covered by the value 
of the collateral (Helsen and Chmelar, 2014). From this perspective, it is able to justify 
that collateral is important sorting device for informational opaque SMEs (Steijvers 
and Voordeckers, 2009).  
Collateral has been suggested as a sorting device (Cowling, 2009). The idea is that 
good borrowers are willing to provide collateral because they are confident that they 
will not make default payment as they do not want to lose their assets (Cowling, 2007). 
Bad borrowers are unwilling to provide collateral because they know they are risky 
and more likely to lose their collateral. Moreover, collateral can be used to align the 
incentive of borrowers with the interests of the lender. The borrower only concerns 
about own profits when the project is successful but does not suffer the losses because 
they can eliminate the losses by bankruptcy. Instead, the lender only earns the interest 
rate if the project is successful but will lose the entire loans if the project fails. In this 
case, it argues that high interest rate will not deter borrowers with high risky project 
but will screen out low risk borrowers who cannot afford high interest rates. Requiring 
collateral allows borrowers to suffer some losses on default, decreasing the asymmetry 
in the returns and in turn strengthening the sorting of borrowers (Helsen and Chmelar, 
2014).  
There are a number of studies in the literature have empirically examined the effect of 
collateral in the corporate borrowing. For example, Atanasova and Wilson (2003) and 
Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) incorporated the collateral assets as a variable in the credit 
supply equation and they found that it is an important determinant of loan availability 
for SMEs in the UK and Japan, respectively. These studies found that firms with more 
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collateral assets are offered more bank loans. These studies also concluded that 
collateral asset is an important factor in mitigating the credit rationing. Moreover, 
Bandt et al. (2008) test the role of collateral assets by comparing the results with and 
without collateral assets in the supply equation, using a large firm-level panel dataset 
in the European countries. Bandt (2008) found that collateral assets take an important 
role in the credit supply and is especially significant for small companies in their 
sample.  
Berger et al. (2011) is a more recent paper to test whether the reduction in ex-ante 
information gaps between borrowers and lenders is associated with a lower incidence 
of collateral. In other words, it is to test whether collateral assets can mitigate the 
informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Based on a dataset of 
14,000 newly issued small business loan obtained from large US banks, Berger et al. 
(2011) finds a strong evidence suggesting that the need for collateral assets was 
lessened when banks can reduce the asymmetric information problem using credit 
scoring system to screening their borrowers.  
2.6 Summary 
The credit market imperfection has strong influential implications to many important 
issues in economics through its significant effects in the corporate finance structure, 
especially those of SMEs. The New Keynesian economics suggests that banks are 
preferable source of external finance than other debt finance because of their ability to 
better identification of borrowers’ quality and the cost advantage in monitoring the 
real ability of borrowers to repay loans, and thus reducing the agency costs incurred 
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with overcoming the asymmetric information and incentive problems (Ramskogler, 
2011). In contrast to larger firms, the fixed transaction cost of direct capital financing 
is likely to be a small proportion to their borrowing, and informational costs are likely 
to be lower due to their established reputations, bond ratings and published annual 
reports (Hall, 2001). Therefore, it is unlikely that large firms are highly dependent on 
bank finance but rather readily switch to finance from direct capital market. In the 
context of the SMEs, the consequence of credit rationing is that it might not only 
prevent the SMEs from having sufficient financial resource to fund profitable 
investment opportunities (Duchin et al., 2010), but also might seriously affect their 
ability to fund business operations, cause a dramatic surge in insolvencies and 
bankruptcies, and eventually reflecting a failure in aggregate economy. Indeed, the 
perspective of New Keynesian economists suggests that SMEs have been largely 
dependent on bank credit as a major source of external finance in supporting their 
business activities. This has an important implication that any shock to banks’ ability 
and willingness to lend may affect finance costs and availability of external finance to 
the SMEs. 
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3. The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the credit market imperfection from the perspective of the 
New Keynesian economics provides an explanation of the existence of credit rationing 
and the SMEs are largely depending on bank loans as a source of external finance. The 
existence of credit rationing and credit crunch has important implications on the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy explains how a relatively small effect in interest rates following a 
change in monetary policy can result in a large volatility in the economic output of a 
nation. The debate lies on the role of credit market, i.e., money view versus credit view. 
The credit view emphasises the role of bank lending in the amplification and 
propagation of the initial effect of monetary shock on corporate sector. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy and how it is related to the SMEs. This chapter starts with a discussion of how 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy works from the money view and 
credit view. After that, this chapter discusses the excess sensitivity hypothesis, which 
describes how the credit market imperfections amplify and propagate the effects of 
monetary policy. This chapter also discusses the disturbance on the monetary policy 
transmission during the credit crunch period.  
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3.2 Monetary View: The Textbook IS/LM Model 
In the money view of monetary policy transmission, banks offer no special services 
on the asset side of their balance sheet, but only on the liability side of their balance 
sheet. In other words, it creates money by issuing demand deposits (Hubbard, 1995; 
Peek and Rosengren, 2010). As specified in many textbooks, the idea of money view 
can be depicted in the typical IS/LM model, where there are two assets: money and 
bonds. The money view assumes that the capital structure does not affect the real 
decisions of the borrowers and lenders, and assumes that loans are perfect substitutes 
for bonds (Cavusoglu, 2002; Gambacorta, 2005). The proponents of money view 
suggest that in the event of monetary tightening, the rising interest rate will increase 
the cost of capital for the corporate sector, which will reduce the profitability of the 
firms’ prearranged spending and investment activities. As a result, rational investors 
would reduce interest-sensitive investment activities and consumptions, in turn, 
deteriorate domestic demand and will lead domestic prices to drop (Huang, 2003; 
Gambacorta, 2005). Moreover, rising cost of capital will also likely to result in firms 
to reduce number of employees in order to cut operating costs thus having an income 
effect on households, and further adversely impacting consumption demand and 
declining sales and profitability of firms (Ferreira, 2007). In short, the money view 
focuses a shift in loan demand following a change in the interest rate implied by the 
policy shocks (Hulsewig et al., 2006). 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) present an important paper to analyse the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) tested the responses of 
GDP output and commodity prices to an unanticipated monetary policy tightening 
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using the US monthly data between January 1965 and December 1993 based on a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model. The results revealed three puzzles in the 
monetary policy transmission. The first puzzle is related to the monetary shock that 
induce only a small movement in open-market interest rates, but has a strong impact 
on the real economy. This was tested by examining the elasticity of interest rates 
against different components of GDP and empirical studies have not found relatively 
strong influence of the cost of capital on the private spending. The second puzzle 
concerns with the poor timing correspondence between interest rates changes and 
movement in some components of spending. The money view predicts that the effect 
of interest rate should stop once it goes back to normal. However, the empirical study 
discovered that some key components of spending do not begin to react until most of 
the interest rate effect is past (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The third puzzle concerns 
with the monetary policy that supposed to have significant short-term effect on the 
spending on assets with shorter lives such as inventories and consumer durables. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) found that most rapid effect has been reflected on 
residential investment, which is perceived as long-lived and should be most reacted to 
long-term real interest rates.  
3.3 Credit View of Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism 
The puzzles shown in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggested that the impact of 
monetary policy shock is insufficient to be explained solely by the money view, and 
that has induced researchers to examine the role of the banking system in explaining 
the monetary policy transmission, known as the credit view or the credit channel. The 
credit view complements the conventional interest rate channel by emphasising the 
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role of banks that amplify and propagate the initial monetary shocks to firms’ 
investment and consumption activities (Atta-Mensah and Dib, 2008; Fountas and 
Papagapitos, 2001).  
In contrast to money view, the credit view recognises the presence of credit market 
imperfection, which posits that some corporate borrowers may have limited access to 
the capital market and rely on the banks credit as a source of external financing and 
thus they are not able to easily substitute to bonds issuance (Brissimis and Magginas, 
2005; Gambacorta, 2005; Bolton and Freixas, 2006; Diaz and Olivero, 2010). As a 
result, it is predictable that any shock that either change the ability of firms to obtain 
bank credit or the ability of banks to supply finance would have significant impact on 
their spending and investment activities.  
The key of credit view is that monetary policy innovation affects not only the interest 
rate, but also size of external finance premium, which is a premium associated with 
the agency costs of asymmetric information incurred by lenders as discussed earlier 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The credit channel specifies that the effect of monetary 
policy shock on firms is amplified and propagated by changes in cost and availability 
of credit over and above the standard impact on finance costs implied by change in 
official rates (Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). The ways that 
the effect of monetary policy can be transmitted to corporate sector under the credit 
view can be divided into balance sheet channel and bank lending channel. 
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3.3.1 Balance Sheet Channel 
The balance sheet channel emphasises that the monetary shocks to firms’ balance sheet 
that affect their ability to obtain external finance, further amplify and propagate the 
effects of initial monetary shocks to firms’ investment activities and consumptions 
(Auel and Mendonca, 2010; Disyatat, 2010). Banks use the information of the firms’ 
balance sheet as a signal of creditworthiness, including existing debts and debt to 
equity ratio, revenue and trends of growth, present and future cash flows, and many 
other measures derived from the firms’ balance sheets that indicate the firms’ ability 
to pay back their debt. Therefore, the external finance premium banks charge varies 
inversely with the firms’ financial positions (Hubbard, 1995). The higher the 
borrowers’ net worth (i.e., sum of liquid assets and marketable collateral), the lower 
the external finance premium charged. This is making sense because a stronger 
financial position implies a lower default risk borne by the lenders, and higher value 
of collateral assets can be used to secure loan liabilities, further reducing default risk, 
and thus a lower agency cost. Conversely, a higher external finance premium will be 
charged if the borrowers’ net worth decreased as a higher default risk incurred.  
The balance sheet channel works in a way that rising interest rates following a 
tightening monetary policy reduces firms’ net worth and cash flows, thus a negative 
impact on firms’ financial health. This increases loan premium that banks have to 
charge, and in turn affect borrowers’ investment and spending (Brissimis and Delis, 
2009; Florio, 2006). A tight monetary policy can affect the firms’ balance sheets in 
two ways. First, higher interest rate increases burdens of firm’s debt-service or finance 
costs, to the extent that borrowers have outstanding short-term or floating rate debt, 
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decreasing cash flows and profitability, thus weakening financial position (Hubbard, 
1995). The impact of monetary policy on firm’s operating cash flows is relatively 
significant because many firms greatly depend on short-term borrowing to fund 
business operations and investment. A fall in cash flows might increase proportion of 
firm’s investment project must be financed externally and thus increase needs for 
external finance. Second, a tighten monetary policy could lead to a fall in asset value 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The implied rising cost of purchasing assets is likely to 
reduce the market demand and so a fall in asset price. A higher interest rate also 
discounts the cash flows generated from assets and thus a fall in the present value of 
collateral net worth (Hubbard, 1995). A declining net income and collateral value of 
assets affect its creditworthiness and as a result the firm only able to obtain external 
finance at higher premium, and even a reduction in the amount of loan (Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008). 
3.3.2 Bank Lending Channel 
The bank lending channel emphasises the amplification and propagation effects that 
generated by the banking sector, mainly through the impact of monetary policy on 
banks’ balance sheet that influence the availability of loanable supply to their 
borrowers (Bernanke, 2007; Disyatat, 2010). The contraction in loan supply under the 
bank lending channel, in real business world, is often known as the credit crunch. The 
critical of credit crunch is that the impact of monetary tightening on external finance 
cost for some borrowers is beyond and over the increase in official interest rate, and 
may even reduce the amount of credit available to some borrowers. Loans spreads and 
quantities of lending are two key indicators of the cost and/or availability of finance 
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for borrowers to be impacted by credit crunch, as the results of the reduction in loan 
supply under the bank credit channel of monetary policy tightening (Hall, 2001).  
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) is among the first paper to model the bank lending 
channel to enhance the money view in explaining the monetary policy transmission, 
by expanding the conventional IS-LM model to allow imperfect substitutability 
between bank loans and bonds. The fundamental idea of the bank credit channel is that 
monetary policy has additional effects on investment activities operating through 
adjustments to the assets side of banks’ balance sheets, i.e., bank reserves (Bolton and 
Freixas, 2006; Diaz and Olivero, 2010). This is associated with the way that central 
bank can affect banks’ loanable supply. The main method adopted by central bank is 
through open market operation, which either gives banks more reserves or takes 
reserves away from banks by buying or selling government securities in the open 
market (Baumol and Blinder, 2009; Peek and Rosengren, 2010). if central bank comes 
to a decision to pursue a loosening monetary policy, it increases banks’ reserves by 
purchasing short-term government security/bond (known as Treasury bond or Gilt) 
from an institution or bank that want to sell them. Price of Treasury bond is an 
important factor to induce firms or banks to buy or sell them. That is, lower down bond 
price would encourage purchases, while increase the price would encourage sale.  
Besides open market operations, central bank as the ‘lender of last resort’ can be 
important for monetary policy transmission to stabilise the investment activity 
(Baumol and Blinder, 2009). In the event of crisis that made banks unwilling to lend 
due to the general risky business environment, or the crisis itself hurts the ability of 
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banks to lend, central bank can intervene by lending to banks at lower rate, creating 
new reserves to banks, which encourage them to extend credit to firms.  
To sum up, the interest rate channel views that the rising interest rate following the 
monetary tightening that increases the cost of capital may reduce the firms’ 
prearranged investment and spending activities, which would lead to a series of 
adverse impact on economy. The credit channel complement the explanation by 
focusing on the credit market friction, that is, the rising interest rate causes declining 
collateral value of assets and cash flows that adversely affect the creditworthiness of 
corporate borrowers (i.e., balance sheet channel), plus the open market operations of 
central banks in the monetary tightening that takes away the bank reserves and so the 
reduction in capacity to lend to their borrowers who need additional funds to support 
their business operations (i.e., bank lending channel), and therefore amplifying and 
propagating the effect of initial monetary shock to the borrowers. 
3.4 Implications of Credit Market Imperfection on the Monetary 
Policy Transmission Mechanism for the SMEs 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the credit market imperfection from the perspective of the 
New Keynesian economics provides an explanation of the existence of credit rationing 
and the SMEs are largely depending on bank loans as a source of external finance. The 
existence of credit rationing and credit crunch has important implications on the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
The SMEs are strongly depending on bank credit as a source of external finance. The 
New Keynesian economics suggests that bank credit is preferable source of external 
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finance than other debt finance because banks are able to better identify borrowers’ 
quality and the cost advantage in monitoring the real ability of borrowers to repay 
loans, and thus reducing the agency costs incurred with overcoming the asymmetric 
information and incentive problems (Ramskogler, 2011). This is because banks 
specialise in collecting information about borrowers’ ability to repay, including the 
patent of past loan repayment, income, and amount of present debt (Hall, 2001), 
obtained from the credit agencies/databases and the on-going relationships with 
customers. Moreover, banks as financial intermediaries may also be able to save 
searching and transaction costs that otherwise incur in the direct capital market. All 
these costs advantages have enabled banks to offer finance to their borrowers at a 
lower premium than in the direct capital market. This is especially important for 
smaller companies, which are particularly informational opaque and subject to these 
costs (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Atta-Mensah and Dib, 2008). Therefore, it is 
predictable that any shock to either banks’ capital or ability of corporate sectors to 
obtain loans from banks could have a serious impact on their ability to fund business 
operations and investment, and so economic output. 
The importance of monetary policy transmission in the SMEs is that the credit channel 
emphasises the role of bank lending in the amplification and propagation of the initial 
effect of monetary shock on the SMEs. The rising interest rate not only induces SMEs 
to reduce interest sensitive spending due to higher cost of capital, but more importantly 
due to the ability to obtain loans from banks to support their spending and investment. 
Specifically, the rising interest rate causes declining collateral value of assets and cash 
flows that adversely affect the creditworthiness of corporate borrowers (i.e., balance 
sheet channel), plus the open market operations of central banks in the monetary 
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tightening that takes away the bank reserves and so the reduction in capacity to lend 
to their borrowers who need additional funds to support their business operations (i.e., 
bank lending channel), and therefore amplifying and propagating the effect of initial 
monetary shock to the borrowers. Therefore, it is able to predict that any shock to the 
monetary policy has a strong impact on the corporate financing of SMEs, which are 
strongly depending on bank credit as a source of external financing.  
3.5 Previous Studies of the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
Transmission 
After reviewing the prior literature regarding how the studies examining the extent of 
credit rationing and their findings, it is now to review the prior empirical studies of the 
credit channel of monetary policy transmission. This section starts with a review on 
the prior literature on the balance sheet channel before looking into the bank lending 
channel.  
3.5.1 Balance Sheet Channel 
The theoretical prediction of balance sheet channel is that rising interest rate following 
a tightening monetary policy will increase firms burden of debt-service or finance cost 
to the extent of existing outstanding debt and also a fall in the present value of 
investment and assets due to higher interest rate. This in turn reduce firm’s cash flow 
and its value of collateral, decreasing the firm’s net worth, which negatively affect its 
creditworthiness and in turn firms are only able to obtain loans at higher external 
finance premium that banks charge, and further amplify and propagate the effect of 
initial monetary shocks.  
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Bernanke and Blinder (1995) is an important paper to carry out an empirical study on 
the credit channel of monetary policy transmission. To test the balance sheet channel, 
it used time series vector autoregression (VAR) model to examine the relationship 
between interest rates and coverage ratio and different components of corporate cash 
flow following an unexpected tightening of monetary policy. Coverage ratio has been 
suggested as an important measurement of risk associated with the ability of a firm to 
pay back its debts. Based on the US data between 1965 to 1995, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) find strong and immediate positive responses of coverage ratio along with the 
movement in funds rates, confirming the prediction of the balance sheet channel 
because the rising funds rate increases the interest expenses (the numerator of the 
coverage ratio) and lower the profit (the denominator of the coverage ratio). The study 
also finds a declining corporate cash flows and profits following a monetary policy 
tightening. It finds an increasing interest costs following a monetary tightening have 
directly contributed to the profits reduction, and at the same time, the corporate income 
fell faster than the cost of employee compensation. Moreover, the result shows that 
the cash of firms squeeze reached its peak around 6 to 9 months after the monetary 
contraction, at the time when output, inventories, and investment of firms start to 
reduce. The empirical study is important as it provides evidence confirming that the 
innovation in monetary policy can have a significant impact on the ability of firms in 
obtaining bank credit, in terms of their creditworthiness that banks most concern in 
making a loan approval, as the balance sheet channel posits.  
Bougheas et al. (2006) and Huang (2003) examined the balance sheet channel using 
panel data approach and their studies examine the impact of monetary policy 
tightening (i.e., rising interest rate) on the firm’s ability to raise bank finance based on 
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the firm-specific characteristics, such as size, risk, and debt. Based on a panel data of 
16,000 manufacturing firms in the UK from 1989 to 2001, Bougheas et al. (2006) finds 
that more financial vulnerable firms (i.e., those smaller, riskier, and younger firms) 
are more markedly affected the monetary tightening than larger, more secure, or older 
firms. They also found smaller firms with less profitability, higher level of debts, or 
lower level of collateral assets were heavily reliant on short-term loans. The result 
confirms the balance sheet channel because balance sheets of smaller, younger, and 
riskier firms are greatly affected by initial rising interest rate and at the same time they 
heavily dependent on short-term loans but banks are unlikely willing to extend loans 
to them, therefore amplifying and propagating the initial impact of interest rate.  
Huang (2003) attempts to find evidence of the balance sheet channel by looking at 
how the impact of monetary policy tightening on firms varies with the bank-
dependency and those listed or non-listed. Based on a panel of 1024 listed non-
financial firms in the UK between 1975 and 1999, the study found a general reduction 
of bank loans to firms during monetary tightening, but more obvious to the small, 
bank-dependent firms than large, non-bank-dependent firms which can benefit more 
from the relationship banking. 
3.5.2 Bank Lending Channel 
There are several empirical methodologies that have been used by prior studies to 
examine the bank lending channel of momentary policy transmission, including VAR 
analysis, flight to quality model, using bank-level data, and using the disequilibrium 
model. These empirical methodologies are evaluated in this subsection and their 
findings are also discussed.  
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VAR Analysis 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) present an important paper providing evidence of bank 
lending channel by examining the impulse response of bank loans, deposits, and 
securities of the US economy to a tightening monetary policy using VAR analysis. 
Based on monthly aggregate data from the balance sheets of commercial banks 
between 1941 1970, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found an obvious reduction in the 
amount of securities and deposits but no significant change in bank loans in short run 
following a monetary policy tightening. This result matches the predictions of bank 
lending channel because following a monetary tightening, there would be a reduction 
in deposit available to banks partly due to the higher reserve requirement, and so a 
decrease in securities holding as banks can immediately liquidate the securities hold 
to diminish the effect of decrease in deposit. The study found bank loans only started 
to drop significantly over a longer run. One explanation of the phenomenon is the loan 
commitments and other implicit arrangements that prevent banks from quickly shifting 
their portfolios in response to a monetary shock (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; 
Kashyap et al., 1993). Hulsewig et al. (2006) cited that a number of studies have tested 
the existence of bank credit channel using the approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
and they generally found similar results.  
However, the empirical strategy used in Bernanke and Blinder (1992) to examine on 
the aggregate data has been widely criticised for containing a severe identification 
problem that is, unable to identify whether the reduction in bank loans is driven by a 
shift in loan supply or loan demand (e.g., Kashyap et al., 1993; Kashyap and Stein, 
1995; Hulsewig et al., 2006; Dell’Aricca et al., 2008; Brissimis and Delis, 2009). It 
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should be noted that the credit channel focuses on the monetary effect on the loan 
supply whereas interest rate channel focuses on loan demand. They argue that if the 
reduction in bank loans is driven solely by loan demand, then the credit channel should 
not exist.  
In recognition of this identification problem, there is a number of empirical studies 
attempting to separate the effect of the firm-specific demand shock from the supply 
shock. For example Kashyap et al. (1993) examine the behaviour of bank loans and 
commercial paper issuance; Kashyap and Stein (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) examine the monetary policy effect on the loan behaviour 
of commercial banks using disaggregate bank-level data and empirical surveys on 
bank loans rejection, and Atanasova and Wilson (2004) and Baek (2006) adopt the 
disequilibrium model of credit rationing that allows classification of firms into 
borrowing-constrained and unconstrained.  
Flight to Quality: Commercial Papers 
Kashyap et al. (1993) attempt to solve the identification problem by examining the 
behaviour of bank loans and commercial papers, and it explained that if monetary 
policy worked only through the interest rate channel, the monetary policy contraction 
lead to a reduction in bank loans that is caused by a reduction in credit demand (i.e., 
induced by increasing cost of capital). If this is the case, then demand for other non-
bank sources of borrowing should also be shrinking at the same time. In contrast, if 
the credit channel exists when reduction in bank loans is caused by a shift in loan 
supply, some firms might switch their finance by issuing commercial paper. Their 
empirical study found an immediate dramatic increase in the issuance of US 
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commercial paper following a tight monetary policy, and the bank loans only began 
to drop in longer run, indicating that banks limitation in loanable supply have resulted 
in borrowers to switch finance by issuing commercial paper.  
Atanasova and Wilson (2003) provide a further interpretation of the finding of flight 
to quality. Atanasova and Wilson (2003) suggested that firms generally demanded 
more for short-term credit because the rising interest rate deteriorating their cash flows 
following a tightening policy, but access to the commercial paper market depends on 
their credit quality. They argued that the rising commercial paper was mainly 
contributed by the high-grade borrowers who were turned away from bank loans, as 
many firms are not always accessible to the commercial paper issuance, especially for 
SMEs, which are particularly informational opaque and more subject to additional 
costs incurred in issuing commercial paper. Therefore, the analysis of bank loans and 
commercial papers may not able to clarify the situation for the SMEs. 
Bank-level Data 
Testing the bank credit channel using aggregate data has been criticised that not 
possible to identify whether the contraction in bank loans is induced by a shift in loan 
supply or loan demand (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Hulsewig et al., 2006; 
Brissimis and Delis, 2009). This has prompted some studies to use bank-level data to 
find evidence of the bank credit channel. These studies examined the impact of 
monetary policy tightening on the lending behaviour, deposits, and securities holding 
of individual banks according to their specific characteristics such as size, liquidity, 
and capitalisation.  
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Based on disaggregated data on the balance sheet of banks in the European countries 
between 1976 and 1992, Kashyap and Stein (1995) find that a tighten the monetary 
policy (i.e., increase federal funds rate) lead to a drop in the deposits available to banks 
and adversely affect the lending of smaller banks significantly, but increases the 
lending of large bank in the short run. The study also discovers that securities holdings 
of banks have been affected by monetary policy, and small banks are more sensitive 
to monetary policy than larger banks. This confirms the theoretical predictions of the 
bank lending channel that the monetary policy tightening affects the capacity of banks 
to lend. Their later study that based on nearly a million quarterly data on the US 
commercial banks between 1976 and 1993 also found a similar result, confirming the 
effect of monetary policy on the banks’ lending behaviour in the US region.  
Kishan and Opiela (2000), Gambacorta (2005), and Jimborean (2009) followed the 
approach of Kashyap and Stein (1995), but added bank capital as an additional factor. 
They specified that bank capital can act as a role of absorbing the effect of monetary 
shocks to the assets and thus a signal of bank’s creditworthiness and ability to raise 
alternative funds and maintaining loan growth during monetary tightening. Based on 
13,000 data of commercial banks in the US between 1980 and 1995, Kishan and 
Opiela (2000) find a result similar to Kashyap and Stein (1995) that undercapitalised 
banks are significantly responsive to a change in federal funds rate. Kishan and Opiela 
(2000) find that for undercapitalised banks with assets less than $50 million, one 
percentage point growth in the federal funds rate causes over 7% drop in the growth 
rate of current period in the total loans over four periods. This is compared to well-
capitalised banks with the same level of assets, the total loans respond by only 4.4%. 
Based on a panel of the commercial banks’ balance sheet data from 10 Central and 
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Eastern European countries between 1998 and 2006, Jimborean (2009) also confirms 
that smaller, high liquid banks strongly affected by the monetary policy tighten 
compared to larger and/or low liquid banks. Brissimis and Delis (2009) applied a 
similar approach to six OECD countries over 1996 to 2003 and it finds a strong 
evidence of bank credit channel in Japan and Greece, mainly due to the financial 
distress of 1990s in Japan and the recent financial deregulations that have not been 
absorbed in Greece during the sample period.  
These empirical studies that use panel data approach generally find a negative impact 
of monetary policy tightening on banks’ balance sheets, which affect their ability and 
willingness to lend, including deposits to banks, securities holdings, and their lending 
behaviour based on their characteristics such as size, liquidity, and bank capital. These 
studies provide evidence of the impact of monetary shocks on banks and it is 
predictable that banks affected by the monetary tightening shocks would tighten credit 
policy and therefore affect credit or financing condition of corporate borrowers. 
Nonetheless, it is criticised that these studies do not provide direct evidence of the 
impact on their corporate borrowers.  
3.5.3 The Disequilibrium Model of Credit Rationing 
Previous studies that examined the effect of monetary shocks to corporate sector face 
challenges in separating effect of firm-specific demand shock from supply shock of 
monetary policy. In other words, previous studies were not able to identify and isolate 
the effect of monetary policy on the supply side of the bank loans. For example, 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) examined the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission using the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis on the aggregate data. 
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The results of these VAR analysis generally showed an obvious reduction of bank 
loans following a tighten monetary policy. However, it has been largely criticised for 
failing to identify whether the loans reduction is caused by a shift in loan supply or 
loan demand (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Hulsewig et al., 2006; Brissimis and 
Delis, 2009). If the reduction in bank loans is solely driven by a fall in loan demand, 
then their analysis should not form evidence showing the impact of monetary shock 
to banks’ capital on corporate borrowers.  
Atanasova and Wilson (2004) attempted to solve the identification problem 
encountered by the prior empirical studies by using the disequilibrium model of credit 
rationing to examine the credit channel of monetary policy transmission. By including 
a measure of monetary condition in the supply equation of the disequilibrium model, 
the identification problem can be solved because it disentangles the effect of firm-
specific demand shock from supply shock. The advantage of using disequilibrium 
model to estimate the credit channel of monetary policy is that it is able to identify and 
isolate the effect of monetary policy on the demand and supply of bank credit to the 
sample firms. The disequilibrium model contains separate equations for the demand 
and the supply of bank loans. Therefore, it is able to capture the impact of monetary 
shocks to firms’ balance sheet that banks used as a signal of creditworthiness such as 
collateral and credit risk. On the other hand, it is also able to capture the shocks to 
firm’s demand for bank finance. Their result generally confirms the theoretical 
prediction that banks reduce their supply of loans to SMEs in the UK when the 
monetary policy is tight.  
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3.6 Impact of Macroeconomic Real Shocks on Borrowing 
In recent empirical literature, there is a considerable amount of literature provide an 
analysis of how credit market plays an important role in amplifying and propagating 
the effect of macroeconomic real shocks on corporate sector and economy. In an 
important paper, Bernanke et al. (1999) developed a financial accelerator model, 
which they incorporate the assumptions of credit market imperfection into the standard 
macroeconomic model to demonstrate the role of credit market friction in the business 
fluctuation. Bernanke et al. (1999) is a very influential model that many studies 
provided analysis on the implication of the model. Bernanke et al. (1999) considers 
that a firm’s demand for capital depends on the potential borrower’s net worth that act 
as a negotiation of terms of external finance with banks. The general setup of the 
model involves incorporating these relationships into the Dynamic New Keynesian 
(DNK) model in order to illustrate how variations in borrower’s net worth can amplify 
and propagate exogenous shocks to the system. In the model simulation, they studied 
on the shocks of technology, government expenditure, and the redistribution of wealth 
from households to entrepreneurs. The results strongly support the theoretical 
prediction of financial accelerator, which posit that credit market can amplify and 
propagate technology and demand shocks. Moreover, the results also indicate that the 
transfer of wealth from households to entrepreneurs does not show relevant effect in 
the system without financial accelerator, but show significant propagation effects 
when credit market frictions exist.  
However, Gerali et al. (2009) argued that the model developed by Bernanke et al. 
(1999) does not incorporate the role of banks but assume that credit transaction makes 
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through the market. They improve the empirical model and test it using data from 
European Central Bank over the period between 1999 Q1 and 2008 Q3. Their 
estimated impulse response has confirmed the findings of Bernanke et al. (1999), and 
also found that the presence of banks has widens the spread between loan rates and 
policy rate and that should responsible for amplification and propagation effect on 
initial shocks. The empirical study also finds evidence of financial accelerator in the 
recent financial crisis where firms and banks were hit by macroeconomic shocks (i.e., 
correction of asset price bubble) and further amplified and propagated by credit crunch 
problem. Similarly, Christiano et al. (2007) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) 
also recognised the importance of banks in amplification and propagation of the initial 
shock to real economy, and thus incorporate banks in their DSGE model. However, 
for simplicity they assume the banks work under perfect competition and do not set 
interest rates, and therefore may not be realistic.  
Cavalcanti (2010) tests the model of Bernanke et al. (1999) on a panel data for 62 
countries between 1981 and 1998 to examine the relationship between credit market 
imperfections and financial accelerator. The empirical model is based on linear 
regression method to estimate the impact of monetary shock (measured by standard 
deviation of real interest rate), volatility of GDP and terms of trade, and volatility of 
GDP growth in the country’s main trade partner, on the business fluctuation (measured 
by standard deviation of GDP growth per capita). The results indicate that for countries 
with low levels of credit market frictions, financial reform that intended to lower such 
frictions would result in a falling macroeconomic volatility, irrespective of the type of 
friction directed. In contrast, for countries with substantial high level of credit market 
friction, macroeconomic volatility would not change significantly due to the decrease 
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in contract enforcement costs, but could rise when the anti-creditor bias in judicial 
system decreases. 
Diaz and Olivero (2010) is another paper that study the implication of Bernanke et al. 
(1999), i.e., the cyclical price-cost margin in credit markets as an amplifier of business 
fluctuation, based on quarterly data on banks’ balance sheets between 1984 to 2005 in 
the US. The study treats the banks’ price-cost margins as the external finance premium, 
measured by the difference between interest rate on loans and banks’ marginal cost of 
funds. Four types of margins have been used in the test and they are the ratio of the 
difference between interest income and expenses to banks’ assets; the ratio of 
difference between interest income and expenses to loans; the spread between bank 
prime and federal funds rate; and the spread between lending rate taken from business 
lending survey and federal funds rate. GDP and total loan as proxy of business cycles. 
Based on a VAR forecast error-based methodology, they find that economy activity is 
negatively and significantly correlated with all the margins, and therefore supporting 
the existence of financial accelerator. 
Vijverberg (2002) attempts to test the impact of financial accelerator on small firms in 
the US industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment sector between 
1972 and 1991. The empirical model is based on a multi-equation switching regression 
model with the unit transaction cost of debt and rationed credit as measures of balance 
sheets and credit market conditions. In respect to the impact of a change in balance 
sheet on corporate investment behaviour, the result shows that a riskier firm with a 
higher debt-asset ratio tend to have higher transaction costs and so a lower investment, 
plus that a credit-constrained firm is not able to borrow as much as they desired for 
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inventory and therefore a decreasing corporate investment. Regarding the impact of a 
change in credit market situation on small firms, the study finds that a shock to credit 
has affect both capital and inventory investment, and more specifically, a larger impact 
on the inventory investment. 
3.7 Quantitative Easing 
3.7.1 Portfolio Balance Channel 
There are several problems and challenges faced by researchers when carrying out 
empirical study on the impact of QE, including attribution issues and counterfactual 
problem. The first problem is attribution issues, which refers to the challenges in 
isolating the impact of QE on economic and financial development as there are many 
other monetary and fiscal policy interventions and shocks at the same time (Joyce et 
al., 2012; Bernardo et al., 2013). Those interventions include reduced interest rate, 
banks’ capital requirement, a significant increased government spending and reduced 
taxation (i.e., fiscal policy to boost demand), injection of money to support market 
liquidity, as well as spillover effects from other countries such as US and Euro area 
taking the similar measures. Second, the counterfactual problem arises when it is not 
possible to truly answer the question whether the QE programme is effective in driving 
economic and financial development unless a counterfactual about what would have 
happened if QE intervention had not been carried out (Joyce et al., 2012). 
There is a considerable amount of literature in the UK carried out studies on providing 
empirical evidence to support the portfolio balance channel of the transmission of 
quantitative easing to the economy. However, most empirical studies have inferred the 
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transmission of quantitative easing from the changes in financial market such as 
government bond prices or yields and other asset prices and risk spreads rather than 
from direct evidence on investors’ behaviour (Joyce et al., 2014). Moreover, Bernardo 
et al. (2013) also suggest that it might take longer time lags for the QE to come to 
effect on the wider macroeconomic impact and as a result another factor that has to be 
controlled for in empirical study.  
Bernardo et al. (2013) attempt to overcome the attribution and counterfactual problems 
by examining the impact of QE-related variables on nominal GDP growth using 
quarterly data from 1990 to 2012. It includes 4 lags of each variable and dummy 
variables in 2000 Q2 as structural break and in 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q2 to adjust for the 
effect of financial crisis. Bernardo et al. (2013) use bank rate (a main instrument of 
monetary policy), quantity of reserves in the banking system, total assets of BoE (a 
measure of portfolio rebalancing effect), ratio of long-term assets to assets held on 
BoE’s balance sheet (a measure of qualitative easing), M4 broad money, and M4LREx 
bank credit to the real economy excluding effects of securitization (a measure of credit 
creation by banks). Using Hendry’s ‘general to specific’ econometric methodology, 
the results show that disaggregated bank credit to the real economy (both households 
and corporate sector) has the most significant impact on nominal GDP growth. 
However, their results show that the changes in interest rate, reserves, and total central 
bank assets ratio do not have significant impact on GDP growth.  
Using vector autoregression (VAR) model, Churm et al. (2015) found that the second 
round of the Bank’s QE purchases during 2011-2012 and the initial phase of the FLS 
each boosted GDP in the UK by nearly 0.5% to 0.8%, whereas the effect on inflation 
 
Chapter 3: The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy                                                     62 
 
 
 
was broadly positive 0.6 percentage points at its peak. Joyce et al. (2012) documented 
an evidence showed a rise in the price of substitute assets for government gilt and a 
significant fall in corporate bond yield in 2009 after the QE programme was 
implemented. Moreover, Joyce et al. (2012) also found an improved capital market 
borrowing conditions in the UK as a dramatic increase in corporate bond and equity 
issuance in 2009.  
Joyce et al. (2014) enhance the evidence of portfolio balance channel of QE by 
comparing the net investment behaviour of insurance companies and pension funds 
before and during the financial crisis, which allows estimation of the sectors that sold 
gilts to the Bank of England and where they reinvested the proceeds. Based on unique 
data on insurance companies and pension funds, Joyce et al. (2014) find that these 
insurance companies and pension funds reduce their investment in gilts but increase 
investment in corporate bonds. This finding is consistent with prediction of the 
portfolio balance channel, which posit that sellers of gilts will use the proceeds to 
invest in riskier, higher return assets and that will increase the asset prices and reduce 
yield, in turn increase net wealth of the asset holders, and as a result encourage 
spending and investment in the economy. 
3.7.2 Bank Lending Channel  
Joyce et al. (2011) specified that MPC anticipated a little effect through banking 
lending channel due to disruption in the financial system and consequent pressures on 
banks to extend more credit that might shrink the size of their balance sheets. 
Nonetheless, Bernardo et al. (2013) believed that the £200 billion of assets purchases 
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in the first round of QE programme in 2009 might have at least prevented a further 
decrease in credit creation but the effect may be limited.  
Joyce and Spaltro (2014) test the bank lending channel of QE by examining the 
historical bank-level relationship between deposits and bank lending. Based on 
quarterly balance sheet data from 30 financial institutions in the UK, Joyce and Spaltro 
(2014) found the QE between 2009 and 2010 may have resulted in small but 
statistically significant increase in bank lending growth. Their results show the effect 
through bank lending channel are likely to be limited the estimated marginal effects 
through deposits are small and they suggest this might due to a low level of bank 
capital. In addition, they found that lending by small banks are more responsive to 
changes in deposits than larger banks and this implied the level of bank capital is an 
important factor in explaining the role of bank lending channel in the transmission of 
QE. This is consistent with the finding of Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), 
which found banks with weaker capital positions and more reliance on market funding 
are likely to reduce their lending than banks with better capital positions during the 
financial crisis.  
In contrast, Butt et al. (2014) used different empirical strategy found no statistical 
significant evidence on the effect of QE in increasing bank lending in the UK based 
on a unique dataset available combining the balance sheet and market operation data 
of financial institutions between 1990 and 2013. Using a different-to-different 
approach, Butt et al. (2014) separated banks into one with large share of funding from 
other financial corporations (OFCs) and another without, and they found no evidence 
that banks have used the deposits generated from OFC to increase lending. Moreover, 
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Butt et al. (2014) also test whether rises in OFC deposits realised during QE were 
correlated with improved lending by using the exogeneity of gilt sales by customers. 
After controlling for bank specific effects and system-wide changes in credit provision, 
they found the changes in OFC deposits were not correlated with changes in lending. 
In addition, Butt et al. (2014) found evidence of flighty deposits that both reserves and 
OFC deposits increased in banks that participated in gilt sales but only a portion of the 
money left at the end of the month. This suggests that banks are less likely to have 
used the deposits to extend lending but implies that the transmission of QE worked 
through portfolio rebalancing channel.  
3.8 Summary 
One major challenge to the empirical studies to examine the impact of macroeconomic 
shocks to the corporate borrowers is to separate the effect of firm-specific demand 
shocks from the supply side shock. For example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
examined the credit channel of monetary policy transmission using the VAR analysis 
on the aggregate data. The results of these VAR analysis generally showed an obvious 
reduction of bank loans following a tighten monetary policy. However, it has been 
largely criticised for failing to identify whether the loans reduction is caused by a shift 
in loan supply or loan demand. One strand of empirical researchers that suggested that 
examining the effect of monetary shocks to the banks’ balance sheets is a useful 
evidence to predict the effect on the corporate borrowers. However, it is argued that 
this is indirect evidence and so should not form the main evidence to determine the 
effect of macroeconomic shocks to the corporate borrowers. Instead, the adoption of 
disequilibrium model of credit rationing is able to eliminate this identification problem 
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by setting up separate equations containing factors determining the credit demand and 
supply. Its endogenous regime switching allows better classification of firms into 
borrowing-constrained and unconstrained without restriction once assigned.  
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4. Monetary Condition Index (MCI) for the UK 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the aims of this thesis is to examine the impact of monetary policy on the 
availability of bank loans for the UK’s SMEs over the sample period between 1991 
and 2010. In Chapter 3, it has provided a discussion of the roles played by banks in 
amplifying and propagating the initial effect of interest rate shock in the monetary 
policy transmission. It is now necessary to produce a measure of monetary policy 
stance for the UK. This chapter aims to develop an index of monetary policy as the 
indicator of monetary policy stance in the UK between 1991 and 2010. The estimated 
MCI will be used in the supply equation of the disequilibrium model in the Chapter 5 
to estimate the impacts of monetary policy on the availability of bank loans to the 
UK’s SMEs. In addition, this chapter also provides an analysis of the monetary policy 
stance in the UK based on the results of the estimated MCI. The analysis of monetary 
policy stance in the UK is important for policymakers to determine the direction to 
steer the economy. The analysis of the monetary condition is more than the direct 
influence of the central bank intervention in the market operations, but it summarises 
the outcomes of development in the overall monetary sphere on the economic 
activities (Gottschalk, 2001).  
In section 4.2, the rationale for estimating the MCI as an indicator of monetary policy 
tightness in the UK is explained. This is to show the benefits for using MCI as an 
indicator of monetary policy tightness rather than using the official interest rate. In 
 
Chapter 4: The MCI for the UK                                                                                                   67 
 
 
 
section 4.3, the methodologies that used by previous studies to estimate the MCI are 
evaluated. In section 4.4, the estimation of the MCI is presented with a description of 
the data used in the estimation. The estimated MCI will be discussed In section 4.5.  
4.2 The MCI as an Indication of the Monetary Policy Tightness 
This section provides the rationale for estimating the MCI as an indication of the 
monetary policy tightness rather than using the official interest rate. This section starts 
with a summary of the monetary policy transmission and discuss how the monetary 
condition of a country can also be influenced by the exchange rate. This section also 
provides justification of why estimating the MCI is superior to the interest rate by 
discussing the importance of exchange rate in affecting the monetary condition.  
4.2.1 A Summary of Interest Rate and Bank Credit Channel 
The monetary policy affects the economy activity and inflation through multiple 
channels. Interest rate is the immediate instrument of monetary policy used by central 
banks to affect the overall level of economic activity and inflation. It can be perceived 
from the traditional interest rate channel and credit channel. The interest rate channel 
works in a way that changes in the official interest rate affects the market interest rate 
affects the firms’ investment and borrowing decisions through its impact of the cost 
of capital (Gambacorta, 2005). The credit channel suggests that bank credit plays an 
important role in monetary policy transmission through its influence on the balance 
sheets of the corporate sector (i.e., balance sheet channel) and banks (i.e., bank lending 
channel). The balance sheet channel suggests that changes in the interest rate affect 
the value of collateral assets hold by the firms and their cash flows, which in turn 
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influence the borrowers’ creditworthiness. The bank lending channel suggests that the 
interest rate changes affect the banks’ balance sheets, which affect their capacity to 
lend. The impact of interest rate on the balance sheets of both firms and banks would 
affect the corporate borrowing, and therefore their spending and investment activities. 
This is particularly important for SMEs, which has been suggested that are 
informational opaque and depending on bank credit as a source of external financing.  
4.2.2 The Influence of Exchange Rate on Monetary Condition 
Besides the interest rate, the monetary condition of a country is also affected by the 
domestic exchange rate, which has an effect on the consumer price inflation and 
economic activity (Dennis, 1997; Batini and Turnbull, 2000). For example, an 
appreciation in the exchange rate makes import less expensive but makes export more 
expensive. The appreciation in exchange rate improves the foreign competitiveness 
and adversely affect the demand of domestic products. Conversely, a depreciation in 
the exchange rate makes import more expensive and makes export less expensive, 
which decreases the competitiveness of foreign products, thus improve the demand for 
domestic products. The exchange rate can thereby reinforce the effect of the official 
interest rate on the economy activity. From this perspective, in addition to the official 
interest rate, the exchange rate also affects the monetary policy stance (Dennis, 1997).  
The effect of exchange rate is particularly important in the UK because it is an open 
economy emphasising on free flow of export and import goods across the border. In 
the UK where it is open economy with a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate 
plays an important role in the monetary policy transmission (Gottschalk, 2001). 
Previous studies have suggested that it is best to assess the extent of monetary 
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tightening or easing relative to prior periods by examining both the exchange rate and 
interest rate channel of monetary transmission (Gerlach and Smets, 2000; Gottschalk, 
2001). In fact, in the UK, the SMEs has a significant contribution to the UK export. It 
has been reported that the SMEs accounted for more than half of the value of goods 
of the UK exports, which is equivalent to €135 billion (the Authority of the House of 
Lords, 2013).  
4.2.3 Possible Uses of MCI 
The MCI is a leading indicator that measure the degree of tightness of the monetary 
condition in an economy. It has been widely used and published by central banks and 
governmental institutions as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy, including 
the central banks of Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (Ericsson et al., 
2000). The MCI has also been estimated by financial institutions and international 
organisations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, 
and Merrill Lynch to investigate the monetary conditions in certain countries (Ericsson 
et al., 2000).  
There are three possible uses of the MCI: operational target, indicator, and monetary 
policy rule. The MCI is an important indicator of monetary condition and it shows 
whether the central bank loosen or tighten monetary policy (Siklar and Dogan, 2015). 
However, it has been criticised the MCI as an operational target tool, which is 
restricted because the choice of weights for interest rate and exchange rate varies on 
its comparative value on inflation and aggregate demand (Siklar and Dogan, 2015).  
 
Chapter 4: The MCI for the UK                                                                                                   70 
 
 
 
It has been criticised that the estimation of MCI’s weights is highly sensitive to the 
chosen model of economy and therefore implying some degree of uncertainty in the 
MCI estimation (Costa, 2000). Moreover, it has also been argued that movement in 
MCI does not directly associated with the changes in monetary policy. Instead, the 
monetary condition of a nation should also be affected by other financial variables 
other than interest rates and exchange rates. As a result, MCI appears inappropriate as 
an operational target for monetary policy but merely as indication of tightness of 
monetary condition in a country compared with previous period (Costa, 2000). This is 
consistent with the purpose of this thesis to use MCI in the disequilibrium model, as 
an indication of the tightness of monetary condition. 
4.3 A Review of the Methodologies to Estimate the MCI 
Section 4.2 provides explanation of why the MCI should be a better measure of 
monetary policy stance of a nation than using the official interest rate alone. As a 
summary, the official interest rate also affects the domestic exchange rate, which also 
tend to change the economic activity and inflation rate. From this perspective, the 
exchange rate can reinforce the effect of the official interest rate on the economic 
activity. Therefore, it should take into account both the interest rate and exchange rate 
in the calculation of the MCI. This idea forms the underlying construction of the MCI. 
MCI is commonly constructed as ‘a weighted average of the percentage point change 
in the interest rate and the exchange rate relative to their values in a base period’ 
(Batini and Turnbull, 2000; Peeters, 1999; Hyder and Khan, 2007; Toroj, 2008; 
Shinkai and Kohsaka, 2010; Osborne-Kinch and Holton, 2010). The key of calculating 
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the MCI is the estimation of the weight of the interest rate and the weight of the 
exchange rate. The MCI’s weights reflect the extent to which the changes in the 
interest rate and exchange rate affect the economy output. To derive the MCI, the 
weights of the interest rate and exchange rate will first be estimated and then inserted 
into the MCI equation.  
There are several ways to estimate the MCI’s weights, rather than simply select the 
weights arbitrary. There are three main methods for deriving the MCI’s weights, 
namely the single equation method, trade share method, and multiple equation method 
(Batini and Turnbull, 2002; Osborne-Kinch and Holton, 2010; and Siklar and Dogan, 
2015). Using the single equation method, the MCI’s weights are computed by 
estimating the aggregate demand equation. It reflects the relative effect of the interest 
rate and the exchange rate on the aggregate demand (Siklar and Dogan, 2015). The 
single equation method has been used by IMF, OECD, and Merrill Lynch for 
computing the MCI’s weights for the UK (Batini and Turnbull, 2002). Using the trade 
share method, the weight on the exchange rate is derived by estimating the long-run 
exports to the GDP ratio equation, while the weight on the interest rate is equivalent 
to the weight of exchange rate deducted by one (Batini and Turnbull, 2002). The trade 
share method has been used by JP Morgan to derive the MCI’s weights. The estimation 
of MCI’s weights using the multiple equation method involves estimating the vector 
autoregression (VAR) model (Siklar and Dogan, 2015). The multiple equation method 
has been used by Goldman Sachs to estimate the MCI’s weights for the UK. The 
MCI’s weights are obtained from the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the GDP 
to a shock in the interest rates and the exchange rate.  
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After describing the three possible estimation methods of the MCI’s weights, it is now 
to evaluate them. The single aggregate demand equation and the trade share method 
have been criticised that they could not reflect the dynamic response of the real 
economy to the shocks in the interest rate and the exchange rate (Siklar and Dogan, 
2015). This is because they derive the MCI’s weights using the average values of 
financial effects on the real economy (Batini and Turnbull, 2000). However, the 
multiple equation method, i.e., the VAR model, is able to reflect the dynamic 
responses of real economy to the shocks in the interest rate and exchange rate because 
the weights are estimated using the impulse responses of the economy output to the 
shocks in the interest rate and the exchange rate (Shinkai and Kohsaka, 2010). The 
dynamic response is particularly important in this thesis, which involves estimating 
on panel dataset.  
Moreover, both the single equation method and the trade share method have also been 
criticised that they contain variables that are correlated with the residuals, known as 
the exogeneity problem (Hyder and Khan, 2007; Shinkai and Kohsaka, 2010). To 
explain why the MCI’s weight must not be considered as exogenous, it is necessary to 
discuss the uncovered interest parity (UIP) that links up the real interest rate and real 
exchange rate. The uncovered interest parity holds that free capital flows would cause 
the positive interest rate inconsistent with the rest of the world into appreciation with 
expectation of future depreciation (Toroj, 2008). However, it has been suggested that 
the equilibrium rarely holds in the short-term. The monetary conditions cannot be 
considered as exogenous, at least not in the mid to long-term, because the central bank 
is responding to macroeconomic development with its policy rate and exchange rate 
as two major equilibrating mechanisms (Toroj, 2008). If financial variables in the 
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estimation model of MCI are assumed to be exogenous, the estimators will be biased. 
The VAR model is able to avoid the exogeneity problem.  
In addition, the single equation method also contains variables that are not parameter 
constant. The coefficients acquired to derive the MCI weights are sensitive to the 
selected sample period for the estimation. With nonconstant parameters, estimation 
over different sample periods would result in different estimates of weights, and thus 
different choices of weights. Several studies have confirmed that the MCI’s weights 
estimated using the VAR model do not have the parameter constancy problem (Batini 
and Turnbull, 2000; Hyder and Khan, 2007).  
To sum up, both the single equation method and the trade share equation have been 
criticised for unable to reflect the dynamic responses and incur exogeneity and 
parameter constancy problem. The MCI’s weights must reflect its dynamic response 
of real economy to the shocks in the interest rate and exchange rate, and must not have 
exogeneity and parameter constancy problem. The multiple equation method that use 
the VAR model is able to estimate the dynamic responses of economy output to the 
shocks of interest rate and exchange rate, and do not have exogeneity and parameter 
constancy problem. Therefore, in this thesis, the MCI’s weights will be estimated 
using the multiple equation method, i.e., the VAR model. 
4.4 Estimation of the MCI for the UK 1990-2010 
This section describes how the MCI for the UK between 1991 and 2010 are estimated 
in this thesis. The results of the estimated MCI are also presented in this section. This 
section first describes the MCI equation. The data that used to estimate the MCI are 
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then be discussed. The discussion includes the implications of the UK’s joining and 
withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) on the exchange 
rate regime and monetary policy, as well as the implications in deriving the MCI for 
the UK between the sample period in this thesis. After that, this section describes how 
the MCI’s weights are estimated and then presents the results of the estimated MCI. 
4.4.1 Construction of the MCI 
The MCI is constructed as ‘a weighted average of the percentage point change in the 
interest rate and the exchange rate relative to their values in a base period’ (Batini and 
Turnbull, 2000; Peeters, 1999; Hyder and Khan, 2007; Toroj, 2008; Shinkai and 
Kohsaka, 2010; Osborne-Kinch and Holton, 2010). This MCI construction can be 
expressed in real terms as in equation 4.1. 
𝑀𝐶𝐼$ 	= 	𝑤( 𝑟$ 	−	𝑟+ 	+	𝑤- 𝑒$ 	−	𝑒+     (4.1) 
where 𝑟$ is the real interest rate expressed in level, 𝑒$ is the logarithm of the 
real exchange rate, and 𝑟+ and 𝑒+ are the level of the interest rate and exchange rate in 
a given base period, respectively. 𝑤( and 𝑤- are the MCI’s weights of real interest rate 
and exchange rate, respectively.  
According to the equation 4.1, the MCI can be divided into two part. The first can be 
expressed as the change in the interest rate relative to its base value (𝑟$ − 𝑟+). The 
second part can be expressed as the change in the exchange rate relative to its base 
value (𝑒$ 	−	𝑒+). 𝑤( and 𝑤- are the weights of the real interest rate and the exchange 
rate, respectively. The ratio of 𝑤( 𝑤- reflecting the relative effect of interest rate and 
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exchange rate on a policy goal such as output or inflation rate. The MCI is scaled such 
that its weights sum to unity, i.e., 𝑤( + 𝑤- = 1. 
The key of calculating the MCI is the estimation of the weights of the interest rate (𝑤() 
and weights of the exchange rate (𝑤-). The MCI’s weights reflect the extent to which 
the changes in the interest rate and exchange rate affect the economy output. The 
MCI’s weights will be estimated in section 4.4.3. The estimated MCI’s weights will 
be inserted into the MCI equation in order to compute the MCI (presented in section 
4.4.4).  
4.4.2 Data 
The data that used in the MCI estimation include the interest rate, exchange rate, GDP, 
and consumer price index (CPI). The interest rate used in deriving the MCI is the 3-
month interbank rate (LIBOR), which was obtained from the official website of the 
Bank of England deflated with the CPI-based inflation. The CPI was obtained from 
the website of the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The exchange rate used is the 
broad real effective exchange rate index of the sterling pound, which was gathered 
from the website of the Bank of England. The data of real GDP was obtained from the 
ONS website. The real GDP and the real effective exchange rate index are expressed 
in logarithm, while the real LIBOR rate is expressed in level. The data used are 
quarterly data between 1991 and 2010. 
Over the sample period between 1991 and 2010, there are two important changes in 
the monetary policy regime in the UK, which is related to UK’s participation and 
withdrawal from the Euro Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) between 1990 and 1992. 
During the participation in the ERM, the ERM required the UK to maintain a fixed 
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rate to DM 2.95 to Sterling Pound. However, due to the pressure of Sterling Pound 
sell out from major speculators in the currency market, the UK were forced to keep 
the interest rate high in order to keep the competitiveness of Sterling Pound currency. 
As a result, monetary condition in the UK at the time was very tight due to a high 
interest rate and the fixed exchange rate. The UK was forced out of the ERM in the 
third quarter of 1992. After the UK withdrawal from the ERM, the monetary policy 
framework in the UK has changed to emphasise on keeping the inflation low and to 
encourage economy growth. Therefore, it is expected to see a high interest rate before 
the third quarter of 1992 and a significant drop in the interest rate after the third quarter 
of 1992.  
In addition, there was a financial crisis in the UK in the mid of 2007. In response to 
the intensified financial crisis in the UK, the monetary policy during the period is 
expected to be easing since the first quarter of 2008. The monetary policy easing is 
associated with a significant fall in the official interest rate and the exchange rate. The 
interest rate cut close to zero bound is aimed to encourage the corporate sector in the 
access of bank credit in order to boost the spending and investment activities.  
In deriving the MCI, while recognising the importance of the changes in these regime 
in the UK, it is not intended to apply any restriction in these changes of regime in the 
estimation of the MCI. Indeed, the changes in the regime would be reflected in the 
calculated MCI later in this chapter. In addition, the estimation of the MCI in this 
chapter is merely an indication of the tightness of monetary condition in the UK.  
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4.4.3 Estimation of the MCI’s Weights 
To estimate the MCI, it involves estimating the weights of the interest rate and the 
exchange rate. As discussed in section 4.3, estimating the MCI’s weights using the 
VAR model has several advantages over the single equation and the trade share 
method. First, the VAR model is able to analyse the dynamic responses of real 
economy to the shocks in the interest rate and the exchange rate because the weights 
are computed using the parameters of impulse responses functions (Shinkai and 
Kohsaka, 2010). The single equation and the trade share method are not able to reflect 
the dynamic response of the real economy to the shocks in the interest rate and the 
exchange rate (Siklar and Dogan, 2015). It is because they derive the MCI’s weights 
using the average values of financial effects on the real economy (Batini and Turnbull, 
2000). Second, estimating the MCI’s weights using the VAR method can avoid the 
exogeneity problem that otherwise encountered if using the single equation or the trade 
share method. The monetary conditions cannot be considered as exogenous, at least 
not in mid to long-term because central bank is responding to macroeconomic 
development with its policy rate and exchange rate as two major equilibrating 
mechanisms. If financial variables in the estimation model of MCI are assumed to be 
exogenous, the estimators will be biased. 
There are three steps involved to estimate the MCI’s weights using the VAR model. 
First, all the three macroeconomic time series data used in the estimation of the MCI’s 
weights must be stationary. Most of the macroeconomic time series are non-stationary 
(contain a unit root) since they are not going back to their mean and the variance is not 
constant (Maddala, 2001). Stationarity is crucial because if the series is non-stationary, 
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the regression results are spurious as it may easily result in incorrect conclusions. 
Moreover, shocks to a stationary series will be temporary and their effects will be 
eliminated over time when the series revert to their long-run mean values (Asteriou 
and Hall, 2007). In contrast, non-stationary data series comprise permanent 
components and so its mean and/or variance will rely on time and will approach 
infinity as time goes infinity. Therefore, it needs to ensure that the data series are 
stationary. Second, it involves testing the time series data for cointegrating relation. If 
there is no cointegration relation in the time series data, then the MCI’s weights should 
be estimated using the unrestricted VAR model on the stationary time series data. 
However, if there is no cointegration relation in the time series data, then the MCI’s 
weights should be estimated using the vector error correction (VEC) method.  
1. Stationarity Test 
A unit root test has to be carried out to assess the stationarity of each macroeconomic 
data series used in the estimation of the MCI. The time series data is believed to 
contain a unit root if the data series is not stationary. Otherwise, if the time series data 
is stationary, it does not contain a unit root. 
To test the stationarity of the data series, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is 
used. ADF test is a dominant method of testing the stationarity of time series data. 
There are several steps involved in testing the stationarity of the time series data using 
the ADF test. First, the data series are tested using the ADF test at its level. If the data 
is not stationary or unit root exists at the level, then it should test the stationarity of the 
data using the ADF test on its first difference. If the data is not stationary at the first 
difference, then test the stationarity again at the second difference to ensure it is 
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stationary. The null hypothesis of ADF test is that it contains unit root and the time 
series is not stationary. The alternative is that there is no unit root and the time series 
is stationary.  
The ADF test were carried out using the Eviews statistical software, which 
automatically takes the optimal number of lagged dependent variables. It needs to 
include just enough lags so that the residuals of the ADF regression are not 
autocorrelated. The decision rules for the unit root test are that if the value of t-
statistics is greater than its critical value, then it should not reject the null hypothesis, 
i.e., unit root exists. If the value of t-statistics is less than its critical value, then it 
should reject the null hypothesis, i.e., unit root does not exist. 
Table 4.1 in the next page summaries the results of the ADF test for all the three data 
time series, i.e., the log of real GDP, the log of real Sterling effective exchange rate 
index (£ERI), and the real LIBOR rate. The null hypothesis is that the data contains 
unit root and is not stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that the data does not 
contain unit root and it is stationary. According to Table 4.1, the results show that the 
null hypotheses of all the three data time series, i.e., the log of real GDP, the log of 
real £ERI, and the real LIBOR rate, are not rejected at the level. This indicates that the 
log of real GDP, the log of real £ERI, and the real LIBOR rate are not stationary at the 
level, regardless of whether their exogenous variable contains constant, linear trends, 
or none exogenous variable. However, the results show that the null hypotheses of all 
the three data time series, i.e., the log of real GDP, the log of real £ERI, and the real 
LIBOR rate, are rejected at the first difference. This indicates that the log of real GDP, 
the log of real £ERI, and the real LIBOR rate are stationary at the first difference, 
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regardless of whether their exogenous variable contains constant, linear trends, or 
none exogenous variable. Therefore, it is able to confirm that the MCI’s weights have 
to be estimated on the first difference of these time series data.  
 
Table 4.1 Testing for Data Stationarity Using the ADF Test 
 Level First Difference Order of 
Integration 
Constant    
lnrgdp -1.638286(1) -3.531681(0) * I(1) 
rlibor -1.906181(4) -3.508818(3)** I(1) 
lnreer -1.555457(3) -6.153374(0)* I(1) 
Constant, linear trend 
lnrgdp -1.105638(1) -3.806360(0)** I(1) 
rlibor -3.481520(4) -4.043064(4)** I(1) 
lnreer -1.165423(1) -6.207106(0)* I(1) 
None    
lnrgdp 2.313499(1) -2.572464(0)** I(1) 
rlibor -1.558222(4) -3.382621(3)* I(1) 
lnreer -0.277103(1) -6.186528(0)* I(1) 
This table reports the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, which is used to test the stationarity 
of the time series data. lnrgdp is the log of real gross domestic production (GDP); rlibor is the real 
LIBOR rate, and lnreer is the log of real Sterling effective exchange rate index. The ADF tests are 
carried out with three different assumptions: with a constant, with a constant and linear trend, and 
no constant and no trend. The optimal lag length of the ADF test is shown in the parenthesis. * 
denotes rejection of null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1% significance level. ** denotes rejection 
of null hypothesis of non-stationary at 5% significance level. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, 
it indicates the time series data contain unit root or in other word the data is not stationary. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, it means that the time series data does not contain unit root or in other 
word the data is stationary. The order of integration shows the minimum number of difference 
required to obtain a stationary series. E.g., I(0) indicates the time series data is stationary at its 
level, while I(1) indicates the time series data is stationary at its first difference.  
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2. Johansen’s Cointegration Test 
The results of the stationarity test show that the MCI’s weights have to be estimated 
using the first difference of these time series data. It is now necessary to test if there 
is cointegrating relation in the time series data. A linear combination of two or more 
non-stationary series may be stationary and if this is the case, the non-stationary time 
series are perceived to be cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). The stationary 
linear combination is termed as the cointegrating equation and may be interpreted as 
a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
If there is no cointegrating relation in the time series data, then the MCI’s weights 
should be estimated using the unrestricted VAR method on the first-difference of the 
time series data. If there is a cointegrating relation in the time series data, then the 
MCI’s weights should be estimated using the vector error correction (VEC) model. 
The VEC model is a restricted VAR model and it has the cointegration relations built 
into the specification that is able to restrict the long-run behaviour of the endogenous 
variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships and permitting for short-run 
adjustment dynamics (Shaik and Miljkovic, 2008). The Johansen’s cointegration test 
is used to test for the cointegrating relation in the time series data.  
In order to carry out the Johansen’s cointegration test, it is necessary to select the 
optimal lag length. This is because the Johansen procedure is sensitive to the selection 
of lag length to obtain a model that reflects true relationship between variables. Too 
few lags may cause the model unable to capture the relationship between over time, 
but too many lags may result in increasing forecasting error. 
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Table 4.2 reports the selection of the optimal lag length for the Johansen’s 
cointegration test. The optimal lag length for the Johansen’s cointegration test should 
be the one with the lowest information criteria. There are several types of information 
criteria: likelihood ratio (LR), final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criteria 
(AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criteria (HQIC), and Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criteria (SBIC). According to Table 4.2, the LR, FPE, and AIC show that 
the optimal lag length selection for the Cointegration test is 5 lag length, while the 
HQIC and SBIC show that the optimal lag length selection for the Cointegration test 
is 4 lag length and 2 lag length, respectively. It has been suggested that the AIC and 
SBIC are the most widely used information criteria. Therefore, both 5 and 2 optimal 
lag length are selected for the Johansen’s Cointegration test.  
Table 4.2: Optimal Lag Length Selection for Cointegration Test 
lag LogL LR FPE AIC SBIC HQIC 
0 -2.69323 NA 0.00024 0.158 0.253 0.196 
1 362.891 690.548 1.17e-08 -9.747 -9.367 -9.596 
2 389.300 47.683 7.25e-09 -10.231 -9.566* -9.966 
3 401.524 21.052 6.65e-09 -10.320 -9.371 -9.942 
4 419.720 29.822 5.19e-09 -10.575 -9.342 -10.084* 
5 431.897 18.943* 4.80e-09* -10.664* -9.146 -10.059 
6 437.888 8.820 5.30e-09 -10.580 -8.778 -9.863 
7 440.008 2.944 6.56e-09 -10.389 -8.302 -9.558 
8 446.003 7.827 7.35e-09 -10.306 -7.934 -9.361 
This table shows the selection of the optimal lag length for the Johansen’s cointegration test. LogL 
= log likelihood; LR = likelihood ratio; FPE = Final prediction error; AIC = Akaike information 
criteria; HQIC = Hannan-Quinn information criteria; SBIC = Schwarz’s Bayesian information 
criteria. * denotes the lowest value of associated information criteria and as the lag order selected 
by the criterion.  
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Table 4.3 shows the results of the Johansen’s cointegration test with the optimal lag 
length of 5. According to Table 4.3, it appears that the value of trace statistics is lower 
than its 5% critical value at zero maximum rank (i.e., no cointegrating relation). This 
indicates that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relation cannot be rejected at 5% 
significance level. This suggests that there is no cointegrating relations in the time 
series data. Therefore, it should be able to confirm that the MCI’s weights should be 
estimated using the unrestricted VAR model on the first difference of the time series 
data.  
Table 4.3: Johansen’s Cointegration Test with 5 lag length, No deterministic 
trend 
maximum 
rank 
 
parms 
 
LL 
 
eigenvalue 
trace   
statistics 
5%  
critical value 
0 39 414.25937 . 27.3675* 29.68 
1 44 423.11583 0.21036 9.6546 15.41 
2 47 427.13658 0.10167 1.6131 3.76 
3 48 427.94314 0.02128   
This table shows the result of the Johansen’s cointegration test with 5 lag length and no 
deterministic trend. The null hypothesis is no cointegrating relation in the time series data. The 
alternative hypothesis is there is cointegrating relation in the time series data. If the value of trace 
statistics is lower than its 5% critical value, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% 
significance level. If the value of trace statistics is not lower than its 5% critical value, then the 
null hypothesis is rejected at 5% significance level.  
 
The above tests have shown that the data used to estimate the MCI’s weights are 
stationary at their first difference and there is no cointegrating relation in the data 
series. Therefore, it is able to confirm that the MCI’s weights should be estimated 
using unrestricted VAR model on the time series data at their first difference. 
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In order to estimate the MCI’s weights using the VAR model, it has to select the 
optimal lag length for the VAR model. The Eviews statistical software has the built in 
routine to compute the optimal lag length for the VAR model. Table 4.4 shows the 
result of the optimal lag length for the VAR model. The decision for selecting the 
optimal lag length is the one with lowest value of the associated information criteria. 
According to Table 4.4, the FPE and the AIC show that the optimal lag length is 4, 
while the HQIC and SBIC show that the optimal lag length is 1. In this case, the 
optimal lag length is chosen based on the FPE and AIC because it has been suggested 
that FPE and AIC are superior than other information criteria when the sample size is 
small (Liew, 2004). Moreover, the sample size of the VAR model is small and 
therefore optimal lag length selected by the FPE and the AIC should be selected, i.e., 
4 lag. 
Table 4.4: Optimal Lag Length Selection for the VAR Model 
lag LogL LR FPE AIC SBIC HQIC 
0 327.3300 NA 2.16e-08 -9.136057 -9.040451 -9.098037 
1 373.3561 86.86611 7.62e-09 -10.17904 -9.796620* -10.02697* 
2 384.9105 20.83042 7.10e-09 -10.25100 -9.581756 -9.984862 
3 398.9707 24.15982 6.18e-09 -10.39354 -9.437479 -10.01335 
4 409.4324 17.09234* 5.97e-09* -10.43471* -9.191834 -9.940461 
5 412.5605 4.846445 7.13e-09 -10.26931 -8.739612 -9.660998 
6 417.2473 6.865091 8.18e-09 -10.14781 -8.331293 -9.425439 
7 423.2660 8.307543 9.11e-09 -10.06383 -7.960495 -9.227401 
8 429.7080 8.347412 1.01e-08 -9.991776 -7.601621 -9.041287 
This table shows the selection of the optimal lag length for the VAR model for deriving the MCI. 
LogL = log likelihood; LR = likelihood ratio; FPE = Final prediction error; AIC = Akaike 
information criteria; HQIC = Hannan-Quinn information criteria; SBIC = Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criteria. * denotes the lowest value of associated information criteria and as the lag 
order selected by the criterion.  
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After selecting the optimal lag length for the VAR model, it is now able to estimate 
the MCI’s weights by looking at the cumulative impulse response function of the GDP 
to a shock to the real LIBOR rate at the first difference (short-term interest rate) and 
real Sterling effective exchange rate index at the first difference (exchange rate) over 
a period of 8 quarters. The weights of the exchange rate and the interest rate should be 
summing up to one. A period of 8 quarters is chosen for estimating the MCI’s weights 
because most studies in the prior literature suggests that the effects of monetary policy 
should last and there is only little effect after 8 quarters.  
Table 4.5 below shows the results of impulse response function of the VAR model. 
The results will be interpreted in the next page.  
Table 4.5 Impulse Response Function 
Step (1) IRF (1) CIRF (2) IRF (2) CIRF 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 -0.000593 -0.000593 0.000551 0.000551 
2 -0.000748 -0.001340 0.001154 0.001705 
3 -0.000844 -0.002185 0.001443 0.003147 
4 -0.000406 -0.002591 0.001384 0.004532 
5 -0.000538 -0.003129 0.000963 0.005495 
6 -0.000454 -0.003582 0.000364 0.005859 
7 -0.000519 -0.004101 0.000014 0.005873 
8 -0.000253 -0.004354 -0.000186 0.005687 
9 -0.000211 -0.004565 -0.000155 0.005532 
10 -2.2e-06 -0.004567 -0.000135 0.005397 
This table shows the results of impulse response function of the VAR model over a number of 
quarterly period indicated by step. Step denotes the number of quarterly period. IRF denotes the 
impulse response function, while the CIRF denotes the cumulative IRF. (1) shows the response of 
the log real GDP to the impulse of real LIBOR rate at the first difference. (2) shows the response 
of the log real GDP to the impulse of the log real Sterling effective exchange rate index at the first 
difference. The MCI’s weights are derived by looking at the CIRF of the log real GDP to the 
impulse in the real LIBOR rate and in the log real Sterling effective exchange rate over a period 
of 8 quarters.  
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The (1)IRF indicates the response of the log real GDP to the impulse of the real LIBOR 
rate at the first difference and the (1)CIRF indicates the cumulative response of the 
log real GDP to the impulse of the real LIBOR rate at the first difference. The (2)IRF 
indicates the response of the log real GDP to the impulse of the log real £ERI at the 
first difference and the (2)CIRF indicates the cumulative response of the log real GDP 
to the impulse of the log real £ERI at the first difference.  
According to Table 4.5, the negative sign in the (1)IRF and (1)CIRF indicate a 
negative relationship between the real interest rate and the real GDP output. This 
suggests that increasing the interest rate would reduce the real GDP. For example, 1 
percentage point increase in the real LIBOR rate would reduce the real GDP output 
by 0.000593% in the first quarter period. The impact of the real LIBOR rate on the 
real GDP output increases another 0.000748% in the second quarter and by 0.000844% 
in the third quarter but the impact become half started in the fourth quarter. The impact 
of the real LIBOR rate on the real GDP output has started to drop after eight quarters 
to 0.000253%. There is only very little effect of real LIBOR rate on the real GDP 
output after 10 quarters. The (1)CIRF in the eight quarter period indicates that the 
cumulative response of the real GDP output  to the impulse of the real LIBOR rate for 
the eight quarters period is 0.004354%. This suggests that the total impact of 1 
percentage point increase in the real LIBOR rate reduces the real GDP output by 
0.004354% over the eight quarters period.  
While the real LIBOR shows a negative correlation with the real GDP, the (2)IRF and 
(2)CIRF shows a positive sign, indicating a positive relationship between the real 
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Sterling effective exchange rate index (real £ERI) and the real GDP. This suggests that 
an appreciation in the domestic exchange rate vis-à-vis other currency will result in a 
growth in the real GDP output. More specifically, 1 percentage increase in the real 
£ERI increases the real GDP output by 0.000551% in the first quarter. The positive 
impact of the exchange rate on the real GDP continues to increase in the second quarter 
by 0.001154%, peak in the third quarter period by 0.001443%, and continue to 
increase by 0.001384% in the fourth quarter. The impact of the £ERI on the real GDP 
output has started to drop significantly in the sixth quarter period and nearly diminish 
after the seventh quarter period and even become negative after eight quarters. The 
(2)CIRF in the eight quarter period indicates that the cumulative response of the real 
GDP output  to the impulse of the real £ERI for the eight quarters period is 0.005687%. 
This suggests that the total impact of 1 percent increase in the real £ERI increases the 
real GDP output by 0.005687% over the eight quarters period.  
After interpreting the results of the impulse response function, it is now necessary to 
present the MCI’s weights by looking at the cumulative impulse response function of 
the real GDP output to the impulse of the real LIBOR rate (the measure of short-term 
interest rate) and the real £ERI (the measure of exchange rate) at the first difference 
over eight quarters period. According to Table 4.5, the (1)CIRF denotes the cumulative 
response of the real GDP output to the impulse of the real LIBOR rate, and it shows 
the total impact of 1 percentage point increase in the real LIBOR rate reduces the real 
GDP output by 0.004354% over the eight quarters period. The (2)CIRF denotes the 
cumulative response of the real GDP output to the impulse of the real £ERI and it 
shows that the total impact of 1 percent increase in the real £ERI increases the real 
GDP output by 0.005687% over the eight quarters period. The weights of the exchange 
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rate and the interest rate should be summing up to one. Therefore, the estimated ratio 
of the MCI’s weights is -0.7656.  
The ratio is a negative figure because a negative response of log of real GDP to real 
LIBOR impulse. This can be interpreted as one percentage point change in real LIBOR 
has about the same effect on the economic output as a 0.7656 percentage change in 
the real exchange rate. 
Validity Test 
Several tests were carried out to assess the validity of the VAR model. First, the VAR 
model is tested for its stability. Second, the VAR model is tested for the 
autocorrelation of the residuals using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. Third, in 
order to determine if the log of real GDP, the real LIBOR, and the log of real effective 
exchange rate at first difference affect one another over time, the Granger causality 
tests are carried out on the VAR model. 
The results of the stability test are shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 (in the next page). 
Table 4.6 shows the Eigenvalue stability condition of the VAR model. If the estimated 
VAR model is not stable, then there should be an eigenvalue equal to 1. According to 
Table 4.6, none of the eigenvalues is equal to 1 and therefore able to confirm that VAR 
model is stable. Figure 4.1 plots the eigenvalues of the companion matrix. No 
eigenvalue is outside the circle, thus confirm the VAR model is stable.  
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Table 4.6 Eigenvalue Stability Condition 
Eigenvalue Modulus 
-0.919282  0.919282 
-0.010757   + 0.810046 0.810117 
-0.107575   - 0.810046 0.810117 
 0.737811   + 0.230493 0.772977 
 0.737811   - 0.230493 0.772977 
 0.479512   + 0.529652 0.714467 
 0.479512   - 0.529652 0.714467 
-0.618834     0.618834 
-0.143885   + 0.509970          0.52988 
-0.143885   - 0.509970          0.52988 
 0.119482   + 0.383527 0.401707 
 0.119482   - 0.383527 0.401707 
This table shows the eigenvalue stability condition of the VAR model. 
It indicates whether the estimated VAR model is stable. If the 
estimated VAR model is not stable, then the eigenvalue should equal 
to 1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1  Eigenvalue Stability Condition 
 
This figure plots the eigenvalues of the companion matrix to show to the stability condition of the 
VAR model. If the VAR model is not stable, then dot should touch the circle.  
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After the stability test, the VAR model is tested for autocorrelation of the residuals 
using Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis of the LM test is no 
autocorrelation of the residuals in the equation. If there is autocorrelation in the 
residuals, it means that the number of lags in the VAR model is underspecified and 
this can significantly increase finite-sample bias in the parameter estimates and cause 
serial correlation. If this is the case, it should add more lags to the VAR model in order 
to eliminate the serial correlation. Table 4.7 displays the results of the LM test. The 
results show that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals cannot be 
rejected at 5% significance level at order 1 through 4. Therefore, it should have 
sufficient evidence to show that there is no autocorrelation of the residuals in the 
equations.  
Table 4.7 VAR Lagrange Multiplier Test 
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 12.9228 9 0.16613 
2 15.6585 9 0.07436 
3 5.2707 9 0.81010 
4 5.9315 9 0.74675 
This table shows the result of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of the VAR 
model. It is used to test whether the VAR model contains autocorrelation in the 
residuals at the lag order. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation in the 
residuals of the equation at lag order. The alternative is there is autocorrelation 
in the residuals of the equation at lag order.  
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In order to determine if the log of real GDP, real LIBOR, and log of real effective 
exchange rate at first difference affect one another over time, the Granger causality 
tests are carried out on the VAR model. Table 4.8 in the next page reports the Granger 
causality test of the VAR model. The null hypotheses are the coefficient of the 4 
lagged values of real LIBOR rate at first difference (D_rlibor) or the log of real 
Sterling effective exchange rate index at first difference (D_lnreer), or both are zero 
in the equation of the log of real GDP at first difference. There are several outcomes 
can be identified from the results of the Granger causality test. First, the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient of 4 lagged values of D_rlibor are zero in the D_lnrgdp 
equation cannot be rejected at 5% significance level. This indicates that there is not 
enough evidence to show that the first difference of real LIBOR Granger causes the 
first difference of log of real GDP with 4 quarters lags. Second, the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient of 4 lagged values of D_lnreer are zero in the D_lnrgdp equation 
can be rejected at 5% significance level. This indicates that there is enough evidence 
to show that the first difference of log of real effective exchange rate Granger causes 
the first difference of log of real GDP with 4 quarters lags. In addition, the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient of 4 lagged values of D_rlibor are zero in the D_lnreer 
equation can be rejected at 5% significance level. This indicates that there is enough 
evidence to show that the first difference of real LIBOR Granger causes the first 
difference of log of real effective exchange rate with 4 quarters lags. 
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Table 4.8 Granger Causality Wald Test 
Equation  Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
D_lnrgdp D_rlibor 4.6369 4 0.327 
D_lnrgdp D_lnreer 9.8252 4 0.043 
D_lnrgdp ALL 11.051 8 0.199 
D_rlibor D_lnrgdp 7.3751 4 0.117 
D_rlibor D_lnreer 25.585 4 0.000 
D_rlibor ALL 39.406 8 0.000 
D_lnreer D_lnrgdp 5.1595 4 0.271 
D_lnreer D_rlibor 12.385 4 0.015 
D_lnreer ALL 17.05 8 0.030 
This table shows the results of the Granger Causality Wald test. 
 
4.4.4 Estimation of the MCI 
After estimating the MCI’s weights using the impulse response function of the VAR 
model, it is now able to calculate the MCI for the UK between 1991 and 2010. The 
weights reflect the relative effect of the real LIBOR rate (a measure of interest rate) 
and the real Sterling effective exchange rate index (a measure of exchange rate) on the 
real GDP output. The MCI ratio of -0.7656 estimated in section 4.7 is used in 
estimating the MCI for the UK. As indicated in the equation 4.1, the MCI is 
constructed as a weighted average of the percentage point change in the interest rate 
and the exchange rate relative to their values in a base period. It can be written in real 
terms as follows: 
𝑀𝐶𝐼$ 	= 𝑊1 𝑟$ 	−	𝑟+ +𝑊2 𝑒$ 	−	𝑒+     (4.1)	
where 𝑟$ is the real interest rate expressed in level, 𝑒$ is the logarithm of the 
real exchange rate, and 𝑟+ and 𝑒+ are the level of the interest rate and exchange rate in 
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a given base period, respectively. 𝑊1 and 𝑊2 are the MCI’s weights of real interest 
rate and exchange rate, respectively.  
Figure 4.2 plots the estimated MCI for the UK from 1991 to 2010. The estimated MCI 
for the UK between 1991 and 2010 are interpreted in the next paragraph.  
Figure 4.2 Estimated MCI for the UK 
 
This figure shows the estimated MCI for the UK using quarterly data between 1991 and 2010. The 
MCI tells the degree of tightening and easing of the monetary condition compared to the previous 
period. An increase in the MCI indicates a tightening of the monetary condition. A fall in the MCI 
indicates an easing of the monetary condition.  
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At a particularly period, changes in the short-term interest rate and in the exchange 
rate may have an influence on the monetary condition in the same direction or in 
opposite direction. The estimated MCI for the UK is an indication of tightness of 
monetary condition compared with previous period. An increase in the estimated MCI 
is interpreted as a tightening of the monetary condition in the period. A fall in the MCI 
indicates an easing of the monetary condition. It should be noted that the change in the 
interest rate is interpreted as percentage points, but the change in the exchange rate is 
regarded as a percentage change because it is expressed in logarithm.  
According to the Figure 4.2, the UK’s MCI is ranging from 88 and 121 during the 20 
years period between 1991 and 2010. The MCI starts at 100 in the first quarter of 1991 
and there are some obvious changes in the MCI in the UK during the 20 years period. 
First, there is a significant drop in the MCI around the third quarter of 1992 to its 
lowest in the first quarter of 1993. This indicates a significant easing of the monetary 
condition in the UK between the third quarter of 1992 and the first quarter of 1993. 
After that, the MCI started to rise slightly from the first quarter of 1993 to the second 
quarter of 1994 but then dropped again to its lowest to around the fourth quarter of 
1995. This indicates that the MCI in the UK was slightly tightened in 1993 but then 
loosened between 1994 and 1995.   
There is a big rise in the MCI started in the first quarter of 1996 and reached its peak 
in the fourth quarter of 2002. This indicates that there was a tighten monetary policy 
stance or condition in the UK started around the first quarter of 1996 until the fourth 
quarter of 2002. After that, the MCI remained in the range between 110 and 120 until 
the fourth quarter of 2007.  
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The MCI started to drop since the first quarter of 2008 from 120 to its lowest point at 
93 in the first quarter of 2009 but slightly higher then. This indicates that the easing in 
the monetary condition in the UK since the first quarter of 2008 until the first quarter 
of 2009. The monetary condition in the UK was slightly higher in the second quarter 
of 2009 and remain between 95 and 100 until the fourth quarter of 2010. This indicates 
that the monetary condition in the UK slightly tightened in the second quarter of 2009 
and did not change much then up to the fourth quarter of 2010.   
4.5 Discussion of the Estimated MCI 
After interpreting the result of the estimated MCI for the UK between 1991 and 2010, 
it is now necessary to discuss the result. The discussion of the result includes to discuss 
whether it fits to what happen in the real world (in section 4.5.1) and comparing the 
estimated MCI with the official interest rate if using it as an indicator of monetary 
policy stance (in section 4.5.2). Moreover, it also includes a discussion of how the 
changes in the monetary condition has an implication on the availability of bank loans 
for the UK’s SMEs (in section 4.5.3).  
Since the index is constructed using differences between actual and arbitrarily chosen 
levels, it should be noted that no significance attached to the level of the index. The 
MCI simply tells the time change in the degree of tightening and easing of the 
monetary condition. 
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4.5.1 Important Events in the UK Economy During 1991 to 2010 
This section starts with a discussion of whether the estimated MCI fits to some 
important events in the UK economy. There are some obvious changes in the estimated 
MCI in the UK between 1991 and 2010 and they are actually quite consistent to the 
economy facts in the UK. First, the results of the estimated MCI show that there is a 
significant drop in the MCI around the third quarter of 1992 to its lowest in the first 
quarter of 1993, indicating a significant easing of the monetary condition in the UK 
between the third quarter of 1992 and the first quarter of 1993 compared to the 
previous period. This changes in the monetary condition in the UK during third quarter 
1992 and first quarter of 1993 was strongly relevant to the UK participation and 
withdrawal from the Euro Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) between 1990 and 1992. 
The story begins with the UK participation in the ERM between 1990 and 1992 in 
order to reduce the double digit inflation. The ERM required the UK to maintain a 
fixed rate to DM 2.95 to Sterling Pound. However, due to the pressure of Sterling 
Pound sell out from major speculators in the currency market, the UK were forced to 
keep the interest rate high in order to keep the competitiveness of Sterling Pound 
currency. As a result, monetary condition in the UK at the time was very tight due to 
a high interest rate and the fixed exchange rate. The UK was forced out of the ERM 
in the third quarter of 1992. Since then, the monetary policy framework in the UK has 
changed to emphasise on keeping the inflation low and to encourage economy growth. 
Therefore, since the third quarter of 1992, the interest rates in the UK were cut in order 
to recover the economy from the recession, i.e., an easing monetary policy.  
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There was a big rise in the MCI since the first quarter of 1996 suggests a significant 
tighten monetary policy stance or condition in the UK and remain a tight until around 
the fourth quarter of 2007. This reflects the a gradually growth in the UK economy 
during the period. However, the economy growth in the UK so rapid during the period 
that in fact created the credit boom that subsequently lead to the financial crisis in the 
mid of 2007. Consistent to this movement in the UK economy, the MCI started to drop 
since the first quarter of 2008 to its lowest point in the first quarter of 2009. This 
indicates that the easing in the monetary condition in the UK since the first quarter of 
2008, in response to the intensified financial crisis in the UK. The monetary policy 
easing is associated with a significant fall in the official interest rate and the exchange 
rate. The interest rate cut close to zero bound is aimed to encourage the corporate 
sector in the access of bank credit in order to boost the spending and investment 
activities. 
4.5.2 A Visual Comparison with the Official Interest and Exchange Rate 
It appears that the estimated MCI is quite consistent with some major events in the UK 
economy. It is now to compare it with the official interest rate if it is used as an 
indicator of the monetary policy stance in the UK. The real Sterling effective exchange 
rate index (£ERI) is also added in the figure. The official interest rate is the quarterly 
average official rate, which was obtained from the official website of the Bank of 
England.  
Figure 4.3 in the next page shows the comparison of the MCI, official rate, and £ERI 
between 1991 and 2010. As an overview, the movement in the MCI seems to be more 
consistent with the £ERI rather than the official interest rate. This seems to suggests 
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that the exchange rate have more impact on the monetary condition in the UK than the 
official interest rate. We will discuss further in the next paragraphs.  
Figure 4.3 MCI vs. Official Rate and £ERI 
 
This figure compares the estimated MCI and the official rate in the UK between 1991 and 2010. 
The estimated MCI for the UK is shown in blue colour and is related to the figure on the left 
vertical axis (ranging from 80 to 125). The official rate of the UK is shown in blue colour and is 
related to the figure on the right vertical axis (ranging from 0 to 16). The official rate is the quarterly 
average official bank rate obtained from the official website of the Bank of England.  
 
According to the Figure 4.3, there are several obvious changes in the estimated MCI 
in the UK between 1991 and 2010 that we can compare with the interest rate and 
exchange rate. First, at the beginning of the sample period, there is a significant 
reduction in the official interest rate from 14% to the lowest 5% in the third quarter of 
1994. It is noted that interest rate continues to drop in the first quarter of 1993 but it 
does not show a corresponding fall in the MCI. The MCI is not easing as much as 
represented by the fall in the official interest rate.  
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The MCI only started to fall significant around in the third quarter of 1992. This seems 
to indicate that the significant fall in the official interest rate only started come into 
effect in two or three quarters later. Then, it is worth noting that the further fall in the 
official rate around the second quarter of 1993, but the MCI appears to rise along with 
the exchange rate. A similar condition can be observed around the third quarter of 
1998, where the fall in the official interest rate did not show a corresponding effect on 
the monetary condition. Again, these inconsistencies between the official interest rate 
and the monetary policy condition suggests that the official interest rate in certain 
circumstances, do not show a corresponding effect in the monetary condition index. 
Instead, the monetary policy stance in the UK, to certain extent, may be more affected 
by the exchange rate rather than the official interest rate.  
The above comparison of the MCI with the interest rate and exchange rate have 
demonstrated that the exchange rate has placed more influence on the monetary 
condition in the UK than the interest rate. This is likely due to the stronger weight of 
exchange rate has placed on the estimation of MCI than the weight of interest rate.  
4.5.3 The Implications of MCI on the Borrowing for the SMEs 
To discuss the implications of the MCI on the SME’s borrowing, it is necessary to 
discuss the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the credit market 
imperfection. A tighten monetary condition will reduce the availability of bank credit 
to the SMEs while an easing monetary condition will increase the availability of bank 
credit to the SMEs. As overall, the credit market imperfection theory suggests that the 
SMEs greatly dependent on bank credit as a source of external financing and therefore 
any shock that affect their ability to obtain bank credit would cause SMEs to face 
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severe financing problem including monetary policy shock. These will be further 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the credit market imperfection has strong influential 
implications to many important issues in economics through its significant effects in 
the corporate finance structure, especially those of the SMEs. According to the 
perspective of New Keynesian economics, banks are preferable source of external 
finance than other debt finance because of their ability to better identification of 
borrowers’ quality and the cost advantage in monitoring the real ability of borrowers 
to repay loans, and thus reducing the agency costs incurred with overcoming the 
asymmetric information and incentive problems (Ramskogler, 2011). It is highly 
probable because banks specialise in collecting information about borrowers’ ability 
to repay, including the patent of past loan repayment, income, and amount of present 
debt (Hall, 2001), obtained from the credit agencies/databases and the on-going 
relationships with customers. Moreover, banks as financial intermediaries may also be 
able to save searching and transaction costs that otherwise incur in the direct capital 
market. All these costs advantages have enabled banks to offer finance to their 
borrowers at a lower premium than in the direct capital market. This is especially 
important for smaller companies, which are particularly informational opaque and 
subject to these costs (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Atta-Mensah and Dib, 2008). 
These arguments are largely supported by previous empirical studies (OECD, 2006; 
European Commission, 2011; European Commission, 2015; OECD, 2015). Therefore, 
it is predictable that any shock to either banks’ capital or ability of corporate sectors 
to obtain loans from banks could have a serious impact on their ability to fund business 
operations and investment, and so economic output. 
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The credit view emphasises the role of bank lending in the amplification and 
propagation of the initial effect of monetary shock on corporate sector. The rising 
interest rate causes declining collateral value of assets and cash flows that adversely 
affect the creditworthiness of corporate borrowers (i.e., balance sheet channel), plus 
the open market operations of central banks in the monetary tightening that takes away 
the bank reserves and so the reduction in capacity to lend to their borrowers who need 
additional funds to support their business operations (i.e., bank lending channel), and 
therefore amplifying and propagating the effect of initial monetary shock to the 
borrowers.  
Besides the interest rate, the monetary condition of a country is also affected by the 
domestic exchange rate, which has an effect on the consumer price inflation and 
economic activity (Dennis, 1997; Batini and Turnbull, 2000). An appreciation in the 
exchange rate makes import less expensive but makes export more expensive. The 
appreciation in exchange rate improves the foreign competitiveness and adversely 
affect the demand of domestic products. Conversely, a depreciation in the exchange 
rate makes import more expensive and makes export less expensive, which decreases 
the competitiveness of foreign products, thus improve the demand for domestic 
products. The exchange rate can thereby reinforce the effect of the official interest rate 
on the economy activity. The effect of exchange rate is particularly important in the 
UK because it is an open economy emphasising on free flow of export and import 
goods across the border and with a floating exchange rate regime (Gottschalk, 2001). 
In fact, in the UK, the SMEs has a significant contribution to the UK export. It has 
been reported that the SMEs accounted for more than half of the value of goods of the 
UK exports.  
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The above discussions have suggested that the monetary condition index estimated in 
this chapter is highly relevant to the financing of the SMEs, which depends on bank 
credit as an important source of external financing. A tighten monetary condition will 
reduce the availability of bank credit to the SMEs while an easing monetary condition 
will increase the availability of bank credit to the SMEs.  
4.6 Summary 
In order to examine the credit channel of monetary policy transmission, this thesis 
needs a measure of the monetary policy stance. This chapter produced an indicator of 
the monetary policy stance, known as the monetary condition index (MCI). The 
estimated MCI in this chapter is quite consistent with the major events in the UK 
economy. For example, there is a significant fall in the estimated MCI since the first 
quarter of 2008, indicating a monetary policy easing. This is quite consistent with a 
series of monetary policy easing strategies implemented by the BoE’s MPC during the 
financial crisis by cutting the official interest rate and introduced the quantitative 
easing programme to boost spending and investment activities. The estimated MCI 
will be included in the supply equation of the disequilibrium model of credit rationing 
in order to examine the impact of monetary policy on the corporate borrowing.   
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5. The Disequilibrium Model of Credit Rationing 
5.1 Introduction 
Inspired by the credit crunch issues emerged in the financial crisis, this thesis aims to 
examine the extent to which the SMEs in the UK face credit rationing and to examine 
the impact of monetary policy and quantitative easing on the corporate borrowing. 
Moreover, this thesis also aims to examine how those credit rationed SMEs fund their 
financing needs, whether they used trade credit as substitute for bank credit. Up to this 
chapter, the thesis has reviewed the theories underlying the credit rationing and the 
transmission of monetary policy through the credit channel and the empirical 
methodologies used by prior empirical studies to examine the credit rationing and the 
monetary policy transmission. The analysis of credit rationing and the credit channel 
of monetary policy transmission in the UK has not been updated since Atanasova and 
Wilson (2003), which examined the UK firms for the period between 1989 and 1999.  
After a review of the empirical methodologies in chapter 3, this attempts to use the 
disequilibrium model to examine the extent to which the SMEs in the UK face credit 
rationing and the credit channel of monetary policy transmission. This thesis decided 
to use the disequilibrium model because it is able to capture and to detangle the factors 
affecting the demand and supply of bank loans. The disequilibrium model contains 
separate equations for the demand and the supply of bank loans, and the credit rationed 
firms are those demanded quantity of bank loans exceeds its supply. Moreover, the 
disequilibrium model can also be used to examine the credit channel of monetary 
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policy transmission. Similarly, the disequilibrium model is able to capture and isolate 
the shocks of monetary policy on the demand and supply of bank loans. As a result, it 
is able to better produce substantial evidence of the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission. Indeed, prior empirical studies such as Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
faced challenges in isolating the demand shocks from supply shocks and therefore has 
been criticised for whether the reduction in bank loans they found using VAR analysis 
is driven by a shift in loan supply or loan demand. By using the disequilibrium model, 
it is able to isolate the effect of monetary policy by including a measure of monetary 
policy in the supply equation of the disequilibrium model.    
In order to examine the impact of monetary policy on the corporate borrowing, a 
measure of monetary policy stance, i.e., the MCI, is needed and it has been constructed 
in chapter 4. The estimated MCI will be included in the supply equation of the 
disequilibrium model to examine its impact on the corporate borrowing. This chapter 
will describe how the disequilibrium model is estimated in this thesis and presents the 
estimated results of the disequilibrium model.  
This chapter is organised as follows:   
Section 5.2 describes the underlying setup of the disequilibrium model to show how 
the credit rationing can be estimated using the disequilibrium model and the statistical 
procedure to implement the model.  
Section 5.3 establishes the hypotheses related to the loan demand and loan supply in 
the context of SMEs. These variables are included in the demand and the supply 
equation.  
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Section 5.4 explains the variables that determine the loan demand and loan supply in 
the context of SMEs. These variables are included in the demand and the supply 
equation.  
Section 5.5 describes the data and provide descriptive statistics to the data.  
Section 5.6 provides an analysis to the corporate financing structure of the firms in the 
sample.   
Section 5.7 reports the estimated results of the disequilibrium model. It is first 
reporting the estimated loan demand and loan supply in order to provide an 
understanding the factors that determine the loan demand and loan supply of the 
sample firms. It is then reporting the proportion of firms in the sample face borrowing 
constraint or credit rationing. Moreover, this section also compares the differences 
between borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms.  
Section 5.8 provides a discussion on the estimated results of the disequilibrium model 
by comparing with the related theories and the prior literature. 
5.2 The Underlying Disequilibrium Model of Credit Rationing 
The underlying disequilibrium model was introduced by Maddala and Nelson (1974), 
and has been adopted by researchers to examine the extent of rationing in the credit 
market, including Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Voordeckers and Steijvers (2008), 
Kremp and Sevestre (2011), and Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012), Adair and Fhima 
(2014), Farinha and Felix (2014), and Soana et al. (2015). This section describes the 
underlying setup of the disequilibrium model to demonstrate how it can be used to 
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examine the credit rationing and investigate the impact of monetary policy on the 
availability of bank loans to the corporate sector. This section also describes the 
statistical process to estimate the disequilibrium model to examine the extent of credit 
rationing and the impact of monetary policy on the availability of bank loans to the 
corporate sector.  
Basically, the disequilibrium model of credit rationing is built based on an assumption 
that the realised loan outstanding is the minimum of demanded bank loan and bank 
credit ceiling for the firm. If the realised loan outstanding belongs to the quantity of 
bank loans supplied, then it means that the firm’s loan demand is not fulfilled but only 
limited to quantity of loans supplied, i.e., credit rationed. Otherwise, if the realised 
loan outstanding belongs to the quantity of bank loan demanded, then it means that 
the firm’s loan demand is fulfilled, i.e., not rationed.  
The disequilibrium model comprises of a demand equation (𝑙$4), a supply equation (𝑙$5), 
and a transaction equation ( 𝑙$ ), as indicated in the equation 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, 
respectively.  
 𝑙$4 = 𝛽78𝑥7$ + 𝜇7$	       (5.1) 
 𝑙$5 = 𝛽;8𝑥;$ + 𝜇;$	       (5.2) 
 𝑙$ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑙$4, 𝑙$5 	       (5.3) 
 where the 𝛽78𝑥7$  contains variables determining the firms’ demand for bank 
loans; 𝛽78𝑥7$ contains variables determining the supply of banks loans to the firms; 𝜇7$	and 𝜇;$ are the error terms of the demand and supply equations, respectively. The 
error terms are distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix = 𝜎AB .  
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The quantity of loan demand and loan supply are unobserved. The only observed 
quantity is the quantity of the transaction equation (𝑙$), which is the actual quantity of 
loan received. The model assumes a voluntary transaction, that is, in a case of excess 
demand 𝑙$4 > 𝑙$5, the lenders cannot be pushed to provide more than they want to so 
that in this case the observed 𝑙$ must always equal to the quantity the lenders want to 
supply, 𝑙$ = 𝑙$5. Likewise, in a case of excess supply 𝑙$5 > 𝑙$4, the borrowers cannot be 
compelled to obtain loan more than they want to, and 𝑙$ = 𝑙$4. 
To estimate the credit rationing using the disequilibrium model, it involves two 
general steps. The first step is to estimate the simultaneous equations as stated in 5.1, 
5.2, and 5.3. In this step, the coefficients of the variables in the demand and supply 
equations are estimated to explain the impact of each variable in the credit supply and 
credit demand. The second step is to use the estimated coefficients obtained in the first 
step to estimate the quantity of credit demand and credit supply. Credit rationed firms 
are those with the excess demand (𝑙$4 > 𝑙$5,).  
A number of previous studies in the literature use the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method to solve the simultaneous equations stated in 5.1, 5.2, and 
5.3. The FIML method involves estimating the log-likelihood function derived from 
the equation 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. However, it involves complicated statistical coding to 
execute such estimation. Instead, this thesis opted for the three stage square (3SLS) 
method to estimate the demand equation and the supply equation. The 3SLS is a 
statistical estimation method that has been widely used to estimate the simultaneous 
equations of demand and supply in the economics models. The estimates of the 3SLS 
method are consistent and asymptotically normal for solving simultaneous equation 
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than the ordinary least square (OLS) and the two stage least square (2SLS). The 3SLS 
method takes into account the inter-temporal correlations between the error terms in 
the simultaneous equation, despite it is asymptotically less efficient than the FIML 
method.  
After obtaining the estimated coefficients of the demand and supply equation using 
the 3SLS method, the second step is to use these estimated coefficients to calculate 
the fitted values of credit demand and supply for each firm in the sample and this 
allows to find the unobserved credit demand and supply. This can be examined using 
the post-estimation command of the 3SLS, called the predict command. After that, it 
is able to estimate the proportion of credit rationed firms for each year by comparing 
the fitted values of the credit demand and credit supply. A firm is credit rationed if the 
quantity of credit demand is more than the quantity of credit supply, or in other words, 
the fitted value of credit demand is greater than the fitted values of credit supply (i.e., 𝑙$4 > 𝑙$5).  
To estimate the impact of monetary policy on the availability of bank loans to the 
corporate sector, the monetary condition index (MCI) that was estimated in Chapter 4 
is included in the supply equation of the disequilibrium model. By including the MCI 
as a variable in the supply equation, it is not only able to examine the impact of 
monetary policy on the availability of bank loans to the corporate sector, but also able 
to examine the impact of monetary policy on the extent of credit rationing in the 
country.  
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5.3 Formulation of Hypotheses 
After describing the empirical methodology that used to examine the extent of credit 
rationing and the impact of monetary policy on the availability of bank loans to the 
corporate sector, it is now necessary to formulates the hypotheses regarding the 
demand and the supply of bank credit to the SMEs. The model specification, i.e., the 
measures or the variables, are be discussed in the section 5.4.   
5.3.1 Hypotheses Regarding the Demand for Bank Credit 
To establish the hypotheses regarding the demand for bank credit for the SMEs, 
previous studies that examined the factors affecting the corporate demand for bank 
credit were reviewed, including Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), Atanasova and Wilson 
(2004), Kremp and Sevestre (2011), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012), Adair and Fhima 
(2014), Farinha and Felix (2014), and Soana et al. (2015). Other relevant factors stated 
in the theoretical literature were also used. Based on the works of these studies, the 
hypotheses regarding the demand for bank loans is modelled as a function of firm size, 
working capital needs, investment needs, internal generated cash flows, and trade 
credit.  
a. Firm size 
The demand for bank credit is determined by the size of a firm. The larger the size of 
a firm, the more the firm demand for bank loans to maintain financial and real 
transactions (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000). Larger firms are expected to need for more 
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capital for business operations and investment. As a result, firm size should be taken 
into account when considering corporate demand for bank loan.  
Hypothesis 1: The demand for bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the size of 
the firm is larger.  
b. Working capital needs 
Working capital is the business capital that is needed to ensure daily operation of the 
business. Higher working capital needs indicate the needs to fulfil its short-term 
liabilities. The examples of short-term assets include the cash in hand or in bank, 
accounts receivable, stocks, and prepayment. The short-term liabilities include 
accounts payable, accruals, and other short-term debts. Firms that have greater needs 
of working capital are expected to have higher demand for bank loans. 
Hypothesis 2: The demand for bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the firm has 
a higher need for working capital. 
c. Investment needs 
Firms seeking for long-term growth are likely to incur more investment in the long-
term assets. To support the long-term growth, they require more funds to finance the 
investment. Bank credit is one of the major sources of external financing, especially 
for the small, young SMEs that are particularly information opaque due to a lack of 
business and credit history. Therefore, firms with greater needs for investment should 
demand for more bank loans to finance. 
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Hypothesis 3: The demand for bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the firm has 
a higher financial need for investment. 
d. Internal generated cash flow 
The availability of alternative source of funds is an important factor determining 
corporate demand for bank loans. The pecking order theory of finance suggests that 
managers of the SMEs prefer internal finance to external finance but they will appeal 
to external finance the internal sources are insufficient to finance the capital needs for 
business expansion. Internal sources of finance are interest free and able to avoid 
underinvestment problem caused by asymmetric information between managers and 
investors (Cotei and Farhat, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2002; Dang, 2005). Therefore, 
the internal generated cash flow is a source of funds substitute to bank loans 
(Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009). 
Hypothesis 4: The demand for bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the firm has 
less internal resources available. 
e. Net trade credit 
The prior literature has largely emphasised that trade credit is an important alternative 
source of funds for bank loans (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Mateut et al., 2006; 
Boissay and Gropp, 2007; Love et al., 2007; Gama et al., 2009; Cole, 2010; Fabbrini 
and Menichini, 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Love and Zaidi, 2010). In an attempt to 
expand the businesses with limited financial resources and without seeking external 
financing, the SMEs often manage their working capital by delaying the payment for 
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their purchases of input for businesses. In fact, Kohler et al. (2000) finds that as much 
as 55% of total short-term credit received by the UK firms over 1983 to 1995 was 
obtained from their suppliers. Moreover, other sources of equity financing are mostly 
not available to smaller firms. 
Researchers suggested that suppliers may also be in a better position to finance SMEs 
because the frequent interactions between firms and suppliers allow suppliers to gather 
more information about firms’ creditworthiness, and thus able to overcome 
information and enforcement problems of the SMEs (Fabbri and Menichini, 2009; 
Gama et al., 2009; Halsey, 2010; Love and Zaidi, 2010). For instance, suppliers can 
threaten to cut off supply if customers do not make payment on time, especially when 
there are only a few suppliers in the market and if customers are greatly relying on 
their suppliers (Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano, 2010a). 
Hypothesis 5: The demand for bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the use of 
trade credit increases. 
5.3.2 Hypotheses Regarding the Supply of Bank Credit 
To establish the hypotheses regarding the supply of bank credit for the SMEs, previous 
studies that examined the factors affecting the supply of bank credit for SMEs were 
reviewed, including Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Kremp 
and Sevestre (2011), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012), Adair and Fhima (2014), Farinha 
and Felix (2014), and Soana et al. (2015). Other relevant factors stated in the 
theoretical literature were also used. Based on the works of these studies, the 
hypotheses regarding the supply of bank loans is modelled as a function of collateral, 
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firm risk, manufacturing industry dummy, trade credit, monetary condition index 
(MCI), and the quantitative easing.  
a. Firm risk 
The risk of a borrowing firm is one of the most important factor for a bank to decide 
whether or not to approve the loan. Banks assess the credit risk of the borrowers, which 
determines the probability that the firm to make the loan repayment. An 
unquestionable fact is that the profitability of banks depends on the probability that 
the borrowers to repay the loan. The risk of a firm can be reflected in the financial 
ratios.  
Hypothesis 6: The supply of bank loans for the UK’s SMEs decreases if a firm is 
characterised by higher level of risk.  
b. Collateral 
The quantity of bank credit offered by banks can also be influenced by the value of 
collateral offered by the borrower. Collateral plays a key role in mitigating the credit 
rationing arising from the problems of information asymmetry (Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009). For the smaller and younger SMEs that are particularly 
information opaque, it can be difficulty for the lender to assess their creditworthiness 
and the general viability of the economy. As a result, SMEs are more subject to credit 
rationing. In this case, collateral become an important assurance that allow the lender 
to fix the interest rate more precisely, to the extent that the loan is covered by the value 
of the collateral (Helsen and Chmelar, 2014). In the case of default, banks can liquidise 
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the collateral to recover the losses of the loan. Moreover, collateral has been suggested 
as a sorting device (Cowling, 2009). The idea is that good borrowers are willing to 
provide collateral because they are confident that they will not make default payment 
as they do not want to lose their assets (Cowling, 2007). Bad borrowers are unwilling 
to provide collateral because they know they are risky and more likely to lose their 
collateral. 
Hypothesis 7: The supply of bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if it can offer 
more assets as collateral. 
c. Trade credit 
The more recent literature has stressed the role of trade credit complement to bank 
credit because it may provide a signal to banks about a firm’s credit quality (Alphonse 
et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2010; Cole, 2010; Ellingsen and Vlachos, 2009; Gama et al., 
2009). The frequent interaction with customers allows suppliers to have informational 
advantage over banks about the firm’s ability to repay its debt. The credit received 
from suppliers may therefore mitigate the information asymmetries between banks 
and borrowers and provide an update for banks about the firm’s creditworthiness 
(Alphonse et al., 2006; Gama et al., 2009). Banks can use trade credit repayment 
history to justify borrower’s credit quality. However, more trade credit outstanding in 
the balance sheet may implies the firm to have more short-term debt. Moreover, banks 
may perceive the trade credit as negative signal to indicate that the firm is not able to 
obtain cheaper credit from banks. Nonetheless, previous studies have commonly found 
that trade credit has a positive impact on the supply of bank credit to SMEs (e.g., 
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Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Ogawa and Suzuki, 2002). Therefore, the hypothesis is 
formulated based on the positive signal of trade credit.  
Hypothesis 8: The supply of bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the firm uses 
more trade credit.  
d. Monetary Condition 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the credit channel of monetary policy transmission suggests 
that a small change in the monetary policy can have a large impact on the economy 
through corporate borrowing. Small and young SMEs are more informational opaque 
than large firms and they are more depending on bank credit as a source of external 
finance.  
Hypothesis 9: The supply of bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if the monetary 
condition in the UK is easing.  
e. Quantitative Easing 
In response to the intensified financial crisis, the Bank of England has launched a 
quantitative easing programme in March 2009 to purchase large amount of assets in 
the corporate sector. The purpose of the quantitative easing programme is to inject 
money directly into the economy in order to stimulate private sector spending and 
ultimately to meet inflation target. Including a measure of quantitative easing in the 
supply equation allows estimation of the bank lending transmission channel of 
quantitative easing, which posits that asset purchases will generate additional reserves 
at the BoE and a corresponding increase in customer deposits when the asset purchase 
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taken placed through banks, in turn that might increase banks’ capacity to extend more 
loans. 
Hypothesis 10: The supply of bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if there is 
quantitative easing.  
5.4 Measuring the Variables 
Taking into account the size difference between firms in the sample, the demand and 
supply equations are expressed in terms of financial ratios and ratios to one year lagged 
total assets, except dummy variables. This alleviates the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity problem in the sample data.  
5.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in the supply equation and the demand equation is the 
quantity of outstanding bank credit in the balance sheet. Due to the fact that micro and 
small firms in the UK are not required to submit a full financial statement, the measure 
of bank credit has been suggested that would be best represented by the bank overdraft 
and long term liabilities.  
5.4.2 Explanatory Variables in the Demand Equation 
a. Firm size 
Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) suggested that capital stock should represent firm size. 
However, Atanasova and Wilson (2003) justified that only capital stock itself is not 
sufficient to reflect the firm size. Instead, it must be take into account of the reserve 
and thus should be measured by total assets. Other studies that use total assets as 
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measure of firm size include Kremp and Sevestre (2011), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012), 
Adair and Fhima (2014), and Soana et al. (2015).  
b. Working capital needs 
The working capital needs is proxied by the difference between current assets and 
current liabilities (Kremp and Sevestre, 2011; Farinha and Felix, 2014). It represents 
the ability of the firms to fulfil the short-term debts. 
c. Investment needs 
The investment needs of a firm has been suggested to be measured by the first 
difference of its tangible assets (Kremp and Sevestre, 2011; Farinha and Felix, 2014). 
d. Internal generated cash flow 
The internal generated cash flow can be measured by net profit plus depreciation 
during the year (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2012). However, 
due to the limitation in the data availability, we use only the net profit as a proxy for 
internal cash flow. 
e. Net trade credit 
Net accounts payable has been suggested as a measure of the trade credit used for 
determining the demand for bank loans and it is defined as a difference between 
accounts payable and accounts receivable. (e.g., Steijvers, 2004; Atanasova and 
Wilson, 2004). 
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f. Control variable: year dummy 
Year dummy variable is included in the demand equation to capture the effect of 
interest rates and the state of economy that affect corporate demand for bank loans 
(Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). Firms might have a lower demand for bank loans due 
to a decreasing need for business investment driven by a weak business condition. 
During economy boom, firms might have a higher demand for bank loans to support 
its investment activities. Moreover, the year dummy also captures the effect of interest 
rate of both the loan and substitutes that could impact the demand for bank loans. 
Higher interest rate of bank loan will likely to prevent firms to borrow from banks and 
thus a negative effect on demand for bank loans.  
g. Control variable: industry 
There are certain industries that require more external finance to support their business 
operations and investments (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This may be due to differences 
between industries in terms of the capital needed for business operations, technology, 
and research and development. Dummy variable for each industry is included in the 
demand equation to capture the effect embedded by the specific characteristics of the 
industry the firm operates in, that might affect their demand for bank loans. 
5.4.3 Explanatory Variables in the Supply Equation 
a. Firm risk 
Some empirical studies have suggested that interest cover is a useful measure of the 
firm risk (e.g., Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Adair and Fhima, 2014). However, 
smaller firms in the UK are only required to submit abbreviated financial statements, 
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it is not possible to obtain information on the interest expenses to calculate the interest 
cover. Instead, we follow Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) that use current ratio, which 
shows the firm’s ability to pay short-term debts, as measure of firm risk.  
Age of a firm is another risk measure considered by banks when making loan decision 
to corporate sector. A firm that already established for many years has a proven track 
record in terms of technical ability, quality and experience of management (Steijvers, 
2004). A dummy variable is included in the supply equation that equal to one for firms 
less than or five years old (Kremp and Sevestre, 2011; Farinha and Felix, 2014).   
Besides age, firm size also reflects the credit risk of a firm and it has been suggested 
that default risk and insolvency risk is higher for smaller firms than larger firms 
(Farinha and Felix, 2014).  
b. Collateral 
Previous studies suggested that tangible asset is the best measure of collateral available 
to a firm (e.g., Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Berger et al. 2011; Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bandt et al., 2008). 
c. Trade credit 
Accounts payable is used as the measure of trade credit for supply equation (Adair and 
Fhima, 2014). 
d. Manufacturing Industry 
It has been recognised that the UK government has provided a number of policies to 
support manufacturing firms. More recently, in compliance with government policy, 
banks in the UK have provided credit policy to increase financial support to business 
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growth of manufacturers. The thesis includes an indicator variable equal to one if it 
belongs to the manufacturing sector, and zero otherwise, in order to measure whether 
manufacturing firms are able to obtain more loans than other industries. 
e. Monetary Condition Index (MCI) 
The MCI as an indicator of the monetary condition, which has been estimated in 
Chapter 4. The MCI is defined as ‘a weighted average of the percentage point change 
in the domestic interest rate and percentage change in an exchange rate relative to their 
values in a base period’ (Batini and Turnbull, 2000, p.4). According to this set up, an 
upswing in interest rate increases the MCI based on the assumption that an 
appreciation of sterling tends to reduce aggregate demand and inflation and thus a rise 
in the indices can be taken as a tightening of monetary conditions. 
f. Quantitative Easing 
This thesis follows Morais et al. (2015) to use the change in the balance sheet of the 
Bank of England as ratio to nominal GDP as a measure of quantitative easing. It should 
be a positive relationship between quantitative easing and credit supply. 
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Since the firm size is measured by the total assets, it is equal to one. The final form of 
equation set is shown as the following: 
𝑙A$4𝑎A,$E7 = 𝛽F + 𝛽7 𝑐𝑓A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽; 𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽J 1𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽K 𝑤𝑐𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽L 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎A,$E7 + 𝜑BOBP7 𝐷𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅B
+ 𝜑BVBP7 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷B 
          (5.4) 
𝑙A$5𝑎A,$E7 = 𝛾F + 𝛾7 𝑐𝑟𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾; 1𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾J𝑎𝑔𝑒A$ + 𝛾K 𝑐𝑜𝑙A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾L𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑁A$ + 𝛾[ 𝑡𝑐A$𝑎A,$E7+ 𝛾\𝑚𝑐𝑖$ + 𝛾]𝑞𝑒$ 
          (5.5) 
𝑙A$ = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑙A$4 , 𝑙A$5         (5.6) 
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5.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The disequilibrium model of the bank credit is estimated using a large panel dataset 
of UK’s SMEs obtained from the Credit Management Research Centre (CMRC) of 
the Leeds University Business School. The initial sample contains 14,447,676 
observations in the UK between 1980 and 2010. Several steps are used to clean the 
initial dataset. 
• Only non-financial firms in England and Scotland between 1990 and 2010 with 
data period more than 40 weeks were selected. Since the variables are 
expressed in total assets of one-year lag, the data period 1990 was lost.  
• Missing and duplicate data were removed.   
• Gaps in the time series data of each firm were dropped and only select those 
with a minimum five consecutive observations in the dataset.  
• The sample also excluded public listed firms, which only accounts for 2889 
observations in the dataset.  
After the data cleaning, the final sample is an unbalanced panel dataset contains 
contains 700,591 firms between 1991 and 2010, a total 6,187,473 observations. 
Observations in the dataset are classified into different sizes based on the Company 
Act 2012. According to Company Act 2012, a micro firm must not exceed 10 
employees, £316,000 total assets, and £632,000 turnover; small firm must not exceed 
50 employees, £3.26 million total assets, and £6.5 million turnover; medium firm must 
not exceed 250 employees, £12.9 million total assets, and £25.9 million turnover. It 
must at least fulfil two of those requirements. However, due to data limitation on the 
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number of employees and turnover as micro and small firms are only required to report 
abbreviated accounts, observations in the dataset are classified into micro, small, and 
medium based on the amount of total assets.  
Table 5.1 provide the distribution of observations over years for all the sample firms 
and classified by the firm size into micro, small, and medium. According to Table 5.1, 
as many as two third of the sample firms are micro firms, 28.26% of them are small 
firms, and only 4% of them are medium firms. Most of the observations are between 
2000 and 2008.  
Table 5.1 Distribution of Observation Over Years 
Year Firm size classification  
 Micro Small   Medium Total 
1991 724 1,161 274 2,159 
1992 3,103 8,546 2,324 13,973 
1993 24,728 17,228 3,360 45,316 
1994 111,285 41,832 4,507 157,624 
1995 130,587 49,577 5,475 185,639 
1996 145,791 55,772 6,200 207,763 
1997 177,418 71,588 9,019 258,025 
1998 229,932 97,140 12,550 339,622 
1999 249,732 103,332 13,864 366,928 
2000 266,619 110,779 15,356 392,754 
2001 282,781 118,801 17,078 418,660 
2002 301,960 126,053 18,427 446,440 
2003 320,405 133,598 19,413 473,416 
2004 357,632 143,408 21,054 522,094 
2005 388,237 151,101 22,182 561,520 
2006 363,354 150,661 22,742 536,757 
2007 337,499 148,361 23,309 509,169 
2008 308,420 141,244 22,553 472,217 
2009 188,466 78,170 10,087 276,723 
2010 558 113 3 674 
Total 4,189,231 1,748,465 249,777 6,187,473 
This table shows the distribution of observation over the sample period. Observations are classified 
into micro, small, and medium sized by the total assets. Micro sized firms have total assets less 
than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms 
have total assets less than £12.9 million.  
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Table 5.2 provides the industry breakdown of all the observations in the sample 
according to the firm size classification. The real estate industry has the largest 
proportion of firms in the sample, with around 1.8 million of micro firms, 0.58 million 
of small firms, and 0.86 million of medium firms. The education industry accounts for 
only 62,446 of the observations in the sample.  
Table 5.2 Industry Breakdown 
Industry Micro Small Medium Total 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 46,811 50,997 5,351 103,159 
Mining and Quarrying 11,183 4,207 1,013 16,403 
Manufacturing 392,887 281,232 49,481 723,600 
Construction 450,518 186,523 17,025 654,066 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 570,784 322,866 49,043 942,693 
Hotels and Restaurant 93,709 50,439 7,160 151,308 
Transport, Storage and Communication 132,192 73,936 10,639 216,767 
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 1,797,325 582,661 86,215 2,466,201 
Education 40,387 18,019 4,040 62,446 
Health and Social Work 75,651 45,754 7,277 128,682 
Other Community, Social and Personal Service 577,784 131,831 12,533 722,148 
Total 4,189,231 1,748,465 249,777 6,187,473 
This table shows the industry break down of the observations in the sample. Observations are 
classified into micro, small, and medium sized by the total assets. Micro sized firms have total 
assets less than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized 
firms have total assets less than £12.9 million. 
 
Table 5.3 (in the next page) reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation of disequilibrium model for all firms in the sample. The mean reports 
the average value of all the firms in the sample. For example, the mean value of assets 
is £578,683 for all the firms in the sample, indicating that on average firms in the 
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sample have £578,683 total assets. The standard error of the mean reports the 
variability between the observations.  
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for All Firms 
 Mean S.E. in Mean Median 
All firms    
   Assets (£) 578,682.9  (1,315,315) 128000 
   Bank credit/assets 0.2674  (10.773) 0 
   Internal cash flow/assets  0.0190  (44.630) 0.0137 
   Trade creditors/assets 0.6645  (12.923) 0.3120 
   Net trade credit/assets 0.2947  (12.566) 0.0369 
   Working capital needs -0.1668  (55.870) 0.1045 
   Investment needs 0.0681  (6.489) 0 
   Current ratio 3.2656 (26.835) 1.1865 
   Collateral/assets 0.3389  (6.494) 0.1540 
This table shows the mean and median of variables of all firms in the sample. The standard error 
of the mean is reported in parenthesis. Except the assets is expressed in £, all other variables are in 
ratio to one year lagged total assets.  
 
Table 5.4 subsample of micro, small, and medium firms. The median company in the 
subsample of micro sized firms has total assets of £54,000; on average micro sized 
firms rely heavily on trade credit as main source of finance than bank credit, and less 
likely to rely on internal generated cash flow. A similar structure of corporate 
financing is found on small sized firms, which the median company in the subsample 
has total assets of £737,000. However, this corporate financing structure is contrasted 
to medium sized firms, which on average medium sized firms rely heavily on bank 
credit as source of funds than trade credit, and less likely to rely on internal generated 
cash flow. The median company in subsample of medium sized firms has total assets 
of £5,227,000.  
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables by Firm Size 
 Mean S.E. in Mean Median 
Micro sized firms    
   Assets (£) 85957.39   (82927.84) 54000 
   Bank credit/assets 0.2517 (10.567) 0 
   Internal cash flow/assets  0.0175   (50.672) 0 
   Trade creditors/assets 0.7516   (6.134) 0.3684 
   Net trade credit/assets 0.3807   (6.037) 0.0714 
   Working capital needs -0.3067   (66.182) 0.0842 
   Investment needs 0.0300   (0.958) 0 
   Current ratio 2.6506 (8.186) 1.1356 
   Collateral/assets 0.2529   (0.986) 0.1154 
Small sized firms    
   Assets (£) 994369.2   (692259.5) 737000 
   Bank credit/assets 0.2785 (8.877) 0.0376 
   Internal cash flow/assets  0.0173    (29.722) 0.0246 
   Trade creditors/assets 0.4986    (21.146) 0.2586 
   Net trade credit/assets 0.1342    (20.833) 0.0145 
   Working capital needs 0.1238    (22.533) 0.1413 
   Investment needs 0.1222    (6.224) 0 
   Current ratio 4.2495 (29.091) 1.2940 
   Collateral/assets 0.4863    (6.230) 0.2827 
Medium sized firms    
   Assets (£) 5932772   (2332220) 5227000 
   Bank credit/assets 0.4525 (21.228) 0.1117 
   Internal cash flow/assets  0.0553     (9.671) 0.0199 
   Trade creditors/assets 0.3645    (19.384) 0.1022 
   Net trade credit/assets -0.0248     (16.169) -0.0069 
   Working capital needs 0.1443     (17.571) 0.1011 
   Investment needs 0.3288     (27.504) 0.0003 
   Current ratio 6.6920 (103.760) 1.2200 
   Collateral/assets 0.7494     (27.503) 0.3796 
This table shows the mean and median of variables of firms in the sample, classified into micro, 
small, and medium sized. Micro sized firms have total assets less than £316,000; small sized firms 
have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms have total assets less than £12.9 
million. The standard error of the mean is reported in parenthesis. Except the assets is expressed 
in £, all other variables are in ratio to one year lagged total assets.  
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5.6 An Analysis of Company Finance Structure 
This section provides an analysis of the financial structure of the firms in the sample 
over the sample period. First, this section describes how many firms in the sample 
used trade creditors, i.e., inter-firm credit provided by their suppliers. Table 5.5 (in the 
next page) shows the number of firms in the sample with trade creditors outstanding 
by the firm size. According to Table 5.5, there are more proportion of small firms used 
trade credit offered by their suppliers than micro and medium sized firms. In general, 
around 90% of small firms the sample used trade credit offered by their suppliers. 
Around 87% to 89% of the medium firms used trade credit offered by their suppliers 
during 1994 and 2008, while slightly more proportion of medium firms (92% to 94%) 
used trade credit as a source of financing.  
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Table 5.5 Number of Firms with Trade Creditors Outstanding 
Year Micro Small Medium 
1991 604 (83.4%) 1060 (91.3%) 254 (92.7%) 
1992 2732 (88.0%) 8090 (94.7%) 2186 (94.1%) 
1993 20106 (81.3%) 15854 (92.0%) 3103 (92.4%) 
1994 87329 (78.5%) 37817 (90.4%) 4022 (89.2%) 
1995 101767 (77.9%) 44938 (90.6%) 4842 (88.4%) 
1996 113096 (77.6%) 50546 (90.6%) 5459 (88.0%) 
1997 137101 (77.3%) 64759 (90.5%) 7975 (88.4%) 
1998 177686 (77.3%) 87549 (90.1%) 10975 (87.5%) 
1999 193058 (77.3%) 93088 (90.1%) 12096 (87.2%) 
2000 207343 (77.8%) 99855 (90.1%) 13410 (87.3%) 
2001 222340 (78.6%) 107241 (90.3%) 14869 (87.1%) 
2002 240398 (79.6%) 113951 (90.4%) 16096 (87.4%) 
2003 258179 (80.6%) 121063 (90.6%) 16950 (87.3%) 
2004 292557 (81.8%) 130461 (91.0%) 18490 (87.8%) 
2005 321931 (82.9%) 136690 (90.5%) 19488 (87.9%) 
2006 303651 (83.6%) 136853 (90.8%) 20192 (88.8%) 
2007 285610 (84.6%) 135355 (91.2%) 20798 (89.2%) 
2008 268297 (87.0%) 129740 (91.9%) 20278 (89.9%) 
2009 166228 (88.2%) 71924 (92.0%) 9030 (89.5%) 
2010 496 (88.9%) 107 (94.7%)  3 (100%) 
This table shows the number of firms in the sample with trade creditors outstanding over the 
sample period, i.e., used inter-firm credit provided by their suppliers. Firms in the sample are 
classified into micro, small, and medium sized. Micro sized firms have total assets less than 
£316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms have 
total assets less than £12.9 million. The percentage of firms with trade creditors outstanding are 
reported in the parenthesis.  
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Table 5.6 Number of Firms with Trade Debtors Outstanding 
Year Micro Small Medium 
1991 612 (84.5%) 1073 (92.4%) 255 (93.1%) 
1992 2714 (87.5%) 8084 (94.6%) 2190 (94.2%) 
1993 20136 (81.4%) 15810 (91.8%) 3117 (92.8%) 
1994 89048 (80.0%) 37739 (90.2%) 4036 (89.5%) 
1995 103938 (79.6%) 44770 (90.3%) 4877 (89.1%) 
1996 115596 (79.3%) 50294 (90.2%) 5502 (88.7%) 
1997 139505 (78.6%) 64265 (89.8%) 8009 (88.8%) 
1998 180015 (78.3%) 86711 (89.3%) 11003 (87.7%) 
1999 193039 (77.3%) 91857 (88.9%) 12117 (87.4%) 
2000 203978 (76.5%) 97969 (88.4%) 13390 (87.2%) 
2001 216128 (76.4%) 104679 (88.1%) 14825 (86.8%) 
2002 229690 (76.1%) 110502 (87.7%) 15949 (86.6%) 
2003 244051 (76.2%) 117006 (87.6%) 16738 (86.2%) 
2004 274008 (76.6%) 125454 (87.5%) 18210 (86.5%) 
2005 297888 (76.7%) 132098 (87.4%) 19172 (86.4%) 
2006 280749 (77.3%) 132307 (87.8%) 19759 (86.9%) 
2007 261883 (77.6%) 131081 (88.4%) 20482 (87.9%) 
2008 241409 (78.3%) 125662 (89.0%) 19993 (88.6%) 
2009 147415 (78.2%) 69408 (88.8%) 8992 (89.1%) 
2010 399 (71.5%) 100 (88.5%) 3 (100.%) 
This table shows the number of firms in the sample with trade creditors outstanding over the 
sample period, i.e., offered inter-firm credit. Firms in the sample are classified into micro, small, 
and medium sized. Micro sized firms have total assets less than £316,000; small sized firms have 
total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms have total assets less than £12.9 million. 
The percentage of firms with trade debtors outstanding are reported in the parenthesis.  
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Table 5.7 Number of Firms with Bank Credit Outstanding 
Year Micro Small Medium 
1991 522 (72.1%) 979 (84.3%) 254 (92.7%) 
1992 2167 (69.8%) 7297 (85.4%) 2101 (90.4%) 
1993 13221 (53.5%) 13986 (81.0%) 2972 (88.5%) 
1994 52565 (47.2%) 32314 (77.2%) 3905 (86.6%) 
1995 58635 (44.9%) 37941 (76.5%) 4682 (85.5%) 
1996 62167 (42.6%) 42232 (75.7%) 5221 (84.2%) 
1997 71171 (40.1%) 53018 (74.1%) 7417 (82.2%) 
1998 87872 (38.2%) 70424 (72.5%) 10187 (81.2%) 
1999 88953 (35.6%) 73229 (70.9%) 11141 (80.4%) 
2000 88972 (33.4%) 76642 (69.2%) 12242 (79.7%) 
2001 91100 (32.2%) 81360 (68.5%) 13641 (79.9%) 
2002 96596 (32.0%) 86828 (68.9%) 14794 (80.3%) 
2003 101966 (31.8%) 91732 (68.7%) 15487 (79.8%) 
2004 110411 (30.9%) 97217 (67.8%) 16777 (79.7%) 
2005 115403 (29.7%) 100980 (66.8%) 17605 (79.4%) 
2006 105603 (29.1%) 98576 (65.4%) 17886 (78.6%) 
2007 95941 (28.4%) 95300 (64.2%) 18104 (77.7%) 
2008 86011 (27.9%) 88837 (62.9%) 17411 (77.2%) 
2009 51855 (27.5%) 48824 (62.5%) 7841 (77.7%) 
2010 137 (24.6%) 67 (59.3%) 3 (100%) 
This table shows the number of firms in the sample with bank credit outstanding over the sample 
period. Firms in the sample are classified into micro, small, and medium sized. Micro sized firms 
have total assets less than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; 
medium sized firms have total assets less than £12.9 million. The percentage of firms with bank 
credit outstanding are reported in the parenthesis.  
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Figure 5.1 compares the percentage of trade creditors to total liabilities between micro, 
small, and medium sized firms. Trade creditors of micro-sized firms in the sample is 
around 30% of their total liabilities in 1991 and the trade creditors are gradually 
increasing over years to as much as 80% of their total liabilities in 2010. Similarly, for 
small-sized firms, their trade creditors are also around 30% of their total liabilities in 
1991 and it is gradually increasing over years to around 70% of their total liabilities 
in 2010. In contrast, trade creditors of the medium sized firms are around 20-30% of 
their total liabilities and remain stable in proportion to their total liabilities, which is 
much lower than micro and small sized firms.  
Figure 5.1 Trade Creditors to Total Liabilities (%), by Size 
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Figure 5.2 compares the percentage of trade debtors to total assets are compared 
between micro, small, and medium sized firms. Micro firms in the sample extended 
more inter-firm credit in proportion of their total assets than small and medium sized 
firms. This is compared to medium firms, which has generally extended credit around 
20% of their total assets to their business customers and the proportion is gradually 
decrease since the financial crisis in 2008.  
Figure 5.2 Trade Debtors to Total Assets (%), by Size 
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Figure 5.3 summarises the proportion of bank credit in micro, small, and medium firms 
to their total liabilities. Micro firms have an average bank credit around 20% in 
proportion to their total liabilities and the figure is gradually falling over years to only 
around 5% in 2010. Small sized firms have an average bank credit around 30% to their 
total liabilities and also decreasing over years. Medium sized firms have much lower 
amount of bank credit in proportion to their total liabilities and the amount seems 
stable over years. Note that dramatic increase of bank credit in 2010 is merely extreme 
value due to a tiny sample of medium firms in 2010.  
Figure 5.3 Bank Credit to Total Liability (%), by Size 
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5.7 Estimated Results of the Disequilibrium Model 
After an analysis of the corporate financing structure of the firms in the sample, it is 
now to estimate the demand equation (equation 5.4) and supply equation (equation 5.5) 
using the 3SLS. After that, the fitted values of both the equations are estimated to find 
the quantity of loan demand and the quantity of loan supply. The quantity of loan 
demand and supply are then used to estimate which firms in the sample face borrowing 
constraint. Borrowing constrained firms are those with excess demand that their 
quantity of loan demand is greater than the quantity of loan supply.  
This section presents the results of the disequilibrium model of credit rationing. 
Remind that the MCI that estimated in chapter 4 is included in the supply equation and 
therefore is able to estimate its effect on corporate borrowing. This section first 
considers the results of the demand equation (in section 5.6.1) before looking at the 
result of the supply equation (in section 5.6.2). After that, this section reports the 
number and proportion of firms in the sample face credit rationing. Credit rationing 
and borrowing constraint are used interchangeably in this thesis, they both refer to the 
condition of excess demand for bank loans. The results of the disequilibrium model 
are discussed in section 5.7.  
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5.7.1 Results of the Demand Equation 
This subsection reports the estimated coefficients of the demand equation (equation 
5.4). Table 5.8 (in the next page) summaries the estimated coefficients of the demand 
equation.  
a. Firm size 
We start by looking at the coefficient of the firm size. The results show that regardless 
of whether it is micro, small, or medium sized firms in the sample, the coefficients of 
firm size have a significant positive effect on desired demand for bank loans, which 
indicates that larger firms have stronger desired demand for bank loans. This is 
therefore able to confirm the hypothesis 1, that the demand for bank credit for the 
UK’s SMEs increases if the size of the firm is larger. 
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Table 5.8 Estimated Coefficients of the Demand Equation 
Variables Micro firm Small firm Medium firm 
Constant 0.08145 (2.62)* -0.01016 (-0.09) 0.18642 (0.05)* 
Internal cash flow/assets 0.00006 (5.35)* -0.00035 (-10.98)* -0.10558 (-66.84)* 
Net trade credit/assets 0.00924 (32.87)* -0.00693 (-32.69)* -0.01706 (-17.96)* 
Working capital needs/assets -0.00006 (-7.46)* 0.00315 (34.37)* 0.09394 (105.01)* 
Investment/assets 0.02642 (20.67)* 0.30961 (301.80)* 0.37929 (287.87)* 
Firm size 2780.232 (62.92)* 162960.8 (300.50)* 732019.1 (163.07)* 
DYEAR    
   1991 0.01001 ( 0.26) -0.01032 (-0.08) -0.04711 (-0.01) 
   1992 0.00889 ( 0.28) -0.01275 (-0.11) -0.06268 (-0.02) 
   1993 0.01076 ( 0.36) 0.00453 ( 0.04) -0.07478 (-0.02) 
   1994 0.00980 ( 0.33) 0.00943 ( 0.08) -0.06104 (-0.02) 
   1995 0.01119 ( 0.36) 0.01031 ( 0.09) -0.09816 (-0.03) 
   1996 0.00994 ( 0.33) 0.00406 ( 0.03) -0.07186 (-0.02) 
   1997 0.00557 ( 0.19) -0.01414 (-0.12) -0.08433 (-0.02) 
   1998 0.00323 ( 0.11) -0.02266 (-0.19) -0.09497 (-0.03) 
   1999 -0.00248 (-0.08) -0.03664 (-0.32) -0.14117 (-0.04) 
   2000 0.00367 ( 0.11) -0.02428 (-0.21) -0.05993 (-0.02) 
   2001 0.00507 ( 0.14) -0.02135 (-0.18) 0.01542 ( 0.00) 
   2002 0.00097 ( 0.03) -0.03281 (-0.28) -0.07034 (-0.02) 
   2003 0.00158 ( 0.05) -0.03658 (-0.26) -0.08074 (-0.02) 
   2004 0.00033 ( 0.01) -0.03712 (-0.32) -0.05805 (-0.02) 
   2005 0.00019 ( 0.01) -0.03764 (-0.32) -0.06183 (-0.02) 
   2006 2.75e-06 ( 0.00) -0.04209 (-0.36) -0.11194 (-0.03) 
   2007 -0.00901 (-0.03) -0.04753 (-0.41) -0.08890 (-0.02) 
   2008 0.00258 ( 0.09) -0.03430 (-0.30) -0.07585 (-0.02) 
   2009 0.00213 ( 0.08) -0.02502 (-0.22) -0.13323 (-0.04) 
DINDUSTRY    
   Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry -0.00417 (-0.60) -0.06069 (-3.08)* -0.02472 (-0.12) 
   Mining and Quarrying 0.11243 ( 6.27)* -0.04299 (-2.46)* -0.07018 (-0.65) 
   Manufacturing -0.00318 (-1.00) -0.10684 (-17.39)* -0.12665 (-1.30) 
   Construction -0.00431 (-1.36) -0.10577 (-18.05)* -0.13667 (-1.52) 
   Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.00044 (0.12) 0.03992 (5.18)* 0.10787 ( 0.96) 
   Hotels and Restaurant -0.00110 (-0.31) -0.06803 (-9.62)* -0.05870 (-0.56) 
   Transport, Storage and Comm. -0.00336 (-1.09) -0.04178 (-7.36)* -0.00557 (-0.06) 
   Real Estate, Renting -0.00386 (-0.87) -0.02095 (-1.97)* 0.01062 ( 0.08) 
   Education -0.00410 (-1.06) -0.01519 (-1.92) 0.00726 ( 0.06) 
   Health and Social Work -0.00447 (-1.42) -0.04418 (-6.90)* -0.03935 (-0.39) 
R-Square 0.0017 0.1513 0.5199 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the demand equation of the disequilibrium model 
(equation 5.4). The t-ratios are reported in parenthesis. * denotes the coefficient is significant at 5%. 
The firms in the sample are classified into micro, small, and medium sized. Micro sized firms have total 
assets less than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized 
firms have total assets less than £12.9 million.  
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b. Working Capital and Investment Needs 
The coefficient of the working capital needs and investment. For small sized and 
medium sized firms in the sample, both the coefficients of working capital requirement 
and investment have significant positive effect on the desired loan demand. This 
confirms that small sized and medium sized firms’ desired demand for bank borrowing 
should increase along with the requirement of working capital and investment. For 
small firms, the coefficients of working capital requirement is around 0.0032 and for 
investment is 0.31, which indicates a much stronger effect of investment on desired 
demand for bank loans than working capital needs. This suggests that £1 increase in 
investment needs will result in £0.31 increase of desired loan demand for small sized 
firms, while £1 increase in working capital requirement will increase desired demand 
for bank borrowing by only £0.0032. For medium firms, the coefficient of working 
capital requirement is 0.094 and for investment needs is 0.38. This suggests that £1 
increase in working capital needs will increase desired loan demand by £0.094, 
whereas £1 increase in investment will lead to £0.38 increase of desired demand for 
bank loans.  
Therefore, it is able to confirm that the hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 for small and 
medium sized firms that the demand for bank credit for the small and medium sized 
firms in the UK increases if it has a higher need for working capital and investment. 
However, for micro sized firms, the estimated coefficient of working capital 
requirement has significant negative effect on desired demand for bank borrowing, 
indicating that they have stronger desired loan demand when they have lower 
requirement for working capital. 
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Therefore, for the micro sized firms, it does not have enough evidence to confirm the 
hypothesis 2. Nonetheless, it is able to confirm that the demand for bank loans for 
micro sized firms in the UK increases if it has stronger financial need for investment.  
c. Internal generated cash flow and Net trade credit 
For small sized and medium sized firms, internal generated cash flow and net trade 
credit have significant negative effect on desired loan demand, indicating that they are 
important substitutes for bank loans. This suggests that small sized and medium sized 
firms have stronger desired demand for bank loans when they have less internal funds 
available to them and received more trade credit from their suppliers. For small sized 
firms, the extent to which the internal funds substitute for bank loans is about 0.0035 
whereas for net trade credit obtained is 0.007. This suggests that £1 increase in internal 
funds will result in £0.0035 decrease of desired loan demand, and £1 increase in net 
trade credit received will reduce desired for loan demand by £0.007. Compared to 
medium sized firms, the coefficient of internal generated cash flow is around 0.1 and 
net trade credit acquired is 0.017. This suggests that £1 increase in internal funds will 
reduce desired demand for bank loans by £0.1, whereas £1 increase in net trade credit 
received will result in decrease £0.017 desired loan demand.  
Therefore, it is able to confirm the hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 for small and medium 
sized firms in the sample, that the demand for bank credit for the small and medium 
sized firms in the UK increases if it has less internal resources available and net trade 
credit outstanding.  
However, for micro sized firms, it is surprising to see that the coefficient of internal 
generated cash flow and net trade credit have a significant positive effect on desired 
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for loan demand. This indicates that the micro sized firms’ desired demand for bank 
loans will increase along with the increase in their internal funds and net trade credit.  
Therefore, it does not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 4 and 5 for 
micro sized firms in the sample.  
d. Time dummy 
For micro sized firms, the coefficients of time dummy variables are positive from 1991 
to 1998 and in 2008 and 2009, and negative and generally declining until 2000. This 
indicates that micro firms have stronger demand for bank loans between 1991 and 
1998 but declining from 1999 to 2007, and then increase in 2008 and 2009. This 
suggests micro firms increase bank credit as source of funds during economic 
recession in 2008 and 2009. For small firms, the coefficients of time dummy are 
negative and declining from 1996 to 2009, which suggests that their desired demand 
for bank loans are declining since 1996, even during economic recession. For medium 
firms, the coefficients of time dummy are negative throughout the sample period and 
is deepest in 2009, indicating that the demand for bank loans are decreasing during the 
sample period and is significant decreased in 2009.  
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5.7.2 Results of the Supply Equation 
After reporting the estimated results of the demand of bank credit, it is now necessary 
to report the estimated coefficients of the credit supply equation (equation 5.5). Table 
5.9. summaries the estimated coefficients of the supply equation.  
Table 5.9 Estimated Coefficients of the Supply Equation 
Variables Micro firm Small firm Medium firm 
Constant 0.10679 (1.55) -0.07697 (-0.92) -0.10408 (-0.25) 
Current ratio 0.00008 (2.00)* 0.00022 (6.96)* 0.00017 (1.30) 
Firm size 2777.205 (62.72)* 165746.8 (300.62)* 888925.4 (171.26)* 
Firm age < 5 years -0.00017 (-0.23) 0.01520 (5.28)* 0.02198 (0.44) 
Collateral/assets 0.02429 (19.54)* 0.30648 (296.24)* 0.33742 (234.02)* 
Manufacturing industry 0.11504 (6.50)* 0.04149 (2.46)* 0.02121 (0.28) 
Trade creditors/assets 0.00907 (32.61)* -0.00990 (-48.38)* -0.04153 (-39.94)* 
MCI -0.00031 (-0.51) -0.00125 (-1.70) 0.00002 (0.00) 
QE -0.07370 (-0.33) -0.17552 (-0.65) -1.58077 (-1.18) 
R-square 0.0016 0.1507 0.4873 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the supply equation of the disequilibrium model (equation 
5.5). The t-ratios are reported in parenthesis. * denotes the coefficient is significant at 5%. The firms in 
the sample are classified into micro, small, and medium sized. Micro sized firms have total assets less 
than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms have 
total assets less than £12.9 million.  
 
a. Firm risk: current ratio 
The coefficients of current ratio of both micro and small sized firms have significant 
positive effect on the desired demand for bank loans, but the effect is not significant 
for medium sized firms. Current ratio reflects the firm’s ability to pay short-term debts 
and the higher the ratio, the more capability the firm is of paying its debt and therefore 
a lower default risk. The positive coefficient in the estimation suggests that credit 
availability increases when the firm is more capable of paying its debt. The coefficient 
of current ratio for micro sized firms in the sample is around 0.00008, and it is 0.00002 
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for small sized firms, and 0.00017 for medium sized firms. This suggests that 1% 
increase in the current ratio of micro sized firms will increase 0.00008% of its credit 
availability, 0.00002% for small sized firms, and 0.00017% for medium firms.  
The coefficients of firm size have a significant positive effect on the availability of 
bank loans for all sized of firms in the sample. This suggests that larger firms have 
supplied more credit than smaller firms.  
The firm age is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is less than 5 years old, 
and is zero if it is or over 5 years old. The coefficient of firm age of micro sized firms 
has a negative effect on the desired loan demand. The negative coefficient of firm age 
indicates that they have more credit availability when they are more than 5 years old. 
This is compared to small sized and medium sized firms, which have positive 
coefficients of firm age and this suggests that they have more credit availability if they 
have been established for less than 5 years old.  
For the measure of firm risk, the current ratio and firm size have provided sufficient 
evidence to confirm the hypothesis 6 that the supply of bank loans for the micro and 
small sized firms in the UK decreases if a firm is characterised by higher level of risk. 
However, the current ratio is not significant for medium sized firms and therefore is 
not able to confirm the hypothesis 6 for medium sized firms. Moreover, the firm age 
also is far too completed to confirm the hypothesis about firm risk in the supply of 
bank loans.  
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b. Collateral 
The coefficients of collateral have significant positive effect on desired demand for 
bank loans for all sized of firms in the sample. The coefficients of collateral of micro 
sized firms is 0.0243, small sized firms is 0.3065, and medium sized firms is 0.3374. 
This suggests that £1 increase in the collateral of micro sized firms will result in 
increasing loan availability to them by £0.0243, £1 increase in collateral of small sized 
firms will increase £0.3065 of loan supply to them, and £1 increase in collateral of 
medium sized firms will increase £0.3374 of loan availability to them.  
Therefore, it is able to confirm the hypothesis 7 for all the firm size in the sample, that : 
the supply of bank credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if it can offer more assets as 
collateral. 
c. Manufacturing Industry 
The coefficient of manufacturing industry dummy has significant positive effect on 
the supply of bank loans to micro and small sized firms, but not significant for medium 
sized firms. It is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to manufacturing 
industry. The positive coefficients in the estimation suggest that greater bank loans 
available to the firm if it belongs to manufacturing industry. Therefore, micro and 
small sized firms in the sample that are belong to the manufacturing industry have 
significant more bank loans available to them, while but not significant for medium 
sized firms. If the micro sized firm is a manufacturing firm, then it has 11.5% more 
bank credit available compared to firms in non-manufacturing sector; if the small sized 
firm is a manufacturing firm, then it has 4.15% more bank credit available to them 
compared to firms in non-manufacturing sector; if the medium firm is a manufacturing 
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firm, then it has 2.12% more bank credit compared to firms in non-manufacturing 
sector.  
d. Trade creditors 
The coefficient of trade creditors of micro sized firms has significant positive effect 
on loan availability, while the coefficients of trade creditors of small and medium sized 
firms in the sample have significant negative effect on loan supply. This indicates that 
more loans are available to micro sized firms that obtained more trade credit from their 
suppliers. However, this contrasted to small and medium sized firms that have lower 
loan availability as they obtained more trade credit from their suppliers.  
Therefore, it is able to confirm the hypothesis 8 for micro sized firms in the sample, 
that the supply of bank credit for the micro sized firms in the UK increases if it uses 
more trade credit. However, for small and medium sized firms in the sample, it does 
not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 8.  
e. Monetary Condition 
The coefficients of monetary condition index (MCI) have negative effect on loan 
availability to micro sized and small sized firms, although the effect is not significant. 
However, the coefficient of the MCI has positive effect on loan availability for 
medium sized firms. The negative coefficient suggests that firms have more bank 
credit availability when the monetary condition is loosening but have less credit 
availability when the monetary condition is tightening. This finding is consistent with 
the theoretical prediction of credit channel view of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. However, this is not the case for medium sized firms. The result shows 
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that loosen (tighten) monetary policy would reduce (increase) the availability of bank 
credit to medium sized firms.  
Therefore, it is able to confirm the hypothesis 9 for micro sized and small sized firms 
in the UK, in that the supply of bank credit for the micro sized and small sized firms 
in the UK increases if the monetary condition in the UK is easing. However, it does 
not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 9 for medium sized firms in the 
UK.  
f. Quantitative easing 
The estimated coefficient of quantitative easing has negative effect on the supply of 
bank credit but the effect is not significant. This suggests that more credit is available 
to firms when less money is created on the balance sheet of banks. Therefore, it does 
not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 10, in that the supply of bank 
credit for the UK’s SMEs increases if there is quantitative easing. 
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5.7.3 The Proportion of Borrowing Constrained Firms 
After reporting the estimated coefficients of both the equation of credit demand and 
credit supply, it is now to report how many of them face borrowing constraint. Credit 
rationing and borrowing constraint are used interchangeably in this thesis. Both 
terminologies are used to describe the situation in which the borrowers have higher 
demand for bank credit than the supply.  
Table 5.10 (in the next page) shows the number of borrowing constrained firms in the 
period between 1991 and 2010. The proportion (%) are reported in the parenthesis. 
According to the table 5.10, over the sample period between 1991 and 2010, the 
average proportion of borrowing constrained firms of the micro sized firms is 58.3%, 
small sized firms is 56.2%, and medium sized firms is 51.6%. The results show that 
the proportion of micro sized firms in the sample that are borrowing constraint is 
significant higher in the recession year of 1991 and generally declines after that until 
1995. The proportion slightly increased to 57% and remains stable at around 57% until 
2000. The proportion of borrowing constrained micro sized firms started to increase 
in 2001 and reached its peak in 2008 to 60.3%. The proportion of borrowing 
constrained micro firms declines in 2009 and 2010.  
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Table 5.10 Number of Borrowing Constrained Firms (1991-2010) 
Year Micro Small  Medium  
1991 519 (71.7%) 656 (56.5%) 152 (55.5%) 
1992 1,881 (60.6%) 4,831 (56.5%) 1,219 (52.5%) 
1993 14,453 (58.4%) 9,798 (56.9%) 1,694 (50.4%) 
1994 61,741 (55.5%) 22,903 (54.7%) 2,370 (51.9%) 
1995 72,168 (55.3%) 26,972 (54.4%) 2,144 (39.2%) 
1996 81,831 (56.1%) 30,471 (54.6%) 3,147 (50.8%) 
1997 101,289 (57.1%) 39,317 (54.9%) 4,319 (47.9%) 
1998 130,238 (56.6%) 53,039 (54.6%) 5,788 (46.1%) 
1999 142,318 (57.0%) 56,705 (54.8%) 8,552 (61.7%) 
2000 152,370 (57.1%) 60,744 (54.9%) 6,856 (44.6%) 
2001 163,608 (57.9%) 65,687 (55.3%) 9,720 (56.9%) 
2002 177,449 (58.8%) 70,207 (55.7%) 9,512 (51.6%) 
2003 188,882 (59.0%) 75,016 (56.2%) 9,653 (49.7%) 
2004 211,480 (59.1%) 81,129 (56.6%) 11,434 (54.3%) 
2005 228,266 (58.8%) 86,768 (57.4%) 12,284 (56.7%) 
2006 215,647 (59.3%) 86,405 (57.3%) 9,823 (43.2%) 
2007 201,874 (59.8%) 85,516 (57.6%) 12,047 (51.7%) 
2008 185,831 (60.3%) 81,328 (57.6%) 12,807 (56.9%) 
2009 110,283 (58.5%) 44,201 (56.5%) 5,302 (52.6%) 
2010 293 (52.5%) 60 (53.1%) 3 (100.0%) 
Total 2,442,421 (58.3%) 981,753 (56.2%) 128,826 (51.6%) 
This table reports how many and the proportion of firms in the sample face borrowing constraint 
between 1991 and 2010. The sample firms are classified into micro, small, and medium size. Micro 
sized firms have total assets less than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 
million; medium sized firms have total assets less than £12.9 million. 
 
For small sized firms, the proportion of borrowing constrained is around 57% in 
between 1991 and 1993 and then slightly decrease to around 55% in 1994 and the 
proportion remain stable between 1994 and 2000. The proportion of borrowing 
constrained small firms then gradually increase in 2001 until its peak at 57.6% in 2008. 
For medium sized firms, the proportion of borrowing constrained firms is significantly 
decreasing from 55.5% in 1991 to the lowest at 39% in 1995. The proportion of 
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medium firms that are borrowing constrained increase in 1996 to 61.7% in 1999 and 
the proportion is decreasing after that. The proportion is increasing to 57% in 2008. 
The descriptive statistics between constrained and unconstrained firms for micro, 
small, and medium sized in the sample are compared in Table 11, 12, and 13, 
respectively, in the next page. T-tests are also performed to test the significance of 
mean difference between constrained and unconstrained firms, whereas Mann-Witney 
tests are estimated to test the significance of differences in median between 
constrained and unconstrained firms. In overall, the results of t-tests show that there 
are significant differences in the mean of total assets between those constrained and 
unconstrained among micro and small sized firms, but not among medium sized firms 
in the sample. Among micro and small sized firms, those borrowing unconstraint 
generally have higher level of assets compared to those of constrained firms. However, 
among medium sized firms, those unconstraint have slightly lower total assets than 
those of constrained.  
It is now to compare differences between constrained and unconstrained of the micro 
firms in the sample. According to Table 5.11 (in the next page), the results of t-test 
also show significant difference in the mean of internal generated cash flow, trade 
creditors, net trade credit, short-term and long-term financing needs, current ratio, and 
collateral between those micro firms that are constraint and unconstraint.  
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Table 5.11 Descriptive Statistics of Constrained, Unconstrained Micro Firms 
 Borrowing Constrained  Unconstrained 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
   Assets (£)  75287 (78177) 44000 100877 (86978) 73000 
   Bank credit/assets  0.2368 (8.812) 0 0.2725 (12.617) 0 
   Cash flow/assets  -0.0252 (62.666) 0 0.0774 (25.825) 0.0189 
   Trade creditors/assets  0.7150 (7.695) 0.32 0.8027 (2.725) 0.4504 
   Net trade credit/assets  0.4959 (7.684) 0.0909 0.2197 (2.192) 0.0454 
   Working capital need -0.4060 (86.628) 0.1676 -0.167 (3.370) 0 
   Investment need  0.0523 (1.185) 0.1676 -0.001 (0.487) -0.0088 
   Current ratio  2.7630 (5.744) 1.2857 2.4934 (10.703) 1 
   Collateral/assets  0.1296 (1.190) 0.0455 0.4254 (0.547) 0.3548 
     
 t-Valuea z-Valueb   
   Bank credit/assets 3.403 (0.0007) 465.755 (0.000)   
   Cash flow/assets 2.044 (0.0410) 169.530 (0.000)   
   Trade creditors/assets 14.424 (0.0000) 237.391 (0.000)   
   Net trade credit/assets -46.183 (0.0000) 237.391 (0.000)   
   Working capital need 3.632 (0.0003) -418.225(0.000)   
   Investment need -56.172 (0.0000) -389.365(0.000)   
   Current ratio -33.237 (0.0000) -426.667(0.000)   
   Collateral/assets 306.177 (0.0000) 1151.444(0.000)   
This table reports the differences in the mean and medium of the variables between constrained 
and unconstrained micro firms. Standard deviation of the mean are reported in the parenthesis. 
Micro sized firms have total assets less than £316,000. a T-tests for differences in means between 
unconstrained and constrained firms; p-values are reported in parenthesis. b Mann–Witney tests 
for differences in medians between unconstrained and constrained firms; p-values are reported in 
parenthesis.  
 
The working capital need and current ratio of micro firms, those borrowing constraint 
generally have deeper negative working capital need but a higher positive current ratio 
than that unconstraint. A negative working capital need might indicate that they 
generally have more current liabilities than current assets and it is worse for micro 
firms that are borrowing constraint than unconstraint. However, the mean values of 
current ratio show that current assets of unconstrained firms are 2.5 times more than 
their current liabilities, whereas constrained firms have current assets 2.7 times more 
than their current liabilities. The negative value in the working capital need might be 
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the effect of one-year lag of total assets in the denominator. Among micro firms, those 
constraints generally have a negative internal generated cash flow while unconstrained 
firms have a positive internal generated cash flow, indicating that micro firms that are 
borrowing constrained in general are making losses and unconstrained firms are 
making profit. Although unconstrained micro firms have higher trade creditors than 
those constrained, they have lower net trade credit than constrained micro firms. This 
indicates that unconstrained firms received more trade credit from their suppliers than 
those constrained but at the same time also extended more credit than constrained 
firms of micro sized. Furthermore, unconstrained firms have around 3.5 times more 
collateral assets than constrained firms.  
The result of the Mann-Witney tests confirms that there are significant differences in 
medians between unconstrained and constrained firms for all stated variables. The 
median firms that are unconstrained have more assets than those of constrained firms 
and it shows that at least 50% of the unconstrained micro firms have £73,000 total 
assets and it is compared to only £44,000 for those are borrowing constraint. The 
median of bank credit for both constrained and unconstrained firms are 0, indicating 
that at least 50% of the micro firms in the sample do not have bank credit, regardless 
of whether they are borrowing constraint or unconstraint. The median value of cash 
flow for constrained firms is 0, indicating that at least 50% of them do not make profit 
and it is compared to unconstrained firms around 0.019 to their total assets. The 
median value of collateral is 0.35 for unconstrained firms and 0.045 for constrained 
firms, indicating that at least 50% of micro firms that are unconstraint have 0.35 
collateral assets to their total assets, and this is compared to only 0.045 for constrained 
firms which is around 8 times less than unconstrained firms.  
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It is now to compare the variables between constrained and unconstrained firms among 
the small sized firms in the sample. Table 5.12 (in the next page) summaries the 
descriptive statistics between constrained and unconstrained for small sized firms in 
the sample. The results show there are significant differences in the mean of bank 
credit, trade creditors, net trade credit, short-term financing needs, current ratio, and 
collateral but found no significant differences in the mean of internal generated cash 
flow and long-term financing needs. Small firms that are unconstraint receive have 
received more bank credit, generated greater internal cash flows, more collateral assets, 
and used less trade credit than those are borrowing constraint. Unconstrained firms 
use bank credit of around 0.13 to total assets more than constrained firms. In terms of 
the median values, it shows that at least 50% of unconstrained small firms have total 
assets of £787,000, which is £87,000 more than those are borrowing constraint. At 
least 50% of the unconstrained firms have 0.15 bank credit and 0.71 collateral to their 
total assets and this is compared to only 0.0086 and 0.09 for those constraint. The 
median value of trade credit is 0.167 for unconstrained firms and 0.354 for constrained 
firms, indicating that at least 50% of the small firms in the sample that are borrowing 
constraint have used trade credit 2 times more than those unconstrained.  
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Table 5.12 Descriptive Statistics of Constrained, Unconstrained Small Firms 
 Borrowing Constrained Unconstrained firms 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
   Assets 957272.2 
(675134) 
701000 1041871    
(710767.6) 
787000 
   Bank credit/assets 0.2209 (7.889) 0.0086207 0.3523 (9.999) 0.151 
   Cash flow/assets  0.0058 (37.909) 0.0307263 0.0321 (13.205) 0.019 
   Trade creditors/assets 0.5968 (7.454) 0.3543506 0.3728 (30.798) 0.167 
   Net trade credit/assets 0.0914 (5.725) 0.000677 0.1889 (30.786) 0.027 
   Working capital need 0.3138 (5.377) 0.3013393   -0.1195 (33.477) 0 
   Investment need 0.1207 (7.278) 0 0.1240 (4.526) 0 
   Current ratio 4.4465 (19.177) 1.485714 3.9973 (38.196) 1 
   Collateral/assets 0.2402 (7.279) 0.0916808   0.8015 (4.525) 0.709 
     
 t-Valuea z-Valueb   
   Bank credit/assets 9.7180 (0.000) 391.186 (0.000)   
   Cash flow/assets 0.5816 (0.560) -101.049 (0.000)   
   Trade creditors/assets -6.9483 (0.000) -330.840 (0.000)   
   Net trade credit/assets 3.0702 (0.002) 145.270 (0.000)   
   Working capital need -12.6184 (0.000) -589.133 (0.000)   
   Investment need 0.3455 (0.730) -39.483 (0.000)   
   Current ratio -10.1318 (0.000) -397.265 (0.000)   
   Collateral/assets 59.1781 (0.000) 1000.77 (0.000)   
This table reports the differences in the mean and medium of the variables between constrained 
and unconstrained small firms. Standard deviation of the mean are reported in the parenthesis. 
Small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million. a T-tests for differences in means 
between unconstrained and constrained firms; p-values are reported in parenthesis. b Mann–Witney 
tests for differences in medians between unconstrained and constrained firms; p-values are 
reported in parenthesis.  
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Table 5.13 (in the next page) compare the descriptive statistics between constrained 
and unconstrained medium sized firms. The results of t-test show significant 
differences in the mean of cash flow, net trade credit, short-term financing needs, 
current ratio, and collateral between constrained and unconstrained firms, but not for 
bank credit, trade creditors, and long-term financing needs. Unconstrained firms have 
slightly more bank credit and internal cash flow, lower short-term financing needs but 
more long-term needs than constrained firms. Moreover, unconstrained firms also 
have higher current ratio and collateral than constrained firms, indicating that those 
medium sized firms that are unconstraint have greater ability to pay short-term debts 
and have more collateral assets to meet their bank credit. The result of the Mann-
Witney tests confirms that there are significant differences in medians between 
unconstrained and constrained firms for all stated variables. The median value of total 
assets of unconstrained firms is lower than those constrained and at least 50% of 
medium firms that are unconstraint have more bank credit, i.e., around 5 times more 
than those constraints and they have 0.774 collateral to total assets compared to 0.125 
for those unconstraint. Similar to small sized firms, at least 50% of medium firms that 
are borrowing constraint use more trade credit than those unconstrained.  
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Table 5.13 Descriptive Statistics of Constrained, Unconstrained Medium Firms 
 Borrowing Constrained Unconstrained 
 Mean  Median Mean Median 
   Assets 6019213   
(2357143) 
5334000 5840703            
(2301820) 
5115000   
   Bank credit/assets 0.4327 (24.653) 0.0443 0.4736 (16.829) 0.212 
   Cash flow/assets  -0.0064 (7.060) 0.0231 0.1211 (11.835) 0.017    
   Trade creditors/assets 0.3643 (17.104) 0.1356 0.3648 (21.5499) 0.073 
   Net trade credit/assets -0.0909 (8.827) -0.0558 0.0456 (21.3755) 0 
   Working capital need 0.4492 (18.500) 0.2677 -0.1806 (16.5167) -0.009 
   Investment need 0.2586 (27.559) 0 0.4036 (27.4452) 0.005   
   Current ratio 5.7668 (48.632) 1.4419 7.6774 (140.4018) 0.963   
   Collateral/assets 0.4252 (27.559) 0.1252   1.0946 (27.4394) 0.774 
     
 t-Valuea z-Valueb   
   Bank credit/assets 0.4809 (0.631) 125.705 (0.000)   
   Cash flow/assets 3.2912 (0.001) -20.602 (0.000)   
   Trade creditors/assets 0.0064 (0.995) -93.056 (0.000)   
   Net trade credit/assets 2.1073 (0.035) 107.391 (0.000)   
   Working capital need -8.9539 (0.000) -253.317 (0.000)   
   Investment need 1.3171 (0.188) 35.261 (0.000)   
   Current ratio 4.5990 (0.000) -181.205 (0.000)   
   Collateral/assets 6.0797 (0.000) 358.481 (0.000)   
This table reports the differences in the mean and medium of the variables between constrained 
and unconstrained small firms. Standard deviation of the mean are reported in the parenthesis. 
Medium sized firms have total assets less than £12.9 million. a T-tests for differences in means 
between unconstrained and constrained firms; p-values are reported in parenthesis. b Mann–Witney 
tests for differences in medians between unconstrained and constrained firms; p-values are 
reported in parenthesis.  
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5.8 Discussion of the Findings 
After reporting the estimated results of both the demand and supply equation of the 
bank credit, as well as the proportion of borrowing constrained firms in the UK, it is 
now necessary to discuss the estimated result. i.e., whether these estimated results are 
consistent with the related theories and the findings of prior literature. This section 
first discusses the estimated results of the demand equation and then followed by the 
supply equation in the disequilibrium model. After that, this section discusses the 
impact of monetary policy on the corporate borrowing, as well as the proportion of 
borrowing constrained firms.  
5.8.1 Determinants of the Demand for Bank Credit  
First, we discuss the estimated results of the demand equation in the disequilibrium 
model. The results of the disequilibrium model of this thesis provides substantial 
evidence suggesting that internal generated cash flow and trade credit are two 
important sources of funds that UK’s SMEs use to substitute for bank credit. The result 
of internal generated cash flow is consistent with the prediction of pecking order 
theory which suggests that companies prefer using internal funds as it is risk free and 
costless before seeking external finance, i.e., bank loans (Cotei and Farhat, 2009). This 
is also consistent with the results of empirical study conducted by Atanasova and 
Wilson (2004), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2008), and Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), Soana et 
al (2015), which found that internal funds is important substitute for bank loans and 
firms have greater demand for bank loans if they have lower level of internal funds.  
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However, it is surprising to see that the coefficient of internal cash flow is positively 
significant to bank credit for micro sized firms, which can be interpreted as that micro 
sized firms have lower demand for bank loans even they generated less internal cash 
flow. This interpretation can be further confirmed by comparing the descriptive 
statistics between constrained and unconstrained firms. The result shows that the 
constrained firms generally have significant lower amount of internal cash flow than 
unconstrained firms and micro firms that are borrowing constraint on average even 
have a negative internal cash flow. This finding is also consistent with Carbo-Valverde 
et al. (2008), which found constrained firms have significant lower internal cash flow 
than those unconstrained. This may be able to explain that micro sized firms tend not 
want to borrow more money from banks to invest in its business that does not generate 
desirable returns.  
The result of the disequilibrium model of this thesis shows a significant negative 
correlation between bank credit and trade credit for small and medium sized firms in 
the sample, providing a substantial evidence of the UK’s SMEs supporting the theory 
of substitution relationship between bank credit and trade credit. The substitution 
theory suggests that trade credit is often used by SMEs to alleviate financial problem 
when they have difficulty raising finance from banks or when they are credit constraint 
by banks. The evidence supporting the substitution theory of bank credit and trade 
credit is enhanced by the classification of borrowing constraint estimated by the 
disequilibrium model of this thesis, which found that small sized firms that are 
borrowing constraint generally have a higher level of trade credit obtained from 
suppliers than those unconstraint, although micro firms that are borrowing constraint 
have a lower level of trade credit than those unconstraint while it is indifferent for 
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medium sized firms. The result also shows that micro sized firms that are borrowing 
constraint have a lower level of trade credit than those unconstraint and this is not 
consistent with the substitution theory of trade credit, but may seems reasonable 
because their suppliers are not willing to sell them on account as a concern of their 
creditworthiness to payback within the specified period.  
The positive coefficients of working capital and investment needs for small and 
medium sized firms indicate that they demand for more bank loans when they have 
greater needs of working capital and investment. This provides evidence suggesting 
that bank credit is one of the major sources of corporate finance to considered by SMEs 
in the UK to fund working capital and investment. This also confirms the theory of 
credit market imperfection that suggest the bank credit is the key external source of 
finance for SMEs. This is consistent with the empirical studies of Kremp and Sevestre 
(2011) and Farinha and Felix (2014) examined on French and Portuguese SMEs 
respectively, which find positive coefficients of working capital needs and investment 
on bank credit, suggesting that the demand for bank loans is strongly driven by 
working capital and investment needs. However, the result shows it is not the case for 
micro sized firms in the sample and their demand for bank loans increase (decrease) 
when they have lower (higher) needs of working capital but stronger needs (lower) 
needs for long-term investment, and a higher (lower) level of internal generated cash 
flow. It might be making sense if micro sized firms with a high level of internal cash 
flow (i.e., a measure of profitability) might want to expand businesses by obtaining 
more finance from bank loans, further evidenced by greater needs for long-term 
investment.  
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5.8.2 Determinants of the Supply of Bank Credit  
On the other hand, the estimated results of the loan supply in the disequilibrium model 
show that the supply of bank loans can be significantly determined by current ratio as 
a measure of risk, firm size, collateral assets, the extent of trade creditors, and if the 
firm belongs to manufacturing industry, but not significantly determined by firm age, 
monetary condition, and quantitative easing. 
The results of the disequilibrium model provide substantial evidence confirming that 
the more bank credit are available for larger firms with more collateral assets. This 
also confirms the role of collateral assets play in mitigating the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problem stemming from informational asymmetry between borrowers 
and banks. This finding is consistent with Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Berger et al. 
2011; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bandt et al., 2008.  
The result of the disequilibrium model suggests that more bank credit is available for 
micro firms when they used more trade credit offered by their supplier. This appears 
to confirm the complementary role of trade credit, which suggests that trade credit 
behaviour can provide a signal to the banks about the credit quality of a firm (Alphonse 
et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2010; Cole, 2010; Ellingsen and Vlachos, 2009; Gama et al., 
2009). However, this is not the case for small and medium sized firms in the sample. 
The results show that more bank credit is available for small and medium sized firms 
if they have lower amount of trade credit outstanding. This may be due to the fact that 
trade credit represents the existing short-term debt and therefore banks concern their 
ability to repay the bank credit when they have higher amount of trade credit 
outstanding.   
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Next, we discuss the impact of monetary policy on the availability of bank loans to the 
SMEs in the UK. The bank credit channel emphasises the shocks of monetary policy 
on banks’ balance sheets that affect the availability of loanable supply to borrowers 
(Bernanke, 2007; Disyatat, 2010). The credit channel of monetary policy transmission 
is significant to the economy because many SMEs in the UK depend on bank credit to 
fund their business activities, i.e., working capital and investment activities. However, 
the results of the disequilibrium model show that the coefficient of monetary condition 
has a negative effect on the loanable supply to micro and small sized firms in the 
sample. This is therefore not consistent with the theoretical prediction that a small 
change in the monetary policy shock has a large impact on the economic activity 
through corporate borrowing. This does not provide substantial evidence to confirm 
the prediction of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission. Despite the effect 
is not significant, it provides, to certain extent, evidence to support the credit channel 
of monetary policy transmission. That is, firms have more bank credit availability 
when the monetary condition is loosening but have less credit availability when the 
monetary condition is tightening.  
The bank credit channel of quantitative easing suggests that the asset purchases of the 
quantitative easing has created more reserves at the BoE and a corresponding increase 
in customer deposits when the asset purchase taken placed through banks, in turn that 
might increase banks’ capacity to extend more loans. However, the result shows that 
it has a negative effect on the supply of bank credit. This suggests that more credit is 
available to firms when less money is created on the balance sheet of banks. This is 
not consistent with the bank credit channel of quantitative easing. Nonetheless, the 
BoE has expected a very limited effect of quantitative easing on the bank credit 
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because it is not targeting at increasing the availability of bank credit to the corporate 
sector.  
5.8.3 Borrowing Constrained Vs. Unconstrained SMEs 
During financial crisis 2007-2010 
There is considerable amount of literature recognised the credit crunch emerged in the 
financial crisis and that restricted the SMEs in the access of bank credit. During credit 
crunch period, there is a sudden reduction in the general availability of bank loans or 
sudden tightening of the conditions required for borrowers to acquire loan from banks 
(Korab and Pomenkova, 2017). During the credit crunch period, a large number of 
borrowers may not able to obtain the desired quantity of bank credit independently of 
the interest rates due to the tighten credit policy. Previous studies also found survey 
evidence of more SMEs in the UK faced loan rejection during the financial crisis 
compared to the prior period. The result of the disequilibrium model finds that the 
proportion of medium firms in the sample are borrowing constraint is significantly 
higher in 2008 than previous years. This provides evidence confirming that corporate 
borrowing of medium firms was affected by the credit crunch emerged in the recent 
financial crisis. However, the result of the disequilibrium model finds no substantial 
evidence of higher proportion of micro and small firms faced borrowing constraint 
during the financial crisis. In addition, the result of the disequilibrium model confirms 
that lower proportion of medium firms in general are borrowing constraint than the 
micro and small firms.  
There is no significant increase in the proportion of borrowing constraint for micro 
and small sized firms in during the period of financial crisis. A possible explanation is 
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that the quantity of credit demand in the disequilibrium model is based on the financial 
ratio of the SMEs. Due to the limited information on the SMEs, there may not able to 
fully, correctly assess the credit demand of these firms. Previous evidence is the UK 
are based on the questionnaire data from both the banks and companies themselves. 
There may have some differences due to the data collection method.  
Compare their financial ratios 
The differences between borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms are also 
compared. It finds a substantial evidence confirming that borrowing unconstrained 
firms have relatively higher level of collateral assets compared to those of borrowing 
constrained. This is quite making sense because banks also assess the borrower’s credit 
risk based on the level of assets that can be offered as collateral. This confirms the role 
of collateral to mitigate the effect of credit market imperfection. For SMEs that are 
informational opaque, borrowers are able to use collateral to secure their loans and to 
provide guarantee to mitigate the adverse selection problem arise from the information 
asymmetry.  
We also find that on average that micro firms that are constrained are characterised by 
higher working capital and investment needs but lower amount of assets and internal 
cash flow, lower amount of collateral, and lower trade credit outstanding than those 
unconstrained. This appears to consistent with the prediction that borrowing 
constrained firms of micro sized have higher capital needs but unable to obtain from 
banks because they have lower amount of collateral and lower ability to repay short-
term debt. This further provide evidence to confirm the importance of collateral in 
mitigating the micro sized firms, that are particularly informational opaque due to a 
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lack of business and credit history, and they are more subject to credit rationing than 
other sized of firms in the UK.  
For small sized firms, those borrowing constrained also have a higher working capital 
need but slightly lower investment need, lower amount of assets and internal cash flow, 
lower collateral, but received higher trade credit outstanding than those unconstrained. 
This provides evidence suggesting that small firms that are borrowing constrained use 
more inter-firm credit offered by their suppliers to alleviate financial problem. It also 
appears to consistent with the prediction that small firms that are constrained have 
higher needs for financing to maintain their working capital. However, they are 
borrowing constrained likely due to their lower ability to generate internal cash flow 
and lower collateral, and higher credit risk measured by a lower ability to pay short-
term debt.   
For medium sized firms, those face borrowing constraint also have significant higher 
financial needs to support their working capital, but have a lower amount of assets and 
collateral, and higher credit risk measured by lower ability to pay short-term debts. 
This is making sense in that borrowing constrained firms have more demand for bank 
credit to support their working capital, and they are more likely to face credit rationing 
due to a lower collateral to support their loans and higher credit risk. Comparing the 
credit risk of the borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms of medium sized, the 
current ratio of the borrowing constrained firms is much lower than those unconstraint.  
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5.9 Summary 
The estimated results of demand equation in the disequilibrium model show that the 
demand for bank loans of firms are significantly determined by its working capital and 
investment needs, internal generated cash flow, trade credit, and firm size. For small 
and medium sized firms, their demand for bank loans increase when they have stronger 
needs of working capital and investment, lower level of internal cash flow and trade 
credit obtained from suppliers, and higher level of assets as a measure of firm size. 
This is compared to the micro sized firms in the sample which their demand for bank 
loans increase when they have greater internal generated cash flow and trade credit, 
lower needs of working capital but stronger needs of long-term investment, and higher 
level of assets as a measure of firm size. On the other hand, the estimated results of 
the loan supply in the disequilibrium model show that the supply of bank loans can be 
significantly determined by current ratio as a measure of risk, firm size, collateral 
assets, the extent of trade creditors, and if the firm belongs to manufacturing industry, 
but not significantly determined by firm age, monetary condition, and quantitative 
easing. We also find that the proportion of medium firms in the sample are borrowing 
constrained is significantly higher in 2008 than previous years. This provides evidence 
confirming that corporate borrowing of the medium firms in the UK were more 
affected by the credit crunch emerged in the financial crisis. However, the result of the 
disequilibrium model finds no evidence of higher credit rationing in the micro firms 
and small sized firms during the financial crisis. In addition, the result of the 
disequilibrium model confirms that lower proportion of medium firms are borrowing 
constraint than the micro and small firms. 
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6. Borrowing Constraints and the Trade Credit in the UK  
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, this thesis already examined the extent of credit rationing of the small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the UK and the impact of monetary policy on the 
corporate borrowing. A question arise from the analysis is that how those borrowing 
constrained firms raise finance to fund their working capital and business operation. 
In recognition that trade credit is one of the major sources of financing in the UK, this 
chapter examines whether the borrowing constrained firms have used trade credit to 
support their working capital and business operations. In other words, this chapter 
provides an examination of the substitution relationship between trade credit and bank 
credit for the SMEs in the UK. This chapter investigates the trade credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission, which is to examine the impact of monetary policy on 
the trade credit behaviour in the UK. Moreover, this chapter also attempt to examine 
the redistribution theory of trade credit, which posits that borrowing unconstrained 
firms use their credit obtained from banks will distribute to constrained firms via inter-
firm credit.  
This chapter starts with a review of the prior literature to provide an understanding 
into the underlying theories of trade credit and the trade credit channel of monetary 
policy, which explains how monetary policy affect the trade credit usage. This chapter 
also review the empirical methodologies to examine the trade credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission. This chapter also estimate the substitution relationship 
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between bank credit and trade credit, and compare the differences in the substitution 
relationship between those borrowing constrained and unconstrained using the same 
dataset in Chapter 5.  
6.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews the relevant literature of trade credit and discusses the underlying 
theories and existing evidence behind the substitution between bank credit and trade 
credit in the corporate financing structure, as well as the existence of both bank credit 
and trade credit channel of monetary policy transmission. It starts with defining trade 
credit and explaining the theories about motives for using trade credit. Some 
contextual analyses of the determination of trade credit usage beyond the theories are 
also discussed in order to provide understanding about the intentions for using trade 
credit. Then, it discusses some theoretical explanations of the credit crunch problems 
and its implications on financing structure of corporate sector, in attempt to provide 
reasoning that trade credit might be a source of financing substitute for bank credit.  
6.2.1 What is Trade Credit 
Trade credit is a source of short-term fund, which is used to fund part of a firm’s 
investments in inventory and account receivable (Danielson and Scott, 2004). More 
specifically, the idea of trade credit is that suppliers sell goods or services to their 
business customers, but do not require immediate payment. Instead, the suppliers only 
require them to pay at a specific time in the future, normally within 30 days after the 
date stated on the invoice. This deferred payment is termed as trade credit and is only 
occurred between business firms rather than public consumers. Fundamentally, there 
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are two major types of trade credit based on the credit terms: net term and two-part 
term. The net terms refer to the credit term with a specific period when the business 
customers must make the payment. For example, net 30 means that the buyer has to 
make the payment within 30 days. The two-part term adds a discount term for business 
customers who make early payment for their purchases on credit. A typical example 
of two-part term is 2/10 net 30, which means that the buyer has to make the payment 
within 30 days and will receive a discount of 2% if make the full payment within 10 
days after the invoice date. From this perspective, the discount rate for early payment 
can be perceived as an implicit interest rate for trade credit, which is the cost of trade 
credit. Using example of two-part credit term of 2/10 net 30, the firm will have to pay 
2% for using trade credit over 10 days, which is equivalent to an annual interest rate 
of 43.8%. The formula for implicit interest rate of trade credit is as below: 
𝐼𝑅	 = 100100	 − 	𝐷𝑅 J[F`aEba − 	1	
where IR = Implicit interest rate of the trade credit, DR = Discount rate for early 
payment, NP = Net period or the period the customer must make their payment, DP = 
Discount period or the period of early payment to receive discount.  
As shown, the interest cost of trade credit is much higher than other source of finance 
and thus in order to avoid this expensive cost, business firms must make their payment 
to suppliers within the discount period (if the impose the discount term for sales on 
credit) or the net period. Next, we are going to explain why firms use trade credit.  
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6.2.2 Motives for Using Trade Credit 
In recognition of the fact that trade credit in general is a much costly alternative to 
bank loans, this raise questions about why trade credit remains a pervasive source of 
financing for SMEs. The proponents of trade credit channel claim that suppliers may 
be in a better position than the traditional banks or financial intermediaries in 
supplying finance to their business customers. This can be explained by the 
conventional theories of trade credit, which are transaction cost, financing advantage, 
and price discrimination. 
Transaction cost theory 
The transaction costs theory highlights the vital role of trade credit in the business 
management of cash or working capital for the cost saving motives. The basic idea is 
that trade credit enables corporate firms to pay for their purchases at a later date and 
more importantly, by separating the delivery of goods and payment and deferring the 
payment for their supplies, the trade credit enables firms to make certain the cash they 
need to hold for payment and have sufficient time to plan for the conversion of liquid 
assets into cash in the most cost effective way. This perspective implies that firms 
could reduce their cash in hands to a minimum level. Moreover, using trade credit also 
allows a firm to reduce the transaction cost incurred by cumulating the payment 
obligation and pays them on a specific date (e.g., at the end of each month or quarter), 
which is known as transaction volume motive. It also allows a firm to reduce the effect 
of growth on working capital needs. In the absence of the credit granted from suppliers, 
firms would need to pay for their purchases on delivery, and more significantly, 
implies an uncertain of the volume and timing of cash flow and therefore would always 
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need to maintain a higher level of precautionary cash in hands to payoff the purchases 
of goods (Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano, 2010a; Cole, 2010). Therefore, trade 
credit is suggested contribute to a greater effectiveness and efficiency in the 
management of working capital and cash (Paul and Wilson, 2007).  
Financing advantage theory 
The financing advantage theory of trade credit claims that suppliers have 
informational advantage over bank lenders in assessing and monitoring the 
creditworthiness of its customers (Cole 2010; Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano, 
2010a). There are three rationales to explain this claim. First, the frequent interactions 
between suppliers and customers, the concurrent transactions with the customers, and 
the knowledge of industry specificities allow suppliers to routinely gather information 
about creditworthiness of their customers, and thus better able to overcome the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard stemming from information 
asymmetries (Fabbri and Menichini, 2009; Gama et al., 2009; Halsey, 2010; Love and 
Zaidi, 2010). Second, suppliers appear to have greater control of the customers 
because they can threaten to cut off the supply if customers do not make the payment 
within the specified time period, especially when there are only a few suppliers in the 
industry and if the customers are greatly relying on their suppliers in the business 
operations (Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano, 2010a). Third, suppliers may be in 
better position to finance SMEs and permit trade credit defaults because suppliers have 
cost advantage in repossessing and reselling the assets of its customers in the event of 
non-payment (Guariglia and Mateut, 2006; Cole 2010). This is contrast to banks in 
which the collateral assets incur higher cost to resell in case for default payment. 
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Besides that, given the information about creditworthiness of the business customers, 
suppliers are also willing to provide trade credit to their customers because of the cost 
saving in inventory by delivering the goods to their customers earlier than it suppose 
to, i.e., the payment date.  
Cole (2010) uses the US data from the Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBFs) 
that contains 6 million firms, confirms the financing advantage theory. The study finds 
that firms that rely on credit from suppliers tend to be larger (note: among the small 
businesses), more liquid, worse credit quality, and tend not to be a service provider. 
This appears to be true because although smaller firms may have greater demand in 
trade credit due to difficulty in assessing to bank credit, the extent to which their 
suppliers allow them to purchase on credit is based on the assessment of their 
creditworthiness. It is rationale for suppliers to believe that smaller firms have lower 
liquidity and ability to repay and therefore only allow a lower limit for purchases on 
credit. Instead, larger among small firms with greater liquid assets and growth 
prospects are likely to be more creditworthy, suppliers find it beneficial to supply 
credit to them, and therefore greater amount of trade credit provided to those firms.  
Price Discrimination Theory 
A question rise earlier that why suppliers have incentive to permit or extend credit to 
firms. Price discrimination theory of trade credit attempts to provide answer to this 
query. Specifically, suppliers offer credit to discriminate among its customers, through 
offering different credit terms. As discussed by the financing advantage theory, 
suppliers have better informational advantage over banks and other institutions in 
collecting information about creditworthiness of non-financial firms. As a result, 
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suppliers are able to discriminate between good and bad firms and provide short-term 
credit to firms which face liquidity problem. Creditworthy firms who repay the trade 
credit earlier before the date as stated in the two-part credit terms would obtain 
discounts on their purchases, whereas firms who pay late find the price of trade credit 
to be favourable than other alternative (Cole, 2010). This short-term credit from 
suppliers appears to be significant for small firms, which often bear the brunt of credit 
rationing because they tend to have less liquidity, greater profitability, and cash flow 
volatility than large firms. In fact, it has been identified that lack of funds and heavy 
reliance on short-term finance are the main causes of corporate failure in the UK.  
Besides that, suppliers may have interest in supplying goods to their customers on 
credit to keep them in operation (Love and Zaidi, 2010). One good reason is that 
suppliers often rely on the customers’ business to market their products, and therefore 
may allow more credit to be granted to financial constrained firms than banks. Huang 
et al. (2010) provide an alternative interpretation, argued that it is the competitive 
forces that drives larger firms with excessive cash flow to extend longer credit terms 
to downstream firms which are suffering from bank credit rationing. In contrast, 
smaller and illiquid firms, which are more likely to be credit constrained, extend less 
credit to their customers and purchase more on credit from their suppliers (Love and 
Zaidi, 2010). On the other hand, bank lenders tend to require collateral assets to secure 
the loans and therefore unlikely a favourable source of finance during monetary 
tightening when the rising interest rate would deteriorate the firms’ balance sheets 
through the implied reduction in the value of collateral assets and lower present value 
of business investment. From this perspective, trade credit is argued a substitute to 
bank credit during the period of credit crunch or monetary tightening.  
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Petersen and Rajan (1997) present an important empirical paper to provide evidence 
of these theories explaining the motives for using trade credit by examining the 
determinants of a firm’s usage of trade credit. Based on one-year US survey data in 
1988-1989, they test the price discrimination and financing advantage theory using net 
profits and net sales growth in both model of account payable and receivable. 
Consistent with the price discrimination theory, the study finds that firms with higher 
net profit, negative sales growth, and loss making firms with negative sales growth 
extend more credit to customers. The former firms can drive sales by transferring their 
liquidation advantage to their business customers, while loss-making firms have 
incentive to drive sales. For financing advantage theory, which describes that suppliers 
can foresee the future profitable firms but negative profit currently, the study finds that 
profit making firms and loss making firms but positive sales growth receive more 
credit, while loss making firms with negative sales growth receive fewer trade credit 
from their suppliers.  
Fabbri and Menichini (2010) presents an important conceptual paper with supporting 
survey evidence. First, they identified that the use of trade credit greatly depends on 
the characteristics of the input such as the level of standardisation and collateral value. 
Specifically, firms which purchase goods use more credit than those buy services, and 
suppliers of services offer less credit than suppliers of standardised goods. Moreover, 
they also highlight an interesting insight that firms use trade credit not necessarily face 
credit constraint, but credit unconstrained firms exploit the liquidation advantage of 
their suppliers to finance their business activities. This is consistent with the financing 
advantage theory that describes suppliers have incentive to offer credit to their 
business customers to save storage costs of tangible goods and to drive sales turnover 
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for profitability, and this is disregard of whether they are credit rationed or unrationed. 
Fabbri and Menichini (2010) provides an alternative interpretation is that the reliance 
on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing if inputs purchased on credit are 
sufficiently liquid. 
6.2.3 Credit Cycle Theory and Trade Credit 
Asymmetries information has been one of the major problems in the credit market 
because borrowers may have ex-ante private information about the expected return of 
their investment projects and lenders face difficulties in justifying whether the 
investment project will generate the expected amount of return. Moreover, corporate 
borrowers might take on riskier investment projects than the originally proposed and 
so might have an ex-post private information over bank lenders. As a result, lenders 
face risks of adverse selection concerning the quality of prospective borrowers. The 
agency cost incurred in overcoming the information asymmetries problem will be 
translated into external financing premium, which varies with different borrowers. A 
major implication of credit market imperfection is that bank loans are preferable 
source of external finance because of the banks’ ability to better identification of 
borrowers’ quality and achieving cost advantage in monitoring the ability of borrowers 
to repay loans and therefore lower agency cost incurred in overcoming the problems 
of information asymmetries. The external financing premium varies with the 
perceived risk of borrowers. The higher the risk of default, the higher premium 
changed on the borrowers. However, when risk of the particular borrower is too high 
that the premium charged is unable to compensate the losses of the adverse selection 
and therefore explaining why some borrowers are credit rationed by bank lenders.  
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The recent financial distress in banking sector has brought a severe implication on the 
credit conditions in the sense that it deteriorates the balance sheets of both banks and 
business firms and that diminish their ability to lend. As a result, banks have generally 
tightened their lending policy in order to minimise the risk of default involved in the 
period of financial crisis. This credit condition is known as the credit crunch. This 
credit crunch problem can be explained by the credit cycle theory, which posits that 
banks and financial institutions tend to excessively increase their lending to corporate 
borrowers during economy boom and sharply slash down the lending to corporate 
borrowers during recession, partly due to the risk involved in the associate economy 
cycle (Duca et al., 2009; Rotheli, 2010). This appears to be true because most business 
companies are likely to make more profit during economy boom due to increased 
purchasing power and demand for products and services in the market, and money 
loan out are more likely to be repaid and thus less risk involved. However, during 
economy recession, more business organisations are likely to make losses due to 
inappropriate investment (especially in the asset and financial market) and reduction 
in the market demand for their products or services offered, driven by rising 
unemployment and inflation rate. As a consequence, in order to ensure business 
continuity, these companies are likely to downsizing the number of employees to 
reduce operating costs, which in turn could lower the consumers’ purchasing power, 
and further deepen the economy recession. In such a period of economic downturn, 
banks are most likely to tighten their lending policy due to higher risk of default during 
the period. In fact, in the period of recent financial crisis in 2007, bank credit granted 
to SMEs has been decelerated significantly in several regions, including UK (Aisen 
and Franken 2010, BOE 2010).  
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There are several empirical surveys have provided some figures and evidence in the 
UK showing that the SMEs, which are vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, were 
suffered from the credit crunch problem in the period of the recent financial crisis. 
BoE (2010), in the ‘Credit Conditions Surveys’, reported that the availability of bank 
credit to corporate has been drastically shrunk during the recent financial crisis started 
since the mid-2007. Another survey conducted by Fraser (2010) for the ESRC, which 
analyses the changes in SMEs finances from 2004 to 2008 (i.e., from the height of 
credit boom to the depths of credit crisis), reveals that the SMEs overdraft rejection 
rate has been increased 3.5 times (from 4.2% to 15.3%) and term loan rejection 
increased 2.5 times (from 6.1% to 16.3%) over the period. The survey also reported 
that overdraft loan size for SMEs has been decreased by 75% among high-risk firms 
(i.e., from £58,000 to £14,500), and even loans by low risk firms have been increased 
78% in collateral posted. These figures may provide a simple illustration of rationing 
in credit market is obvious to SMEs in the recent period of economy recession. This 
ongoing credit crunch problem is particularly significant because many firms greatly 
dependent on short-term borrowing to fund inventories and other working capital, and 
can significantly affect the business operations and investment activities.  
6.2.4 Monetary Policy Innovations and Trade Credit Channel 
In addition to the natural economic cycle, monetary policy innovation would also have 
an impact on the credit condition through the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Traditional interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission suggests 
that monetary policy innovations have an impact on economic activities through its 
influence on cost of capital that would affect profitability of the firms’ prearranged 
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investment activities. Specifically, during the monetary policy tightening, the rising 
interest rate increases the cost of capital for investment activities and result in a 
reduction in profitability. In response, rational investors may reduce interest-sensitive 
investment activities and consumptions including reducing number of employees in 
order to minimise the operating cost. This is, in turn, likely to deteriorates the domestic 
demand as a result of a reduction in the purchasing power of consumers in general, 
which would worsen the sales revenue of firms in general.  
The credit view enhances the explanation of transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy by introducing the role of banks and financial institutions in amplifying and 
propagating the impact of initial interest rate shock on economic activities. The ways 
that the effect of monetary policy can be transmitted to corporate sector under the 
credit view can be divided into the balance sheet channel and bank credit channel. 
Balance sheet channel describes that in the event of monetary tightening, the rising 
interest rate influences the firms’ balance sheets through extra burden in firms’ debt 
and impairment in the value of assets, which in turn affect their creditworthy and 
decreasing their ability to raise finance from banks, at least not without higher interest 
rate. Bank lending channel affects the corporate borrowing through the influence of 
monetary policy innovations in the supply side of bank credit (i.e., banks’ balance 
sheet) through the open market operations by the central bank, either gives banks more 
reserves or takes reserves away from banks by buying or selling government securities 
in the open market, as well as through the policy of binding reserve requirement. These 
credit views of monetary policy transmission attempts to explain the amplification and 
propagation of the initial influence of monetary contraction to the availability of bank 
credit to corporate sector.  
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6.2.5 Substitution of Trade Credit for Bank Credit 
Both the credit crunch and the monetary policy tightening have negative implications 
on business firms, in that the bank lenders generally tighten their lending policies and 
that result in increasing number of firms face borrowing constraint, especially for 
small, young and opaque firms which are likely to be credit rationed by banks due to 
the greater concern of adverse selection and moral hazard problems stemming from 
information asymmetries. The rising interest rate during monetary policy tightening 
increase the burden of corporate debt and might cause some firms not afford the 
expensive finance cost. Trade credit, in this deteriorating credit condition, may 
become a useful alternative source of external financing for business firms. As 
explained in the discussion of transaction cost, financing advantage, and price 
discrimination theory, suppliers may be in better position than banks in providing 
short-term credit to firms. Using trade credit allows a firm to reduce the transaction 
cost by cumulating the payment obligation and pays them on a specific date. Delaying 
the payment to suppliers enables firms to exploit the liquidation advantage of the 
suppliers in order to relaxing their working capital management. For suppliers, they 
are willing to provide business customers to purchase on credit for the purpose of 
driving sales to compete in the market and saving inventory costs. Trade credit also 
allows suppliers to price discriminate among business customers by offering discount 
for early payers. The forgone discount for firms who pay later than the discount period 
is perceived as interest cost for using the trade credit.  
Petersen and Rajan (1994) provided a useful explanation of the substitution of trade 
credit for bank loans. Consistent with the pecking order of corporate finance theory, 
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they suggest that a firm will use the cheapest source of funds, i.e., internal cash, before 
borrowing from banks and financial institutions. If the bank and institutional lenders 
do not ration credit, then the firm will use only the combination of cash in hands and 
bank loans to finance their prearranged investment opportunities. However, if the firm 
is credit rationed by bank lenders, then it will turn to use trade credit as a substitute 
fund. The main reason is that trade credit is a much expensive source of finance than 
bank loans (as calculated earlier in section 2.1: the forgone even only 2% discount for 
early payment imply an interest rate of 43.8%) and so argue that should only be used 
as the last resort.  
During the credit crunch period where banks and financial institutional lenders have 
generally tightened their lending policies, SMEs are more likely to face restriction in 
accessing to bank loans and therefore might turn to use more on credit provided by 
their suppliers, through deferring the payment of their supplies, in order to alleviate 
financing problem. A similar condition appears to happen during monetary policy 
tightening where the rising interest rate affects not only the lending ability of banks, 
but more importantly affecting the creditworthy of firms to obtain bank loans, through 
the implying extra discount in future cash flows from investment activities and the 
value of collateral assets. 
After a discussion of the theory about the substitution relationship between trade credit 
and bank credit, it is now to discuss the empirical evidence in the prior literature. In 
US, Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide important evidence of substitution relationship 
between trade and bank credit using the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) 
conducted by the Federal Reserve Board. They use the percentage of trade credit paid 
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late and the amount of trade credit discount foregone as proxies for trade credit 
demand. They found evidence that firms depend greatly on credit provided by 
suppliers if they have shorter relationships with banks, by delaying the payments or 
foregoing the discount for early payment. Moreover, they also find evidence 
suggesting that firms which depend more on trade credit tend to located in less 
concentrated market and have relationship with more financial institutions. Their later 
paper published in 1997 uses a method of simultaneous equation, discovered a 
significant negative relationship between length of banking relationship and trade 
credit demand and a positive but not significant relationship between trade credit 
demand and borrowing constraints. In other words, this means that firms with shorter 
or weaker relationship with banks use more trade credit while borrowing constrained 
firms do not seems to use more trade credit as substitution for bank credit.  
Danielson and Scott (2004) extend the research of Petersen and Rajan (1997) to 
examine the relationship between trade credit demand and availability of bank loan, 
and incorporate trade credit price and firm or industry characteristics as control 
variables, using survey data of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) 
1995. They model the availability of bank loan as a function of firm risk, strength of 
banking relationship, and market structure. Using bivariate probit method of 
estimation, they found evidence suggesting that small US firms use trade credit when 
they were denied and did not applying bank loans to finance their businesses.  
Using a panel of around 47 thousands of SMEs in the Europe over period 1996-2002, 
Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano (2010a) discovered that usage of trade credit is 
greater for larger firms with higher growth of sales, but short of cash flows and less 
 
Chapter 6: Borrowing Constraints and the Trade Credit in the UK                                             178 
 
 
 
access to other source of short-term financing. The study also finds firms that granted 
more trade credit to their customers tend to be larger but have lower sales growth, and 
have greater access to short-term finance at lower costs. This is consistent with the 
incentive theory that sellers extend trade credit to customers in order to drive sales.  
In the UK, Atanasova and Wilson (2004) examines on the trade credit usage between 
borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms, and their empirical research on 639 
UK SMEs over the period from 1990 to 1999 finds that the reduction of bank loans 
during tightening monetary policy causes bank dependent firms to cut their operating 
expenses, and increase their use of trade credit as alternative to bank credit. The study 
also discovers that borrowing constrained firms have used more trade credit to support 
their financing needs for business growth when compared to borrowing unconstrained 
firms. Mateut et al. (2006) obtain a similar result with an empirical investigation of 
16,000 UK manufacturing firms. Guariglia and Mateut (2006) examine around 600 
firms in the UK during 1980-2000 find supporting evidence suggesting the trade credit 
can be used to offset the liquidity problems, especially for credit constrained firms, 
and able to make the economy recession less severe. 
Using the data from emerging countries in the Southeast Asia, Love et al. (2007) 
studies on the public listed firms, find that more liquid firms after a crisis event extend 
more credit to their customers and accept less credit from their suppliers. Their later 
paper, Love and Zaidi (2010), which examines the 3000 firms that are mostly SMEs 
between November 1998 and February 1999, finds that credit constrained firms do not 
increase their purchases on credit after the crisis and have a shorter length of time to 
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pay back to their suppliers. The study also finds that those credit-constrained firms 
extend less credit to their customers and set a shorter length of repayment time.  
6.3 Estimation Methodology 
To examine the substitution relationship between trade credit and bank credit, this 
thesis uses the model of trade credit determinants. By incorporating the bank credit 
received and other firm-specific variables that determining the trade credit usage in 
the models, it is able to see how usage of trade credit changes with variations in bank 
credit and through business and economic cycles. Regarding the estimation method, 
panel data estimation method is used to test the regression, which follows the form as:   
𝑌A,$ = 𝛽c𝑋c,A,$ + 𝛾F𝑀𝐶𝐼$ + 𝜇A + 𝑣A,$     (6.1) 
where the subscript i indicates different firms, t as time (year), 𝑋c,A are k firm-specific 
variables that determine the usage of trade credit, 𝑀 is the measure of monetary policy, 𝑣A,$ as the error terms, 𝜇A are the unobserved time invariant firm-effects arising from 
the characteristics of different firms. Fixed effect model is chosen because the 
assumptions of random effects model (i.e., 𝜇A is independent and normally distributed, 
and 𝜇A  and 𝑣A,$  are independent of each other) are hardly satisfied in practice. 
Hausman tests are carried out to confirm the choice of fixed effect model.  
In order to examine the trade credit and bank credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission, monetary condition index (MCI) is also included in the models so to be 
able to see the variation in the use of trade credit and bank credit by the SMEs when 
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monetary policy is tightened or contraction. The MCI has already been estimated in 
chapter 4.  
One of the major limitations in previous empirical studies is that they consider only 
the credit received from suppliers (i.e., account payable) but ignore the credit granted 
to business customers (i.e., account receivable) in examining the trade credit channel 
of monetary policy transmission (e.g., Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Guariglia and 
Mateut, 2006). This thesis considers both credit received from the suppliers (account 
payable) and supply to business customers (account receivable) in explaining the 
impact of monetary policy innovations on the firms’ bank and trade financing.  
6.4 Model Specification of Substitution Hypothesis 
After describing the empirical methodology used to estimate the substitution 
relationship between trade credit and bank credit, it is now necessary to establish the 
hypotheses and measuring the variables. This hypotheses and variables explain both 
the trade credit demand and the willingness to offer trade credit to other firms.  
6.4.1 Dependent Variable 
First, the dependent variable for the model trade credit demand or trade credit received 
from suppliers is justified to be the ratio of accounts payable (AP) to one year lagged 
total assets. Accounts payable is the amount of trade credit the firms received from 
their suppliers. Second, the dependent variable for the trade receivable model or trade 
credit extended to customers is the ratio of accounts receivable (AR) to total assets. 
Accounts receivable is the amount of trade credit the firms extended to their customers. 
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The use of ratio to one year lagged total assets is to control the operational scale or 
firm size and to capture the significance of trade credit in financing the firm’s assets.  
6.4.2 Establishes the Hypotheses and the Explanatory Factors 
The hypotheses are established by discussing the determinants of both the demand of 
the trade credit and willingness of offer trade credit to other firms.  
1. Firm risk 
Higher firm risk should indicate the lower ability of the firms to obtain formal bank 
credit. Higher firm risk should then obtain external finance by delaying the payment 
of goods purchase from their suppliers. As discussed earlier in this chapter, suppliers 
may be better than banks in assessing the risk of the firms. However, suppliers also 
assess the risk of the firms when deciding to extend the credit period to their customers. 
Therefore, suppliers should extend more credit to firms with lower level of risk. 
Current ratio has been identified as an important risk measure about the ability of a 
firm to repay short-term debts and therefore it is included in the trade creditors model. 
It is expected that higher current ratio means a lower risk of the firms and therefore 
should be a negative effect of firm risk on accounts payable.  
Hypothesis 1: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when the firm 
risk is lower.  
Hypothesis 2: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when it has a lower risk.  
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2. Working capital needs 
The SMEs with higher financial need for working capital should require more finance, 
including the trade credit. Indeed, working capital need include to finance the goods 
purchased from suppliers. On the other hand, suppliers should not be able to extend 
more trade credit to business customers when they have less working capital need.  
Hypothesis 3: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when the firm 
has greater need for working capital.  
Hypothesis 4: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when the firm has less need for working capital.  
3. Maturity of firm’s assets 
Maturity of the firm’s assets can be another determinant of demand for credit from 
suppliers and explanation for extending credit to customers. Firms hold more short-
term assets are expected to have greater demand for short-term credit, including trade 
credit. The rationale is that firms need to match the maturity of the liabilities with the 
liquidity of their assets in order to make sure the cash flows produced by assets are 
enough to pay the periodic liabilities (Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano, 2010b). 
Therefore, it should predict that firms with bigger investment in current assets require 
more trade credit in order to smooth the management of working capital. The empirical 
study of Garcia-Teruel and Matinez-Solano (2010a) on large sample of European 
SMEs confirms this prediction. For the credit extend to customers, firms with high 
maturity of firm’s assets should extend less credit to customers because high 
investment in current assets have lower their capability to extend credit to customers.  
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For accounts payable model, the maturity of firm’s assets is proxied by accounts 
receivable and inventory. For accounts receivable model, the maturity of firm’s assets 
is proxied by accounts payable and inventory. Account receivable is considered as one 
of the determinants of the demand for trade credit because greater amount of credit the 
firms extend to their customers. One should predict that the firms would seek more 
funds to relax the amount of credit they extend to their customers. However, firms 
with higher amount of credit received from suppliers (i.e., accounts payable) should 
have higher capacity to provide credit to customers and therefore a positive correlation. 
Higher level of inventory implies a greater investment in the business and should have 
higher need for financing, including credit from suppliers (i.e., accounts payable). 
However, for accounts receivable or credit extend to customers, firms with higher 
level of inventory implies higher investment in assets and therefore may have less 
capacity to extend credit to customers. However, some may argue that firms with 
higher level of inventory may have incentive to extend credit to customers in order to 
promote sales.  
Hypothesis 5: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when it has 
more outstanding in the account receivable and inventory level.   
Hypothesis 6: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when the it has less outstanding in the account payable and a 
higher inventory level.  
4. Internally generated cash flows 
Demand for trade credit can be determined by the cost and availability of the 
substitutes including internally generated cash flows. Indeed, pecking order theory of 
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finance suggests that internal generated cash flow is a costless and risk-free source of 
finance and should be used in the first priority before seeking costly external finance. 
Therefore, one can predict that if a firm is able to generate high level of internal cash 
flow to support the business operation, then its demand for trade credit should be 
decreased. Firms that unable to generate sufficient internal cash flow to finance 
investment activities increase demand for trade credit. In respect to the accounts 
receivable model, similarly, firms with higher internal generated cash flows are able 
to offer more credit to customers but firms with less internal generated cash flow have 
less capability to provide credit to their customers. Driving sales is one of the major 
incentives for firms to extend credit to customers.  
Hypothesis 7: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when it has 
lower level of internal generated cash flow.   
Hypothesis 8: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when it has a higher level of internal generated cash flow.  
5. Bank credit 
Credit market imperfection is highlighted that caused by problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard arising from asymmetric information between bank lenders and 
corporate borrowers. Banks approve loans to corporate borrowers on the ground of 
their assessment about creditworthiness of the corporate borrowers. Risk involved 
with the borrower is positively correlated with the level of interest rate charged. Bank 
lenders are not willing to provide credit to over risky firms at too high interest rate 
because those firms have a very high probability of default. From this perspective, 
there may be a substitution relationship between bank credit and trade credit in the 
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sense that when firms are credit rationed by banks, then they might turn to obtain funds 
from suppliers by delaying payment on purchases. For accounts receivable, firms that 
are able to obtain more bank loans not only to support their working capital needs but 
also able to offer more credit to their customers. The redistribute theory describes this 
perspective states that firms which are not credit-constrained by banks can obtain 
sufficient and may even more amount of bank loans they need and that allows them to 
distribute the bank credit to corporate customers for alleviating the financial problems 
of their customers. Therefore, bank loans should be positively correlated with accounts 
receivable.  
Hypothesis 9: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when it has 
lower level of bank credit outstanding.   
Hypothesis 10: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when it has a higher level of bank credit outstanding.  
6. Monetary conditions 
Bank credit channel of monetary policy transmission suggests that tighten monetary 
policy will lead to not only increasing the cost of capital for business firms (i.e., 
interest rate channel), but also deterioration in balance sheets for both banks and firms. 
As a result, during monetary policy tightening, banks tend to tighten lending policy 
and causing more firms face greater difficulty in raising finance from banks. These 
credit-rationed firms might turn to obtain credit from suppliers in order to alleviate 
financing problem. Therefore, the monetary condition of a country should have a 
positive impact on the demand for trade credit. Similarly, during monetary policy 
tightening, firms increase difficulty in raising funds from banks and in turn have less 
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capacity to extend more credit to customers. Therefore, monetary condition is believed 
to have a positive correlation with the trade credit extended to customers. The MCI 
has been estimated in chapter 4.  
Hypothesis 11: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases during 
monetary condition is tightening.   
Hypothesis 12: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when the monetary condition is loosening.  
7. Quantitative Easing 
The bank lending channel of the transmission of quantitative easing (as discussed in 
chapter 2) might lead to an improvement in the bank credit. As a result, it should be 
able to predict a negative relationship between quantitative easing and trade credit 
demand and a positive relationship between quantitative easing and trade debtors.  
Quantitative easing lead to a fall in the demand for trade credit and therefore increase 
the willingness of firms to offer inter-firm credit. A measure of quantitative easing is 
included in both the trade creditors and trade debtors equation in order to examine the 
impact of asset purchases under the quantitative easing programme on the corporate 
borrowing, i.e., the bank lending channel. This thesis follows Morais et al. (2015) to 
use the change in the balance sheet of the Bank of England as ratio to nominal GDP 
as a measure of quantitative easing.  
Hypothesis 13: The demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when the 
quantitative easing is introduced.  
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Hypothesis 14: The willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business 
customers increases when the quantitative easing is introduced.  
 
The final form of the trade payable and trade receivable model are:  
𝑎𝑝A$𝑎A,$E7 = 𝛽F + 𝛽7𝑐𝑟A$ + 𝛽; 𝑤𝑐𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽J 𝑎𝑟A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽K 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽L 𝑐𝑓A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛽[ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛A$𝑎A,$E7+ 𝛽\𝑀𝐶𝐼$ + 𝛽]𝑄𝐸$ + 𝜈A$ 
          (6.1) 
𝑎𝑟A$𝑎A,$E7 = 𝛾F + 𝛾7𝑐𝑟A$ + 𝛾; 𝑤𝑐𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾J 𝑎𝑝A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾K 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾L 𝑐𝑓A$𝑎A,$E7 + 𝛾[ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛A$𝑎A,$E7+ 𝛾\𝑀𝐶𝐼$ + 𝛾]𝑄𝐸$ + 𝜈A$ 
          (6.2) 
6.5 Estimation Result  
After constructing the model of accounts payable and accounts receivable, it is now 
necessary to estimate the model using the fixed effect model of the panel data approach. 
We use the results of disequilibrium model that classify the sample firms into 
borrowing constrained and unconstrained, and compare the differences of these model 
between the borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms. This section first reports 
the account payable model, which explains the demand of trade credit. This section 
then reports the accounts receivable model, which explains the willingness of firms to 
extend credit.  
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6.5.1 Trade Creditors – Who Demand Credit  
Table 6.1 in the next page summarises the comparison of estimated parameters of the 
trade creditors model between borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms. The 
results are interpreted in the page after next.  
Table 6.1 Estimated Coefficients of the Trade Creditors Model 
Variables Micro firm Small firm Medium firm 
Borrowing constrained    
Constant -0.2170 (-3.84)*     0.0977 (1.85) -0.7436 (-2.19)* 
Trade debtors/assets  2.1199 (100.20)*    0.7977 (886.03)*  0.7571 (599.75)* 
Stocks/assets  0.8099 (208.86)*  0.8052 (1021.68)*  0.6279 (162.98)* 
Cash flow/assets  0.0236 (157.42)* -0.0141 (-133.63)* -0.9444 (-49.72)* 
Bank credit/assets  0.0364 (66.96)* -0.1672 (-175.52)* -0.3644 (-100.30)* 
Working capital need/assets -0.0205 (-187.22)*    -0.3272 (-255.44)* -0.3366 (-81.97)* 
Current ratio -0.0091 (-9.65)* -0.0003 (-1.32)  0.0051 (9.40)* 
MCI  0.0031 (6.25)*  0.00018 (0.38)  0.0074 (2.49)* 
QE  1.0042 (6.31)* -0.1527 (-1.04) -0.2541 (-0.31) 
    
Borrowing unconstrained    
Constant  0.0643 (4.00)*  0.0248 (0.29) -0.0017 (-0.02) 
Trade debtors/assets  0.9401 (1017.09)*  0.4875 (40.05)*  0.8008 (51.93*) 
Stocks/assets  0.6192 (261.70)*  0.3376 (103.77)*  0.1203 (7.94)* 
Cash flow/assets  0.00002 (0.46)  0.8494 (1815.54)* -0.00004 (-0.02) 
Bank credit/assets -0.0001707 (-1.12) -0.11346 (-51.89)*  0.1549 (96.18)* 
Working capital needs/assets -0.3118 (-614.49)* -0.8344 (-4568.03)*  0.0083 (9.11)* 
Current ratio -0.0015 (-8.30)*  0.0014 (4.96)* -5.76e-06 (-0.08) 
MCI  0.0008 (5.44)*  0.0010 (1.28)  0.0002 (0.18) 
QE  0.3598 (7.94)*  0.0255 (0.11) -1.0020 (-3.23)* 
This table shows the differences in the demand for trade credit between borrowing constrained and 
unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is the trade creditors, i.e., accounts payable. * denotes 
the coefficients are significant at 1% level. t-value are reported in parenthesis. The firms in the 
sample are classified into micro, small, and medium sized. Micro sized firms have total assets less 
than £316,000; small sized firms have total assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms 
have total assets less than £12.9 million.  
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a. Firm risk 
According to Table 6.1, the coefficients of current ratio have significant negative 
effect on trade credit demand for micro firms, regardless of whether they are constraint 
or unconstraint. This indicates that they have more demand for trade credit when they 
have lower ability to repay short-term debts. In contrast, small unconstrained firms 
and medium constrained firms have stronger demand for trade credit when they have 
greater ability to repay short-term debts.  
Therefore, it is able to confirm the hypothesis 1 for small and medium sized firms, in 
that their demand for trade credit increases when the firm risk is lower. However, it 
should not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 1 for micro sized firms. 
b. Working capital needs 
The coefficients of working capital needs are significant negative to trade credit 
demand for micro and small sized firms, indicating that they have higher demand for 
trade credit when they have lower working capital needs and the effect is stronger for 
unconstrained firms than constrained firms. However, for unconstrained medium 
firms, it is a positive coefficient, indicating that they have higher demand for trade 
credit when they have higher needs for working capital.  
Therefore, it does not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 3 that the 
demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when the firm has greater need 
for working capital, except for the unconstrained medium firms. There is evidence to 
show the demand for trade credit increases when the unconstrained medium firms have 
greater need for working capital. 
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c. Maturity of the firm’s assets 
For micro, small, and medium sized firms in the sample, the coefficients of the trade 
debtors have significant positive effect on the trade payable, for both the borrowing 
constrained and unconstrained firms. This suggests that whether the firm is micro, 
small, or medium sized, or whether it is borrowing constrained or unconstrained, the 
amount of credit from suppliers of a firm in the sample increase along with the amount 
of trade credit given to customers. Firms in the sample should obtain more amount of 
credit from suppliers when they have given more amount of credit to customers. The 
coefficients of trade debtors are 2.12, 0.7977, and 0.7571 for borrowing constrained 
micro-sized, small-sized, and medium-sized firms, respective. This is compared to 
0.94, 0.4875, and 0.80 for unconstrained micro-sized, small-sized, and medium-sized 
firms. For micro-sized firms that are borrowing constrained, £1 increase in trade credit 
given to customers will result in £2.12 increase in trade credit obtained from suppliers, 
and this is compared to unconstrained micro-sized firms, £1 increase in trade credit 
given to customers will increase trade credit obtained from suppliers by £0.94. For 
small-sized firms that are borrowing constrained, £1 increase in trade credit given to 
customers will increase £0.7977 in the credit obtained from suppliers. This is 
compared to those unconstrained, which £1 increase in trade credit given to customers 
will result in £0.4875 increase in credit obtained from suppliers. For medium-sized 
firms that are borrowing constrained, £1 increase in trade credit given to customers 
will increase the credit obtained from suppliers by £0.757. This is compared to those 
unconstrained, which £1 increase in trade credit given to customers will increase £0.80 
in credit obtained from suppliers.  
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The coefficients of stocks have significant positive effect on the trade creditors for 
both constrained and unconstrained micro, small, and medium-sized firms. 
Constrained firms in general have a higher demand for trade credit than unconstrained 
firms. £1 increase in stock of micro firms that is constraint increase £0.81 in trade 
credit demand and it is compared to £0.62 for those unconstraint. For small sized firms, 
£1 increase in stock can increase £0.805 in trade credit demand of constrained firms 
and it is compared to only £0.338 for unconstrained firms. Medium sized constrained 
firms have £0.63 increase in demand for trade credit for every £1 increase in stocks, 
whereas unconstrained firms have £0.12 increase in trade credit demand for every £1 
increase in stock.  
Both the results on the trade credit and inventory have confirmed that the hypothesis 
5, that the demand of the UK’s SMEs for trade credit increases when it has more 
outstanding in the account receivable and inventory level.   
d. Internal generated cash flow 
The coefficients of internal generated cash flow have negative significant effect on 
trade credit demand of small sized firms that are borrowing constraint but positive 
significant for those unconstraint. This indicates that small sized firms that are 
borrowing constraint have a lower demand for trade credit when they have more 
internal generated cash flow, whereas those unconstraint have lower demand for trade 
credit even when they have lower level of internal cash flow. This suggests that trade 
credit is an important source of external fund for constrained firms.  Small firms that 
are borrowing constraint reduce trade credit demand by £0.014 for every £1 increase 
in internal generated cash flow, while those unconstraint reduce trade credit demand 
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by £0.85 for every £1 decrease in internal generated cash flow. A positive effect of 
internal generated cash flow on trade credit demand is also found on both borrowing 
constraint and unconstraint of micro sized firms. Medium sized firms have more 
demand for trade credit when they have lower internal generated cash flow and the 
effect is much stronger for constrained firms than those unconstrained. Medium firms 
that are borrowing constrained reduce £0.94 demand for bank credit for every £1 
increase in internal generated cash flow, and this is compared to only £0.00004 for 
those unconstrained.  
Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 7 for medium 
firms regardless of whether it is constraint or unconstraint, and confirm for small firms 
borrowing constraint, that their demand for trade credit increases when it has lower 
level of internal generated cash flow.  
e. Bank credit 
The coefficients of bank credit are negative significant for small firms both constraint 
and unconstraint but the effect is higher for those borrowing constraint than 
unconstraint, indicating that bank credit is a significant source of fund substitute for 
trade credit for small sized firms both constraint or unconstraint. The result also show 
that bank credit is also an important source of funds substitute for trade credit for 
medium firms that are constraint and micro firms that are unconstraint. However, it 
shows a positive coefficient of bank credit for micro constrained firms and medium 
unconstrained firms, indicating a higher demand for trade credit when they have more 
bank credit obtained.  
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Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 9 for small firms, 
and medium firms that are constraints and micro firms that are unconstraint, that the 
demand for trade credit increases when it has lower level of bank credit outstanding.   
f. MCI 
The coefficients of MCI have positive effect on trade credit demand for micro, small, 
and medium firms regardless of whether they are constraint or unconstraint, indicating 
that firms use more trade credit as a source of funds during a tighten monetary 
condition. The impact of monetary condition on trade credit demand is significant for 
micro sized firms than small and medium sized firms.  
There should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 11 for micro sized firms 
that the demand for trade credit increases during monetary condition is tightening. 
However, it should not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 11 for small 
and medium sized firms.   
g. Quantitative easing 
A positive coefficient of quantitative easing indicates firms have stronger demand for 
trade credit when there is a positive intervention by the central bank to inject more 
money into the market, whereas a negative coefficient indicates firms have stronger 
demand for trade credit when the central bank reduces such intervention. Medium 
sized firms have stronger demand for trade credit when the central bank reduce the 
intervention to purchase gilts from non-bank sector and the effect is stronger if it is 
borrowing unconstraint.  
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Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 13 for micro 
sized firms that the demand for trade credit increases when the quantitative easing is 
introduced. 
6.5.2 Trade Debtors: Who Offers Credit 
Table 6.2 in the next page shows the estimated parameters of the trade debtors model.  
a. Firm risk 
The coefficients of current ratio have a positive effect on trade credit offered to 
business customers for unconstraint firms in the sample, indicating that firms that are 
unconstraint tend to offer more inter-firm credit when they have stronger ability to pay 
back short-term debt. In contrast, micro and medium firms that are borrowing 
constraints tend to offer more (less) inter-firm credit even they have weaker (stronger) 
ability to pay short-term debt. However, this is contrasted to small sized firms which 
tend to offer more inter-firm credit if they have higher ability to payback short-term 
debt, regardless of whether they are borrowing constraint or unconstraint.  
Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 2 for micro sized 
and medium sized firms that are borrowing constraints that the willingness to extend 
trade credit to business customers increases when it has a lower risk. 
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Table 6.2 Estimated Coefficients of the Trade Debtors Model 
Variables Micro firm Small firm Medium firm 
Borrowing constrained    
Constant  0.3042 (161.10)*  0.3168 (6.77)*  1.2095 (3.05)* 
Trade creditors/assets  0.0024 (100.20)*  0.6254 (886.03)*  1.0397 (599.75)* 
Stocks/assets  0.0015 (11.61)* -0.4421 (-470.39)* -0.8742 (-205.54)* 
Cash flow/assets -1.01e-06 (-0.20)  0.0081 (86.10)*  1.2299 (55.43)* 
Bank credit/assets  0.0001 (6.35)*  0.1391 (164.63)*  0.5495 (133.71)* 
Working capital need/assets 5.32e-06 (1.43)  0.1610 (138.08)*  0.4311 (90.20)* 
Current ratio -0.0019 (-59.23)*  0.0008 (3.67)* -0.0071 (-11.04)* 
MCI -0.0007 (-43.13)* -0.0013 (-3.17)* -0.0110 (-3.14)* 
QE -0.1223 (-22.82)* -0.3722 (-2.86)*  0.1758 (0.19) 
    
Borrowing unconstrained    
Constant  0.3273 (28.97)*  0.2084 (23.63)*  0.3077 (13.21)* 
Trade creditors/assets  0.4654 (1017.09)*  0.0052 (40.05)*  0.0350 (51.93)* 
Stocks/assets -0.0762 (-44.66)*  0.0127 (37.56)* -0.0099 (-3.15)* 
Cash flow/assets  0.0005 (14.29)* -0.0040 (-32.96)*  0.0110 (24.00)* 
Bank credit/assets  0.0043 (40.33)*  0.0217 (96.52)*  0.0652 (232.16)* 
Working capital needs/assets  0.1441 (374.66)*  0.0041 (37.61)* -0.0111 (-59.57)* 
Current ratio  0.0004 (3.31)*  0.0002 (6.84)*  0.00002 (1.25) 
MCI -0.0008 (-7.74)* -0.0003 (-4.08)* -0.0003 (-1.44) 
QE -0.3905 (-12.25)* -0.0802 (-3.24)* -0.0361 (-0.56) 
This table shows the differences in the behaviour of trade debtors (i.e., the willingness to offer 
inter-firm credit) between borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms. The dependent variable 
is the trade debtors, i.e., accounts receivable. * denotes the coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
t-value are reported in parenthesis. The firms in the sample are classified into micro, small, and 
medium sized. Micro sized firms have total assets less than £316,000; small sized firms have total 
assets less than £3.26 million; medium sized firms have total assets less than £12.9 million.  
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The coefficients of working capital needs have positive significant effect on micro and 
small firms both borrowing constraint and unconstraint, but not significant for micro 
firms that are borrowing constraints. This indicates that they tend to offer more inter-
firm credit when they have higher need for working capital, i.e., current assets. For 
medium sized firms, those borrowing constraints tend to offer more inter-firm credit 
but those borrowing unconstraint tend to offer less when they have higher need for 
working capital.  
Therefore, it has not enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 4 that the willingness 
of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business customers increases when the 
firm has less need for working capital.   
b. Maturity of the firm’s assets 
For micro sized firms that are borrowing constraint, the coefficient of stocks has a 
positive significant effect on trade credit extended to customers, but the coefficient is 
negative significant for those unconstraint. This indicates micro sized firms that are 
borrowing constraint increase their trade credit extended to customers when they have 
higher stocks level as a measure of short-term assets but those unconstraint tend to 
extend more inter-firm credit when they have lower level of stocks. This is contrasted 
to small firms that are borrowing constraint have a negative effect while those 
borrowing unconstraint have a positive effect. Medium firms have negative effect of 
stocks on trade credit extend to customers but stronger effect for borrowing constraint 
than unconstraint.  
The coefficients of trade creditors have significant positive effect on the trade debtors 
for all micro, small, and medium firms, and the effect is stronger for micro that are 
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unconstraint than those constraints; small firms that are constraint than unconstraint; 
and medium firms that are constraint than unconstraint. This indicates that micro sized 
firms that are unconstraint willing to provide credit to business customers than those 
constraint. Micro sized firms that are unconstraint increase the amount of trade credit 
extended by £0.4654 for every £1 increase in trade credit demand, but compared to 
only £0.0024 for micro firms that are constraint. For small sized firms, £1 increase in 
trade credit demand increase £0.625 trade credit extended to customers if they are 
borrowing constraint but only increase by £0.005 if they are unconstraint. For medium 
sized firms, £1 increase in the trade credit received by those borrowing constraint 
increase £1.04 trade credit extended to their business customers and this is compared 
to only £0.035 for those unconstraint. 
Therefore, it does not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 6 for all the 
SMEs groups in the sample.    
c. Internal generated cash flow 
The coefficients of internal generated cash flow have a negative effect on trade debtors 
for micro firms that are borrowing constraint but a positive effect for those 
unconstraint, indicating that micro firms that are borrowing constraint offer more 
inter-firm credit even when they have less internal funds generated but those 
unconstraint tend to offer more inter-firm credit when they are able to generate more 
internal funds. This is contrasted to small firms that are borrowing constraint tend to 
offer more inter-firm credit when they generate more internal funds and those 
unconstraint tend to offer more inter-firm credit even when they have lower internal 
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funds. Medium firms that are borrowing constraint tend to offer more inter-firm credit 
than those unconstraint when they have more internal funds.  
Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 8 for medium 
sized firms that the willingness to extend trade credit to business customers increases 
when it has a higher level of internal generated cash flow. However, it should not have 
enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis for micro firms that are constraints and 
small firms that are unconstraint.  
d. Bank credit 
The coefficients of bank credit have significant positive effect on trade debtors 
regardless of their size and borrowing constraint or unconstraint, indicating that all 
firms tend to offer more inter-firm credit when they access to more bank credit and 
the extent varies with whether they are borrowing constraint or unconstraint. For micro 
sized firms, £1 increase in bank credit of those borrowing unconstraint increases 
£0.004 inter-credit offer to customers and compared to only £0.0001 for those 
constraint. For small firms, £1 increase in bank credit of those are borrowing constraint 
tend to offer £0.14 more inter-firm credit and those unconstraint increase £0.02 more 
inter-firm credit. The effect of bank credit is greater for medium firms that are 
borrowing constraint, which offer £0.55 more inter-firm credit for every £1 increase 
in bank credit while those unconstraint only offer £0.065 more inter-firm credit.  
Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 10 that the 
willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business customers increases 
when it has a higher level of bank credit outstanding. 
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e. MCI 
The coefficients of MCI have negative significant effect on trade credit offered to 
business customers but the effect is not significant for medium firms that are 
borrowing unconstraint, indicating that firms tend to extend less credit to business 
customers during a tighten monetary condition and extend more during loosen 
monetary condition.  
Therefore, it should have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 12 that the 
willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business customers increases 
when the monetary condition is loosening.  
f. Quantitative easing 
The coefficients of quantitative easing have significant negative effect on trade debtors 
but a positive effect for medium firms that are borrowing constraint. This indicates 
that firms in general regardless of constraint or unconstraint tend to reduce inter-firm 
credit to business customers when the central bank injects more money into the market 
by purchasing gilts from non-bank sector. However, medium sized firms that are 
borrowing constraint tend to offer more inter-firm credit when the central bank 
purchased more gilts from the non-bank sector. The coefficients of quantitative easing 
are -0.39, -0.08, and -0.036 for micro, small, and medium sized firms that are 
borrowing unconstraint, respectively, which suggest that every 1-unit increase in the 
central bank’s balance sheet to GDP will reduce £0.39 trade credit extended to 
customers for micro firms that are borrowing unconstraint, £0.08 and £0.036 for small 
and medium firms that are borrowing unconstraint, respectively. This is contrasted to 
micro and small sized firms that are borrowing constraint every 1-unit increase in the 
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central bank’s balance sheet to GDP increase inter-firm credit offered to customers by 
£0.12 and £0.37, respectively, but medium firms that are borrowing constraint tend to 
reduce offering inter-firm credit by £0.176.  
Therefore, it should not have enough evidence to confirm the hypothesis 14 that the 
willingness of the UK’s SMEs to extend trade credit to business customers increases 
when the quantitative easing is introduced. 
6.5.3 Hausman Test to Confirm the Fixed Effect Model 
This subsection reports the Hausman test to confirm the use of fixed effect model for 
the trade creditors and trade debtors equations. Table 6.3 to 6.10 shows the results of 
relevant Hausman test. All the p-values = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect should 
be used to estimate the trade creditors and trade debtors equation.  
Table 6.3 Hausman Test for Trade Creditors Model of Micro Constrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade debtors/assets 2.1199 2.0519 0.0680 0.0099 
Stocks/assets 0.8099 0.8112 -0.0013 0.0011 
Internal cashflow/assets 0.0236 0.0236 -0.00004 0.00007 
Bank credit/assets 0.0364 0.0398 -0.0034 0.0002 
Working capital need/assets -0.0205 -0.0203 -0.0002 0.00005 
Current ratio 0.0091 -0.0144 0.0052 0.0004 
MCI 0.0031 0.0044 -0.0013 0.0001 
QE 1.0042 1.0536 -0.0494 0.0258 
chi2(8) = 552.18, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000    
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade creditor model of borrowing constrained 
firms of micro size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the 
model. The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
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Table 6.4 Hausman Test for Trade Creditors Model of Micro Unconstrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade debtors/assets 0.9401 0.9298 0.0102 0.0004 
Stocks/assets 0.6192 0.6933 -0.0741 0.0013 
Internal cashflow/assets 0.00002 -0.00007 0.00009 0.00002 
Bank credit/assets -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0004 0.00009 
Working capital need/assets -0.3118 -0.3044 -0.0074 0.0003 
Current ratio 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0005 0.00008 
MCI 0.0008 0.0011 -0.0003 0.00004 
QE 0.3598 0.3873 -0.0274 0.0094 
chi2(8) = 4646.93, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000   
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade creditor model of unconstrained firms of 
micro size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the model. 
The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
 
 
Table 6.5 Hausman Test for Trade Debtors Model of Micro Constrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade creditors/assets 0.0024 0.0024 -0.00001 9.99e-06 
Stocks/assets 0.0015 0.0004 0.0011 0.00004 
Internal cashflow/assets -1.01e-06 -0.00001 0.00001 2.34e-06 
Bank credit/assets 0.0001 -0.0001 0.00002 7.48e-06 
Working capital need/assets 5.32e-06 0.00002 -0.00001 1.70e-06 
Current ratio -0.0019 -0.0027 0.0008 0.00001 
MCI -0.0007 -0.0008 0.00008 4.99e-06 
QE -0.1223 -0.1335 0.0112 0.0011 
chi2(8) = 5479.29, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000   
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade debtor model of constrained firms of 
micro size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the model. 
The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
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Table 6.6 Hausman Test for Trade Creditors Model of Small Constrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade debtors/assets 0.7977 0.8209 -0.0233 0.0004 
Stocks/assets 0.8052 0.7973 0.0079 0.0002 
Internal cashflow/assets -0.0141 -0.0131 -0.0010 0.00003 
Bank credit/assets -0.1672 -0.0656 -0.1016 0.0007 
Working capital need/assets -0.3272 -0.4892 0.1620 0.0009 
Current ratio -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0006 0.00009 
MCI 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0008 0.0001 
QE -0.1527 -0.0605 -0.0922 0.0200 
chi2(8) = 41779.74, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade creditor model of borrowing constrained 
firms of small size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the 
model. The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
 
 
Table 6.7 Hausman Test for Trade Debtors Model of Small Constrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade creditors/assets 0.6254 0.6341 -0.0087 0.0003 
Stocks/assets -0.4421 -0.4466 0.0045 0.0004 
Internal cashflow/assets 0.0081 0.0077 0.0004 0.00003 
Bank credit/assets 0.1391 0.0628 0.0764 0.0006 
Working capital need/assets 0.1610 0.2867 -0.1257 0.0008 
Current ratio 0.0008 0.0002 0.0007 0.00008 
MCI -0.0013 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0001 
QE -0.3722 -0.4173 0.0451 0.0231 
chi2(8) = 28737.87, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade debtor model of constrained firms of 
small size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the model. 
The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
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Table 6.8 Hausman Test for Trade Creditors Model of Medium Constrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade debtors/assets 0.7571 0.7978 0.0406 0.0007 
Stocks/assets 0.6279 0.1384 0.4895 0.0030 
Internal cashflow/assets -0.9444 -0.0215 -0.9229 0.0187 
Bank credit/assets -0.3644 -0.0334 -0.3310 0.0035 
Working capital need/assets -0.3366 -0.1581 -0.1784 0.0037 
Current ratio -0.0051 0.0014 0.0037 0.0003 
MCI 0.0074 0.0044 0.0030 0.0015 
QE -0.2541 -0.2964 0.0423 . 
chi2(8) = 117515.01, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade creditor model of borrowing constrained 
firms of medium size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for 
the model. The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
 
 
Table 6.9 Hausman Test for Trade Creditors Model of Medium Unconstrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade debtors/assets 0.8008 0.5259 0.2749 0.0149 
Stocks/assets 0.1203 0.8888 -0.7686 0.0135 
Internal cashflow/assets -0.00004 -0.0102 0.0102 . 
Bank credit/assets 0.1549 0.1629 -0.0080 0.0011 
Working capital need/assets 0.0083 -0.0009 0.0084 0.0001 
Current ratio -5.76e-06 -1.21e-06 -4.55e-06 . 
MCI 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 . 
QE -1.0019 -0.9420 -0.0599 . 
chi2(8) = 21961.23, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade creditor model of unconstrained firms of 
medium size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the model. 
The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
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Table 6.10 Hausman Test for Trade Debtors Model of Medium Constrained 
                Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B)  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Trade creditors/assets 1.0397 1.0187 0.0209 0.0011 
Stocks/assets -0.8742 -0.1938 -0.6804 0.0033 
Internal cashflow/assets 1.2299 0.0127 1.2172 0.0219 
Bank credit/assets 0.5496 0.0690 0.4806 0.0039 
Working capital need/assets 0.4311 0.1997 0.2313 0.0043 
Current ratio -0.0071 -0.0021 -0.0049 0.0004 
MCI -0.0110 -0.0092 -0.0018 0.0019 
QE 0.1758 -0.0869 0.2628 . 
chi2(8) = 56657.63, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
This table shows the result of Hausman test for the trade debtor model of constrained firms of 
medium size. The Hausman test is used to test if the fixed effect model is appropriate for the model. 
The p-value = 0.0000, confirming that fixed effect model should be used.  
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6.6 Discussion of the Estimated Results 
After reporting the results of the estimated coefficients of both the trade credit demand 
and trade debtors equations, it is now necessary to provide a discussion of the results. 
This is to discuss whether the findings of the empirical study are consistent with the 
theories and findings of the prior literature.  
We first discuss the trade credit demand between borrowing constrained and 
unconstrained. The amount of credit from suppliers of a firm in the sample increase 
along with the amount of trade credit given to customers, regardless of whether they 
are borrowing constrained and unconstrained. The higher the level of their stocks 
outstanding, the higher the both constrained and unconstrained firms of micro, small, 
and medium sized of their trade credit outstanding, suggesting that they are depending 
on trade credit on their stocks. Moreover, the result also shows that the internal 
generated cash flows and bank credit are important substitute for constrained firms 
than those unconstrained. This is quite consistent with both the theories and empirical 
studies in the prior literature, including Atanasova and Wilson (2004). Indeed, the 
substitution theory suggests that bank credit is an important substitutable funds for 
trade credit. When firms have restricted access to the bank credit, firms are likely to 
use more trade credit as an external funds substitute for bank credit. However, the 
trade credit demand model found that this is not the case for medium unconstrained 
firms which they have higher demand for trade credit even when they have accessed 
to more bank credit.  
The results of the trade credit demand model also found that micro and small sized 
firms have higher demand for trade credit when they have lower working capital needs 
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and the effect is stronger for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. This suggests 
that working capital needs may unable to explain the trade credit behaviour for micro 
and small sized firms.  
The trade credit demand model also found that small unconstrained firms and medium 
constrained firms have stronger demand for trade credit when they have greater ability 
to repay short-term debts. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction of 
the credit risk. Higher credit risk should have less access to trade credit.  
A more important finding of this trade credit demand is that the monetary condition 
has a positive impact on the trade credit demand, regardless of whether the firms are 
constrained or unconstrained. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction, to 
certain extent, that firms use more trade credit during a tighten monetary condition, 
when the bank credit availability are affected by the higher interest rate. However, this 
is indifferent for borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms. In addition, the 
impact of monetary condition on trade credit demand is stronger for micro firms than 
small firms.  
On the quantitative easing, the trade credit demand model found that medium sized 
firms have stronger demand for trade credit when the central bank reduce the 
intervention to purchase gilts from non-bank sector and the effect is stronger if it is 
borrowing unconstraint. In other words, medium sized firms should have lower 
demand for trade credit when the quantitative easing increase the reserves and deposit 
on the bank side. This is quite consistent with the theoretical prediction because when 
there are intervention on the banks’ balance sheet, bank credit should be more 
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available to the firms and that reduce their demand and dependence on the trade credit 
to support their working capital needs.  
After that, we consider the willingness of firms to extend credit. First, the result shows 
that unconstrained firms of small and medium sized are willing to extend more trade 
credit to other firms when they have more internal generated cash flow and they have 
access to more bank credit. This is quite consistent with the redistribution theory of 
trade credit, which suggests that firms that have access to more bank loans will 
distribute their bank credit obtained to others through inter-firm credit. However, the 
result shows that small and medium sized firms that are borrowing constrained are 
more willing to extend more trade credit to other firms than those unconstrained. In 
addition, micro firms that are borrowing constraint offer more inter-firm credit even 
when they have less internal funds generated but those unconstraint tend to offer more 
inter-firm credit when they are able to generate more internal funds. Although this is 
not consistent with the theoretical prediction, but it may making sense that borrowing 
constrained firms are looking to generate more revenue and therefore willing to extend 
more credit by offering sales at later payment. This is further confirmed by the finding 
that micro and small sized firms tend to offer more inter-firm credit when they have 
higher need for working capital. However, this is not the case for medium firms that 
are borrowing unconstrained. Medium firms that are borrowing unconstrained tend to 
offer less credit when they have higher needs for working capital.  
This thesis also found that small firms that are unconstraint tend to offer more inter-
firm credit when they have stronger ability to pay back short-term debt. This is quite 
making sense since firms with higher ability to pay back short-term debt are able offer 
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more trade credit. Otherwise, by delaying the payment received on the sales, they 
might have liquidity problem unable to meet the maturity of short-term liabilities. 
However, the results show that this is not the case for micro and medium firms.  
In respect to the impact of monetary condition, the result show that firms tend to 
extend less trade credit during a tighten monetary condition and extend more credit 
during loosen monetary condition. This is quite making sense as firms should have 
restricted in the access to bank credit during tighten monetary condition due to a higher 
interest rate and therefore unwilling to offer more trade credit to their business 
customers. Instead, during a loosen monetary condition, bank credit are cheaper and 
therefore easier access to bank credit and therefore firms are more willing to offer 
more credit. In respect to the quantitative easing, it is quite surprising to see the result 
that finds that firms tend to unwilling to offer inter-firm credit when there is invention 
by the central banks to increase the reserves and deposit on the banks’ balance sheet.  
6.7 Summary  
This chapter aims to estimate if borrowing constrained firms use bank credit as a 
source of funds substitute for bank credit by comparing the trade credit demand 
between constrained and unconstrained firms. The results generally confirm that 
borrowing constrained firms use more bank credit than unconstrained firms for small 
and medium size. Moreover, this chapter also estimate the willingness of firms to offer 
trade credit to other firms. The results generally show that borrowing unconstrained 
firms extend more credit to other firms when they have access to bank credit. This is 
quite consistent with the redistribution theory of trade credit, which suggests that 
 
Chapter 6: Borrowing Constraints and the Trade Credit in the UK                                             209 
 
 
 
unconstrained firms will redistribute their credit obtained from bank loans to other 
firms through offering inter-firm credit. However, the effect is not as much as those 
of borrowing constrained. In other words, this appear to indicate that borrowing 
constrained firms are more willing to redistribute the amount of bank loans they have 
received, to the extent that they are not fully constrained, to other firms than those 
unconstrained. This might be driven by the idea that borrowing constrained firms 
strive for obtaining more revenue by allowing more sales on account.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion                                                                                                                  210 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
7.1 Summary  
The huge losses in the financial sector has raised the issues of credit crunch in the UK. 
The credit crunch has implications on the ability of SMEs in the UK in access to the 
bank credit, which is an important source of finance to them. In response to the 
intensified financial crisis, the Bank of England’s (BoE) Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) has implemented loosening monetary policy, including interest rate cut close 
to zero bound and large scale asset purchases known as quantitative easing to inject 
money directly into the economy in order to boost spending and investment activities. 
This raise questions about the effectiveness of these measures of monetary policy to 
steer the economy. Inspired by these issues in the UK economy, this thesis aims to 
examine the extent to which the SMEs in the UK face credit rationing and to examine 
the impact of monetary policy and quantitative easing on the corporate borrowing. 
Moreover, this thesis also attempts to examine how the credit rationed firms raise 
funds in order to support the working capital and business operations, whether they 
have used trade credit as a source of funds substitute for bank credit. In addition, this 
thesis also examines the willingness of firms to extend trade credit. The scope of this 
thesis is not limited to the recent financial crisis, but the overall borrowing conditions 
of the SMEs in the UK between 1991 and 2010, and to review the role of banks play 
in the monetary policy transmission.  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion                                                                                                                  211 
 
 
 
The credit rationing refers to a situation in which a borrower desires to obtain a specific 
amount of bank loan but the bank reject to supply, at least not the full amount, despite 
or because the borrower offer to pay higher interest rate, even if the bank has excessive 
loanable supply. The existence of credit rationing can be explained by the credit 
market imperfection theory, which suggests that every corporate borrower is different 
in terms of their creditworthiness and financial positions. Bank lenders concern about 
the risk and return and they are generally unable to predict the creditworthiness of 
corporate borrowers due to the asymmetric information between them. The problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard have prevented bank lenders from fulfilling the 
loan requirement of corporate borrowers when the interest charged is unable to cover 
the risks involved in loan contract, and therefore credit rationing.  
In respect to transmission mechanism of conventional monetary policy, the credit view 
enhances the money view in explaining the impact of interest rate on corporate 
borrowing through bank credit. There are two channels of monetary policy 
transmission from the credit view: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending 
channel. The balance sheet channel works in a way that rising interest rates following 
a tightening monetary policy reduces firms’ net worth and cash flows, thus a negative 
impact on firms’ financial health. This increases loan premium that banks have to 
charge. The bank lending channel emphasises the amplification and propagation 
effects that generated by the banking sector, mainly through the impact of monetary 
policy on banks’ balance sheet that influence the availability of loanable supply to 
their borrowers. From the view of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission, 
in addition to the financial characteristics of corporate borrowers, any macroeconomic 
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shock to the supply of bank loans would also suggested that may affect the cost and 
availability of bank loans to the corporate sector. 
In respect to the quantitative easing, its bank lending channel of transmission 
mechanism works in a way that banking sector would generate additional reserves at 
BoE and a corresponding increase in customer deposits when assets are purchased 
from non-banks through intermediate transaction. The additional reserves mean that 
banks’ holdings of liquid assets will have increased, which might make banks more 
willing to extend illiquid loans. However, it is expected that the quantitative easaing 
only a limited effect on corporate borrowing as it is designed to target at the asset 
purchases from non-bank companies.  
In order to estimate the extent of credit rationing and to examine the impact of 
monetary policy and quantitative easing on the corporate borrowing, this thesis uses 
the disequilibrium model. The disequilibrium model, which comprises of a demand 
and a supply equation, each containing the determinants of demand and supply of bank 
credit, respectively. The demand equation and the supply equation are used to estimate 
the firms’ quantity of loan demand and loan supply. The credit rationed firms are those 
with the quantity of loan demand exceeds the quantity of loan supply. By using the 
disequilibrium model to estimate credit rationing, it is able to capture and to detangle 
the factors affecting the demand and supply of bank loans. 
The estimated results of demand equation in the disequilibrium model show that the 
demand for bank loans of firms are significantly determined by its working capital and 
investment needs, internal generated cash flow, trade credit, and firm size. For small 
and medium sized firms, their demand for bank loans increase when they have stronger 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion                                                                                                                  213 
 
 
 
needs of working capital and investment, lower level of internal generated cash flow 
and trade credit obtained from suppliers, and higher level of assets as a measure of 
firm size. This is compared to micro sized firms in the sample which their demand for 
bank loans increase when they have greater internal generated cash flow and trade 
credit, lower needs of working capital but stronger needs of long-term investment, and 
higher level of assets as a measure of firm size. 
The results of the disequilibrium model of this thesis provides substantial evidence 
suggesting that internal generated cash flow and trade credit are two important sources 
of funds that UK’s SMEs use to substitute for bank credit. The result of internal 
generated cash flow is consistent with the prediction of pecking order theory which 
suggests that companies prefer using internal funds as it is risk free and costless before 
seeking external finance, i.e., bank loans (Cotei and Farhat, 2009). This is also 
consistent with the results of empirical study conducted by Atanasova and Wilson 
(2004), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2008), and Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), Soana et al 
(2015), which found that internal funds is important substitute for bank loans and firms 
have greater demand for bank loans if they have lower level of internal funds. 
However, it is surprising to see that the coefficient of internal cash flow is positively 
significant to bank credit for micro sized firms, which can be interpreted as that micro 
sized firms have lower demand for bank loans even they generated less internal cash 
flow. This interpretation can be further confirmed by comparing the descriptive 
statistics between constrained and unconstrained firms. The result shows that the 
constrained firms generally have significant lower amount of internal cash flow than 
unconstrained firms and micro firms that are borrowing constraint on average even 
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have a negative internal cash flow. This may be able to explain that micro sized firms 
tend not want to borrow more money from banks to invest in its business that does not 
generate desirable returns. 
This thesis also find evidence suggesting that bank credit is one of the major sources 
of corporate finance to considered by SMEs in the UK to fund working capital and 
investment. This also confirms the theory of credit market imperfection that suggest 
the bank credit is the key external source of finance for SMEs. However, the result 
shows it is not the case for micro sized firms in the sample and their demand for bank 
loans increase (decrease) when they have lower (higher) needs of working capital but 
stronger needs (lower) needs for long-term investment, and a higher (lower) level of 
internal generated cash flow. It might be making sense if micro sized firms with a high 
level of internal cash flow (i.e., a measure of profitability) might want to expand 
businesses by obtaining more finance from bank loans, further evidenced by greater 
needs for long-term investment.  
On the other hand, the estimated results of the loan supply in the disequilibrium model 
show that the supply of bank loans can be significantly determined by current ratio as 
a measure of risk, firm size, collateral assets, the extent of trade creditors, and if the 
firm belongs to manufacturing industry, but not significantly determined by firm age, 
monetary condition, and quantitative easing. The results of the disequilibrium model 
provide substantial evidence confirming that the more bank credit are available for 
larger firms with more collateral assets. This also confirms the role of collateral assets 
play in mitigating the adverse selection and moral hazard problem stemming from 
informational asymmetry between borrowers and banks. This finding is consistent 
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with Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Berger et al. 2011; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 
2009; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bandt et al., 2008.  
It has recognised the credit crunch emerged in the financial crisis and that restricted 
the SMEs in the access of bank credit. During credit crunch period, there is a sudden 
reduction in the general availability of bank loans or sudden tightening of the 
conditions required for borrowers to acquire loan from banks. During the credit crunch 
period, a large number of borrowers may not able to obtain the desired quantity of 
bank credit independently of the interest rates due to the tighten credit policy. Previous 
studies also found survey evidence of more SMEs in the UK faced loan rejection 
during the financial crisis compared to the prior period. The result of the 
disequilibrium model finds that the proportion of medium firms in the sample are 
borrowing constraint is significantly higher in 2008 than previous years. This provides 
evidence confirming that corporate borrowing of medium firms was affected by the 
credit crunch emerged in the recent financial crisis. However, the result of the 
disequilibrium model finds no substantial evidence of higher proportion of micro and 
small firms faced borrowing constraint during the financial crisis. In addition, the 
result of the disequilibrium model confirms that lower proportion of medium firms in 
general are borrowing constraint than the micro and small firms.  
In terms of the impact of monetary policy on the availability of bank loans for the 
SMEs in the UK, this thesis estimated the monetary condition index (MCI) as an 
indicator of the monetary condition in the UK. The MCI is included in the supply 
equation in order to estimate the impact of monetary policy on the corporate borrowing. 
The results of the disequilibrium model confirm the credit channel of monetary policy 
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transmission. Firms have more access to bank credit when the monetary condition is 
loosening and firms have less access to bank credit when the monetary condition is 
tightening. Similarly, a measure of quantitative easing is included in the supply 
equation to examine the impact of quantitative easing on the bank credit availability. 
However, this thesis finds a little effect of quantitative easing on the bank credit. 
Nonetheless, it meets the prediction that the quantitative easing works through the 
portfolio rebalancing channel rather than through bank credit channel.  
The results of the trade credit model find that borrowing constrained firms use more 
bank credit than unconstrained firms for small and medium size. Moreover, this thesis 
also estimates the willingness of firms to offer trade credit to other firms. The results 
generally show that borrowing unconstrained firms extend more credit to other firms 
when they have access to bank credit. This is quite consistent with the redistribution 
theory of trade credit, which suggests that unconstrained firms will redistribute their 
credit obtained from bank loans to other firms through offering inter-firm credit. 
However, the effect is not as much as those of borrowing constrained. In other words, 
this appear to indicate that borrowing constrained firms are more willing to redistribute 
the amount of bank loans they have received, to the extent that they are not fully 
constrained, to other firms than those unconstrained. This might be driven by the idea 
that borrowing constrained firms strive for obtaining more revenue by allowing more 
sales on account.  
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7.2 Limitations and Direction for Future Research 
There are several limitations that can be identified in this thesis. The first limitation is 
about the estimation of the monetary condition index (MCI). The key to the estimation 
of the MCI is the weights of interest rate and exchange rate. There are several studies 
in the literature have suggested the time varying aspect of the MCI due to the fact that 
the weights are depending on the average effect of the interest rate and exchange rate 
on the GDP output over the sample period. In this thesis, it is assumed that the time 
varying effect has been incorporated into the weights of interest rate and exchange rate 
by using the VAR model to estimate the weights. The VAR model takes into account 
the shocks of interest rate and exchange rate on the economic output over two years 
period. It is therefore argued that the VAR has taken into the overall effect of the 
interest rate and exchange rate over the 20 years period rather than on each year.  
The second limitation is about the estimation of the disequilibrium model. Most 
previous studies that examined the credit rationing using the disequilibrium model 
adopted the maximum likelihood estimation method as indicated by Maddala and 
Nelson (1974). However, due to the problems encountered in the statistical coding, it 
was not able to estimate the disequilibrium model using the maximum likelihood 
method. Nonetheless, it is still able to estimate the disequilibrium model using the 
three stage least square (3SLS).  
The third limitation is probably related to my personal health problem. I was diagnosed 
with nasopharyngeal cancer (NPC) in June 2014 and has received medical treatment 
in Singapore for half a year. The cancer has probably developed for more than a year 
because two very large tumours were found in my nose. I suffered very serious 
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headache and nose bleeding for more than a year. This has affected my research for 
this thesis. Around one and half year after the medical treatment, I have fully recovered 
from the cancer and returned to the university for my thesis. However, I still suffered 
some side effects, such as get tired and cold very easily due to a weak immune system 
as a result of the chemotherapy. I believed that these side effects have affected the 
quality of this thesis.  
If given opportunity for future research, I would improve the measure of monetary 
condition to include other financial effects, known as the financial condition index. 
Indeed, stocks in the stock prices and asset prices may also affect the bank credit 
market, in that it affect the balance sheet of both the corporate sector and the banking 
sector, and thus the credit channel.  
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